D C 

227 



C 




NAPOLEON • S CONCENT RATION ON THE 
iBHINS AND MAIN IN 1805. 

Prom Original Documents in the Archives 

of the French War Office. 

By 

Frederic Louis Huidekoper. 

\\ 

Journal of the Military Service Institu- 
tion for September-October, 1907, 

Pages 207-220. 



A 



DEfc 28^10 






SEPTEMBER 




#ff^ 



> i 





JOURNAL 

HE 

ilUTARY 
INSTITUTION 




1878 



1907 



mmmmmm 



THE ARMY A SCHOOL V? ARMY IN 
CUBA ^ MILITARY INTELLIGENCE V? 
JAPANESE INFANTRY ^ RIFLE IN 
AUSTRALASIA ^ FORTRESSES IN 
WAR ^ MARCHES IN TROPICS ^ RE= 
CRUIT AND RIFLE ^ NAPOLEON ON 
RHINE ^ RELIEF FOR INFANTRY V? 



TYPES AND TRADITIONS ^ COMMENT 



I GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N.Y. H 

%\< / ' FtFTY CENTS A COPY. THREE DOLLARS A YEAR. '' r 



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ARTISTIC and STANDARD: 



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Branches 

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Copyright, The Military Service Institution, 1907. Entered at N. Y. P. O. as second-class matter. 



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The Powder Used by Uncle Sam 

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Every man in the service should 
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Accept no substitute for Mennen's Borated Talcum Toilet Powder. There is no 
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Use 
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xiv 




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THE STUDEBAKER OPERA BUS 

The Opera Bus is a standby to the hostess and of utmost comfort and 
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The Studebaker Opera Bus is designed to afford plenty of seat-room, and 
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New York City — Studebaker Ems. Co. of 

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of California, Market and 10th Sts. 
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INCORPORATED 1900 



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THE JOURNAL. 

Brig. -Gen. Theo. F. Rodenbough, U. S. A., Editor 

AUTHORS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OPINIONS 
PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL 



"Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a Souldier perfect in the Art Military, how great 
soever his practical knowledge may be." — ("Observations on Military Affairs," by Gen. Monk, 
Duke of Albemarle — 1647.) 





CONTENTS FOR SEPTEMBER-OC 1 OBER, 1907. 



I. 

n. 
in. 

IV. 

v. 

VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 

IX. 

x. 

XI. 
XII. 



OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

THE ARMY IN CUBA. 

TRANSMISSION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. II. 

NOTES ON NEW JAPANESE INFANTRY TRAINING. 

RIFLE PRACTICE IN AUSTRALASIA. 

GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES IN WAR. (Trans.) 

PRACTICE MARCHES IN THE TROPICS. 

HOW TO INSTRUCT A RECRUIT TO SHOOT 



Capt. Hanna 143 

Col. Bullard 152 

Col. Scriven 158 

Capt. Low 182 

Maj. Brown 185 

Gen. Taylor 189 

Maj. Rockenbach 197 

Corporal Earry 202 



Mr. Huidekoper 206 

Col. Crane 221 

227 



256 




NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE RHINE. 

WANTED: RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY 

TYPES AND TRADITIONS OF THE OLD ARMY. 
"City Point to Appomattox with Gen. Grant." (111.) Gen. Morgan 

COMMENT AND CRITICISM. 

"A Consolidated Service Magazine?" (Gen. Woodruff) — "Trumpets and 
Bugles." (Lieut. Wieser) 

TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 
Some Ideas on Field Engineering — French Military Forces in Indo- 
China — German Colonial Troops and the Heliograph. 

MILITARY MISCELLANY. 
Burgoyne's Surrender — Antietam — French Army Artists — Thrifty 
Soldiers — Carnivorous Horses. 



REVIEWS AND EXCHANGES. 
Letters from George Washington — Law of Riot Duty — Fighting Polar 
Ices — Weights and Measures — Staff Officer's Scrap Book — Book Notes. 

ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
Editor's Bulletin — Forecast — Executive Council — Prizes. 



262 



275 



278 



285 



-<- 



Copyright, 1007, Military Service Institution — All rights reserved. 



S 



< .' 




There's nothing in the 
too delicate 
for 




JOURNAL 

OF 

THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION 



OF THE 

UNITED STATES. 



Q A»> (j> 



"I cannot help plead to my countrymen, at every opportunity, to cherish all that is 
manly and noble in the military profession, because Peace is enervating and no man is 
wise enough to foretell when soldiers may be in demand again." — General Sherman. 



Vol. XLI. 



SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1907. No. CXI.V1V. 




OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

By Captain MATTHEW E. HANNA, Third Cavalry. 

J T is not probable that the present ratio of the 
1 enlisted strength of the Regular Army to the 
whole population of the United States will soon 
be greatly increased. The prejudice against a 
large standing army that sprang into vigorous 
life in the forcing bed of colonial oppression has 
' taken such deep root in the minds of the people 
of this country during the century and a quarter 
in which it has been carefully nursed, that it will 
require a stronger wind than soon will blow to 
tear it from its bed. Those of us who have an intimate personal 
knowledge of the spirit that pervades the army know that it 
does not now in any way constitute a menace to the welfare of 
the country and would not were it increased many fold ; but it is 
useless for us to rant against this prejudice or attempt to break 
it down by mere disclaimer of its justice. On the contrary, wis- 
dom suggests that it be accepted as an existing national charac- 
teristic, a legacy passed down to us from the days of 1776, and 
inseparably connected with the oppressions, sufferings and sacri- 
fices of our forefathers. 

It is not too much, perhaps, to hope that time and overpower- 
ing circumstances may change all this, but it is as yet scarcely 
within the range of safe prophesy. The ever widening sphere of 
our national influence and activities may eventually compel the 
people of this country to risk, as the lesser of two evils, the 
danger they have been taught to see in a powerful permanent 



i 4 4 OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

military establishment. It may be, but God forbid, that our eyes- 
will not be opened until a foreign foe has turned the dogs of war 
loose on our shores and humiliated us with defeat. It is not 
probable, however, that an)' such dire calamity will overtake us ; 
when such an emergency does arise, Yankee pluck, luck, enter- 
prise, or whatever you may call it, will probably sooner or later 
be equal to the danger and triumph in the end. But at what 
stupendous cost of life and treasure. 

Which is the better; to maintain a military establishment: 
commensurate with the dangers that seem probable, with the at- 
tendant menace, real or fancied, to republican institutions, but, 
with the certainty that wars which might otherwise be waged will 
be avoided and that those which are waged will be quickly and 
victoriously terminated, or to place our confidence in hastily 
raised, untrained levies, with the increased probability of useless 
wars, the certainty of their being more prolonged, and the un- 
certainty of their final outcome ? These are two alternative prop- 
ositions concerning which we might speculate indefinitely and 
never reach an answer satisfactory to the whole American people. 
Who can tell what the future has in store for us ? The all-impell- 
ing force of circumstances may constrain us, however reluctantly, 
to abandon the policy of a century or two, and become a nation 
of soldiers. But that day appears still far away and we shall 
most probably have at least one more war before it dawns. Such 
preparations as can be made for that war in time of peace will, 
have to be made under conditions essentially as they exist to-day. 
The necessity for a navy and for seacoast defenses appeals, at 
spasmodic intervals, to the American people, and we may see 
those arms of the national defense increased from time to time. 
But not so with the cavalry, field-artillery and infantry. 

Accepting this as a logical deduction from the temperament 
of our people, the object of this paper is to suggest a plan by 
which our present little field-army of about 50,000 men may pre- 
pare the country for the strongest possible defense on the im- 
mediate outbreak of war. This plan does not attempt to work a 
miracle and place in the field an armed host suddenly raised, 
equipped, drilled and trained, and all wrought from nothing. It: 
merely proposes to take the conditions as they are, make the most: 
of them, and adapt them as far as possible to our needs. 

If war were to break out to-morrow, there would be im- 
mediately available for the defense of the main land of the United 
States that portion of the Regular Army not serving in Alaska or- 



OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 145 

the Insular possessions. This force might be expanded in a short 
time by regular enlistments to nearly double its peace-time 
strength. Our only remaining source from which to draw large 
numbers of men with some previous military training is the Or- 
ganized Militia. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the 
merits of this force ; it is sufficient to say that in the nation's ex- 
tremity we will be thankful for such organized bodies to draw 
upon for the first line of defense, and will only be sorry that 
their number is not greater. After the Regular Army and Or- 
ganized Militia have been mobilized, we must needs resort for 
additional forces to the Volunteer, without whom in any great 
and protracted war the country cannot be saved, but who, before 
he is at all fit to take the field, must have weeks and months of 
training. In any case the task of saving the country from an in- 
vading foe will fall upon the War Department ; and there also lies, 
the responsibility. 

How are we to perform the stupendous task of recruiting., 
equipping, training and mobilizing the hundreds of thousands of 
volunteers that will be needed in any great struggle, and what 
preparations can be made in time of peace, under existing condi- 
tions, for hastening the training of this large volunteer force? 
It is with the latter part of this question that I am here con- 
cerned. As suggested above, our immediately available first line 
probably will not exceed 75,000 men; a mere advance guard of 
the larger force that will be needed. At best, troops will be 
rushed to the front illy equipped for the serious task of war and 
with little or no instruction in the simplest duties of a soldier. 
Before a determined and aggressive enemy we will indeed be 
fortunate if such a war as we have here in mind does not open 
under a cloud of defeat and disaster which will hang over the 
country until experience under fire has made seasoned soldiers 
of some, and time has permitted us to make trained soldiers of 
others farther to the rear and away from the turmoil of the bat- 
tle-field. On all sides haste will be the watchword. The cry will 
be for volunteers, more volunteers, and yet more volunteers to 
sacrifice before the advancing foe, until time and experience swells 
our ranks with sufficient trained men to check and roll back the 
enemy. In this, the nation's hour of need, every trained soldier 
will be worth his weight in gold, for he will be able to teach fifty 
who are untrained. There will be no lack of volunteers ; the young 
men of our country can be depended upon to enlist by hundreds 
of thousands if the emergency so demands. But the need will 



146 OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

be for teachers ; for men who have at some previous time had suf- 
ficient military training t6 enable them to instruct others. The 
greater the number of such men scattered throughout the country 
when this emergency arises, the sooner may the raw volunteers 
be sent to the front with some semblance of military training. 

From whence will these men come? Certainly not from the 
enlisted or commissioned strength of the Regular Army in any 
great numbers, nor yet from the Organized Militia, for every man 
of these will have the work of four men to do at the front. The 
answer appears to be that they must be in every section of the 
country when war is declared, and it must be a part of our scheme 
of defense to place them there in time of peace. In other words, 
under the peculiar military system which we are compelled to 
continue in this country our Regular Army is above all things a 
school, and the more thoroughly all else can be subordinated to 
this essential idea in its administration, the more nearly will it 
come to fulfilling the difficult task imposed upon it. Every man 
that has served an enlistment in our army becomes a valuable 
military asset on the outbreak of war. Every such man is at 
once thought of as a possible instructor, and the greater the num- 
ber of such men scattered throughout the country, the sooner a 
volunteer force may be prepared for the field. Of course they will 
not all enlist or receive commissions, but this fact is still another 
argument why their number should be as great as it is possible 
to make it. 

Is the number of such men that are being sent abroad from the 
army yearly as great as it might be ? I believe not, and it is my 
purpose to suggest a method by which this number may be in- 
creased. The present enlisted strength of the army, exclusive 
of non-commissioned officers and certain special classes, is about 
40,000 men. I do not wish, nor have I the data at hand to en- 
able me to deal accurately with statistics, but it is safe to say 
that of this number about 5,000* reenlist yearly and approximate- 
ly 8,000 are discharged yearly. It is this latter number that we 
wish to increase. How is it to be done without materially im- 
pairing the efficiency of the regular establishment? The answer 
is by prohibiting reenlistments, except of non-commissioned of- 
ficers, whose reenlistment will be encouraged by increased 
pay, and by shortening the period of enlistment of privates to 
two years. 



*In the entire army there were 13,000 reenlistments in 1905, 6300 in 1904, and 6300 in 
1903. 



OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. i 47 

There are about 40,000 privates in the army as organized to- 
day. If one-half of this number is discharged yearly an army of 
1,000,000 men will be scattered throughout the country within 
five years. The majority of our recruits are young men but little 
more than twenty-one years of age, many of them less. Ten 
years after they have completed their single enlistment they will 
be in the very prime of their manhood. Fifteen years from the 
termination of such enlistment they are still in the flush of life, 
and at the end of twenty years they will not be so old but what 
their blood will quicken at the very thought of war. Ten years 
of such a system will place 200,000 trained soldiers in the coun- 
try, and each succeeding five years will add its increment of 
100,000 men. After from twenty to twenty-five years there will 
be from 400,000 to 500,000 men in the country, within the ages 
prescribed for our militia, with two years' training in the Regular 
Army, from whom we can expect assistance. 

Of course it is useless to attempt to say what part of these 
would volunteer, but make your own conjecture and put the per- 
centage very low, as low even as five per cent, and the number is 
still large when the special task for which these men are intended 
is kept in mind. Remember that they are not expected, in them- 
selves, to furnish the second line of our defense, but to become the 
instructors that are to assist in the training of the great mass of 
volunteers that we must ultimately rely upon in any great war. 

It may be objected to that a man will forget, in ten, fifteen or 
twenty years, on the farm or in the factory, the two years' in- 
struction he previously received in the army. True, he may not 
handle a gun with the same ease as when last on parade, he may 
not sit in the saddle with the same comfort as when he took a 
post prize for rough riding, and he may not shoot so well as when 
he made sharpshooter, but how much easier will it be for him to 
recover his expertness in these matters than for the raw recruit 
to learn them for the first time. But there is one thing he will 
learn in those two years, the essential characteristic of an army, 
that he will not forget in twenty years nor in a lifetime — disci- 
pline. 

Imagine yourself in command of a volunteer regiment, with 
many, if not the majority, of your officers as ignorant of the 
duties of a soldier as are the privates they command, beset by 
all the perplexing difficulties that such a situation would pre- 
sent, attempting to do in a month or two of feverish haste a 
task that is supposed to require two years of careful work with 



148 OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

the ablest assistance in time of peace. When in the midst of your 
trouble you discover that the roll of your regiment contains the 
names of a score or two of men who have served an enlistment 
in the Regular Army, you would not stop to ask any questions 
as to how old they are, or how long ago they served their en- 
listment, but you would put them to work, and, next after your- 
self, they would most probably become, for the time being, the 
most important persons in the regiment. 

How would such a change affect the efficiency of the army? 
Tt cannot be doubted that an army of old soldiers of ten to thirty 
years' service is far superior to one made up of young men in 
their first enlistment. In this statement there is no room for 
argument, and none will be attempted. But what is our duty to 
the country as an armed organization entrusted with the responsi- 
bility of preparing in time of peace for the nation's defense in 
time of war ? Is it to raise our small army to the highest possible 
state of efficiency without thought of the other hundreds of thou- 
sands that will be needed to support it? If so, then we want the 
old soldier of many enlistments. Of such men was our army 
composed in '98, and a more splendid lot of soldiers it would be 
difficult to imagine; man for man they probably had not their 
equal on the globe. But what was there behind this little army 
to support it ? With rare exceptions, nothing but untrained, un- 
disciplined rabble. The policy of encouraging reenlistments 
which made the creation of this little army possible, sacrificed all 
else to the one idea of the highest possible efficiency in the en- 
listed strength of the Regular Army, and completely neglected the 
no less important idea of so utilizing the regular establishment 
in time of peace as to insure a speedily trained second line of 
defense on the outbreak of war. 

The efficiency of our army has suffered since the close of 
the Spanish- American War from two causes : first, and greatest, 
the inexperienced non-commissioned officer ; and second, the 
disinclination of enlisted men of all grades to reenlist. Under 
the plan here proposed, the second of these causes, far from being 
removed, will be perpetuated and further exaggerated by pro- 
hibiting all reenlistments of privates, and by reducing the term of 
enlistment to two years; but, on the other hand, the first cause 
will disappear under the provision permitting non-commissioned 
officers to reenlist and providing for such increase in their pay 
as will insure their reenlisting. The pay of the private will re- 
main as it is now, or be increased only by such amount as is 



OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 149 

necessary to insure providing the increased number of original 
enlistments; while the allowances for clothing, etc., will be ad- 
justed to suit the conditions of the shortened term of enlistment. 

I have not the data at hand or the space to show with any de- 
gree of accuracy the effect this change would have on army ap- 
propriations ; that they would be increased is apparent, but only 
along the lines that every one in the army and many out of it 
admit to be necessary. One item of present expenditure, how- 
ever, would soon disappear, viz., retired pay of soldiers who have 
served throughout their period, or until a short time before re- 
tirement, as privates. Let us now glance at some of the minor 
advantages that may be expected to result from the execution of 
such a plan. It is not proposed as a panacea to cure all the ail- 
ments of the army, but it is believed that it will assist in re- 
lieving much of its suffering. It is certainly clear that the in- 
creased pay and advantages of the non-commissioned officers 
will result in keen competition for these positions, thereby giving 
us a far superior class of men in these grades, and stimulating dis- 
cipline. The first sergeant in his first or second enlistment will 
disappear, to be replaced by the old and tried soldier, and these 
positions will not go begging, as often happens to-day, because 
of a lack of good men to fill them, or because when such a man is 
available he does not want to be advanced to a non-commissioned 
officer with his added responsibility and but slightly greater pay. 

It is reasonable to hope that desertions would be fewer; two 
years do not appear nearly so long to the dissatisfied recruit as 
do three years; and, moreover, a more desirable class of young 
men might be expected to enlist. A change so radical may be 
expected to produce results equally radical. One of these may be 
an improvement in public sentiment toward the army. From an 
institution which may furnish a young man a lifetime vocation, 
thus severing him more or less completely from the community 
in which he may exercise some influence for good, our army be- 
comes a school wherein a young man may receive two years of 
liberal education, not only free of all expense to him but at a 
salary, and may go forth at the end of his enlistment, if his serv- 
ice has been honorable, equipped with a diploma that will make 
him worth many dollars more per month in the opinion of any 
well-informed employer. The soldier will be brought into closer 
touch with the civil community. The country will learn of the 
army for the first time from the men who love it and served hon- 
orably in it, and who wanted to reenlist but could not because 



r 5 o OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 

the lav/ would not permit, instead of getting the distorted view 
it receives to-day from deserters, men dishonorably discharged, 
and the great number of dissatisfied spirits who receive an hon- 
orable discharge after three years of complaining service. 

The latter class may wholly or partly disappear. Human na- 
ture is a queer composition, especially that of the average Ameri- 
can ; there is much perverseness in his make-up; he wants what 
he cannot get and loves to refuse to do what he thinks others may 
wish him to do. Positively refuse to reenlist privates, and this 
trait in human nature will become apparent in an increased de- 
sire to reenlist. A new and different report of the army will be 
spread throughout the land. A better class of recruits will flock 
to our recruiting stations. Let the tide of public sentiment that 
has piled so high against our army but set in the opposite direc- 
tion, be the riffle ever so small in the beginning, and the army 
will eventually be seen in its true character as one of the greatest 
educational institutions of the land. 



This paper attempts nothing more than the roughest kind of 
an outline of the plan proposed, with no pretensions as to having 
worked out its details, and such few details as are given are but 
mere suggestions that might liave to be modified to harmonize the 
various necessities of the service. Of course, just who should be 
given the privilege of reenlisting, whether it should be extended 
to cooks, farriers, mechanics, etc., as well as to non-commissioned 
officers, is a matter of but minor importance. To avoid appoint- 
ing non-commissioned officers, from men in their first enlistment 
(as so often has to be done to-day) a very limited number of 
privates, to be selected in an appropriate manner, might be per- 
mitted to reenlist. It may be objected that the plan does not fit 
in with the highly technical character of the artillery service, 
but I see no fundamental reason why it may not apply, in a more 
or less modified form, to this branch of the service as well as to 
the cavalry and infantry. 

Shortening the period of enlistment to two years may arouse 
much criticism. If so, the three year period might be retained, as 
its replacement by the two year enlistment does not constitute a 
vitally essential part of the scheme; personally, I believe the ad- 
vantages of scattering a greater number of trained soldiers 
throughout the country in a given time, of fewer desertions, and 
of less discontentment in the army, greatly outweigh the ad- 



OUR ARMY A SCHOOL. 



151 



vantage of the additional instruction and discipline that the 
soldier will receive in his third year. As to the theory of re- 
enlistments, in general, I do not believe it to be founded on a 
sound economic principle. In two years of constant, careful in- 
struction, a private soldier should be able to learn seventy-five 
to ninety per cent, of all that can be taught him, of his duties, in 
time of peace. It is in these years that the nation gets the greatest 
return in the form of material improvement of the raw soldier 
for the amount of money expended. In subsequent enlistments 
the soldier acquires the remaining ten to twenty-five per cent, of 
what he has to learn, but at proportionately much greater expense 
to the Government. 




THE ARMY IN CUBA. 




By Lieut. -Colonel ROBERT L. BULLARD, Eighth Infantry. 

THERE has been no war, but the high- 
est purpose of the soldier accom- 
plished the guaranteeing of peace. If 
thereon the army boasts a little, let it not 
be set down to vainglory but to soldier 
pride. 

Comment can fall under but two 
heads, the military aspects of the army's 
occupation and its part in the pacification 

CS^alrye Dragoons 1857 ' 01 ^-UDa. 

I. MILITARY ASPECTS. 

The call to Cuba caught the army, except as to numbers, pre- 
pared, practically already mobilized for field service after the 
summer's maneuvers ; and never, perhaps, did the nation get 
prompter or better returns for any than for its money spent in 
those maneuvers. After them, the movement of the troops and 
the occupation of Cuba were effected with order and expedition, 
with less apparent strain and error than any similar movement 
in years, with less, even, than the march to the maneuvers them- 
selves. It was the plain result of practice and preparation, of 
forethought and of better organization. It gives hope for the 
future. 

A painful feature from the first, however, was the pitiable 
measures that a great nation had to resort to in order to secure 
this insignificant force of 5000 men for the occupation of Cuba. 
We annihilated the third battalions; we took eight regiments to 
get five ; we practically cleaned up all the available armed forces 
of the republic within the limits of the United States. Such a 
thing would have brought us low before any power of the world ; 
we would have been laughed to scorn by any but a weak and 
divided people like the Cubans. If instead of for 5000 there 
had been a call for 50,000 ready soldiers, itself a mere trifle in 
these days of hundreds of thousands, this great, vainglorious, 
boastful people could hardly have moved a peg for a month ! 

The movement to Cuba, the reception, supply and distribution 
of troops over the island into a small army of occupation, gave 



THE ARMY IN CUBA. 153 

opportunity to test the machine. Beyond all doubt, except to the 
hypercritical and reactionary, the results were good. In his per- 
sonal experience and observation through all, the writer has seen 
no cause for a single growl. He thought he saw one; inquired 
into, it proved groundless. But growls there were undoubtedly, 
criticisms and complaints, violent and noisy; yet through all 
their noise and violence, in every instance the ear could never 
shut out a note of personal failure somewhere upon the part of 
the growler. It is a soldier trick, it is a favorite way, that, of; 
concealing a weak point by making a noisy attack elsewhere, or 
of covering our own failure by a clattering charge. 

After occupation of the island, the little army scouted, 
marched over and mapped every foot of its mountain, plain and 
marsh. It took months, and was hard work and dull for officers, 
men and government mule. Its training effect was incomparable ; 
it was just the thing needed to fix the theory long studied in the 
garrison schools at home. It discharged (alas !) the men finished 
field soldiers. What is left will hereafter know what it is, men 
and officers, to camp, march, make a map and gather information, 
and mules to balk at nothing. 

What is there about an American that makes him so perverse 
about learning a foreign language ? For the officer, there is no 
knowledge, no, beyond a certain point, not even military knowl- 
edge, that is so generally valuable or useful as languages. With 
all the experience in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines dur- 
ing the past eight years, one would think that this had rooted 
itself in the brains of officers to bring forth its fruits, at least r 
in the learning of Spanish. Who so thought saw his thought 
sadly fall on coming to Cuba. It has not turned out so. After 
the long encouragement and appeal of authority, after the Span- 
ish courses in our service schools, the teachings of recent and the 
urgings of prospective experience, those of our officers whom I 
saw on coming to Cuba who could swap one thought with a 
Cuban, I could count upon my fingers. The "wayno," "vamoose" 
and "speera," the carabao Spanish of the Manila coachman, is 
not Spanish ; it will not serve in Cuba. The conditions here im- 
pressed the need that officers should know Spanish. He almost 
lost his use that did not ; he immediately enhanced his value, he 
was in demand at once, who did. Will we again be caught upon 
this point? It is a question for authority. 

In spite of our disgust and contempt for their smallness, al- 
most all of our military work and command since the Civil War*. 



i 54 THE ARMY IN CUBA. 

whether in drill in quiet times of peace, in the Indian wars, or 
in the practical work in Cuba and the Philippines, have been of 
the lieutenant's, captain's and major's caliber. They continue so 
in Cuba now, and if we project the imagination toward future 
possible tasks, we meet always the same probability. What of 
it? At least it is the small man's opportunity. If it does not 
fill our large ideas of theory, it gives far more of us our chance 
in practice. If it does not practice the general, it at least teaches 
the small fry; it gives them an opportunity for development of 
discretion, independence and self-reliance, opportunity the like 
of which is not perhaps to be had or dreamed of in any other 
army of the world. The result of such training in recent years, 
together with the careful instruction of higher authority on ar- 
rival in Cuba, has had marked effect in the conduct of commands. 
With officers, even young officers, there has been a remarkable 
absence of "breaks" and errors of judgment to bring them trou- 
ble with the military authority, civilians or government officials. 
It is a matter of congratulation. 

In this Cuban intervention, the American soldier has thus far 
again dignified himself and justified the faith of his friends. A 
surpassing excellence of conduct toward Cubans and an unusual 
worthiness of conduct as a soldier have characterized him every- 
where in Cuba. More marked than usual? Unquestionably. 
The cause ? An appeal to his manhood, decency and self-respect ; 
an officer who in the beginning came near to his men, who forgot 
the impersonal written order and spoke by word of mouth 
straight to his officers and men assembled about him. In the 
Regular Army, it was a strange sight ; in any army, a wonderful 
return. To the volunteer, disappeared from among us from the 
days of the great Civil War until the Philippines, the regular 
soldier must perhaps give thanks for bringing us to the idea that 
the common soldier may be thus wonderfully touched on his 
honor. May the principle never pass from before our minds. 

But the most striking and pleasing thing in connection with 
the American soldier's service in Cuba has been the view it devel- 
oped in him of the revolutionist and insurgent. Under the in- 
junctions and orders of authority the army, officers and men, 
have in public preserved a commendable attitude of impartiality 
between the warring factions of the Cuban people. To them, 
officially, all Cubans, insurgent or loyalist, have been alike. But 
in private, in retirement, as men, nothing has been able to make 
our officers or men think of the two parties alike or to have any 



THE ARMY IN CUBA. 155 

use for the side that raised the insurrection. In this, our Gov- 
ernment's course of impartiality has not budged them. They 
were from the first and have remained resolutely against the 
insurgents and cannot be induced to think of them in any other 
way than with fixed and profound prejudice and contempt. It is 
a pleasing thought. Let the American people take note that to 
the core their army is loyalist and everywhere hates the name of. 
rebel and insurgent. 

II. IN THE PACIFICATION. 

"The army has not been used and has had no effect upon the 
situation," said a gentleman, speaking of the pacification of 
Cuba. Never was a man more deceived in the surface of things. 
True, for fighting the soldier has not been used ; but for pacifica- 
tion, in his other attributes, he has ; yet, so quietly, so skilfully,, 
so unostentatiously that he has seemed never to have been in play. 

The army's coming into Cuba was, as to effect, like the com- 
ing to anchor of a battleship in a harbor; silent,placid, without 
threat, yet with conscious dignity and potentiality. It represented 
more than itself — the moral force of a great nation. Otherwise 
it had been ridiculous. It was playing a part ; but a part, a role, 
be it remembered, however great, is of none-effect by itself — it is 
utterly spoiled if the playing be bad. In the army's acting rested 
much in Cuba. 

To the Cuban from the first the United States soldier was 
made to stand for something not to be trifled with, not to be 
roused, never, except in the last extreme, to be called into action. 
It was not encouraged to mix in the life of the country and was 
strictly held back from mixing in politics, police or public af- 
fairs. It was studiously kept a thing uncommon and apart. It 
was placed upon a pedestal alone. Its solemn quiet and dignified 
attitude of calm observer of passing men and events has enor- 
mously augmented its respect and the potentiality of its influence. 
From the first it was plainly laid down and carefully adhered 
to that it was to be the quiescent moral force of the United States 
behind a government mainly of Cuban officials. By no other 
policy could 5000 men have been made to count for so much. 
It was a master stroke that fixed that policy. To the Cubans the 
army thus became a reserve power of an enormous regulatory 
and pacificatory effect. 

But the army was small. Cuba has two millions of people 
scattered over a country seven hundred and fifty miles long. 



J56 THE ARMY IN CUBA. 

Divided up and scattered over all the island's length into the 
smallest garrisons, there were still not soldiers enough to go 
round. So, as far as possible, they were marched around, not 
for show, not for trickery or deception, but that Cuba might be 
made to see the representative of the strength of the United 
States, the United States soldier, the big, sandy-haired, blue- 
eyed man, who had been so free with the Filipinos, now re- 
served and distant with the Cubans. Most of Cuba saw him. 
Wherever he went, by familiarity he has not bred contempt; by 
dignity of bearing and conduct he has left respect. This was 
the miraculous feeding of the five thousand with the five loaves 
and two little fishes. But it was hard. Though perhaps in the 
end we may say that the multitude has been fed, the loaves and 
the fishes were too few. We who saw, know that there are places 
in Cuba where, there being no permanent material representative 
of this moral force of the United States, there was hardly per- 
ceptible moral effect. 

In their revolutions against Spain, Cubans relied very 
largely upon their knowledge of the country and how to get 
around in it. At once upon the occupation of Cuba the little 
American army, for possible contingencies, entered upon a scheme 
of exploration, map-making and information-gathering to cover 
the whole island. Without bluster or talk the work went on be- 
fore the eyes of all Cuba. It carried American soldiers into 
every nook and corner of the island. The sight at once had a 
most sobering-, thought-producing effect upon the wild, uncer- 
tain classes of Cubans. Everywhere were heard remarks like 
these : "They will know our country better in six months than 
we in all our lives," "They will know every marsh and cave, 
mountain and wood in all Cuba when the next trouble comes." 
That trouble has not come. The work has been finished. Be- 
sides its mere military results, it has borne to Cubans a mes- 
sage of infinitely beneficial and pacificatory import. It was no 
threat, but a silent, impressive lesson. It had another and very 
•curious result. The idea of it struck the Cuban fancy ; it touched 
their sense of shrewdness ; it seemed to tickle them. Out of this 
grew greater Cuban admiration for Americans and greater in- 
fluence of Americans with Cubans. Now, if the army can but 
get past the term of pacification without firing one hostile shot, 
it is probable that we shall thereby have already accomplished the 
conquest of future revolution. 

Altogether the army's part in the Cuban intervention has 



THE ARMY IN CUBA. 157 

been a thing of tact, and the little force has well earned its name, 
"The Army of Cuban Pacification." 

Considering our whole work in recent years in Cuba, the 
Philippines, in China and in Cuba again, we cannot fail to be 
impressed with the fact that if army officers and the army have 
had to know something of the art of war, they have had to know 
and use far more of the art of pacification. In the Philippines 
their work was four-fifths peace and one-fifth war-making; in 
Cuba it has been all peace-making. With the small, quarrelsome, 
revolutionary Latin-American states near us, with whom we 
neither would nor can fight, the future promises ever the same 
thing. Our whole recent experience, then, our present duties 
and future prospects all point to the idea that by the study of 
how to make war alone we shall be but little prepared for by far 
the greater burdens of duty which are to fall upon us, which are 
the making of peace. To know the art of pacification almost 
equally with the art of war is, besides, a necessity for the army 
officer who may to-day and in the future desire to serve well his 
country ; for, however incongruous it may seem, the work of mak- 
ing peace is falling and will fall upon the man whose duty it is 
also to make war. By proper instruction and study we should be 
prepared for this duty ; it is missing the problem, it is neglect of 
preparation if we fail to do so. 

But how prepare ? The basis of all peace is law, and the ways 
and means of pacification should be a branch of the law, em- 
bodied in that to be studied and required of all officers. The 
law department of our service schools should, from our recent 
broad experience and precedents, work down to principles and 
state and teach the art of pacification for future military occupa- 
tions. The materials exist, the work is worthy, its needs ap- 
parent. The results would probably be law only about as the 
law of nations is law, but if the fighter must also be the pacifier, 
these results would be none the less valuable to the army for 
the future. 

The armed man, the best practical means of securing peace, 
had better, at least, not sit still and let the impractical idealist 
alone assume these functions. 




THE TRANSMISSION OF MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE.* 

By Lieut.-Colonel GEORGE P. SCRIVEN, Signal Corps, U.S.A., 

Chief Signal Officer, Department of the East. 

Gold Medalist, M. S. I. 

THE SIGNAL CORPS AND THE MOBILE ARMY : COMMUNICATIONS 

AND PERSONNEL. 

THE transmission of intelligence in the United 
States Army is intrusted to a signal corps 
composed of men selected or appointed to per- 
form the more technical duties devolving upon 
them. These duties have become formidable' in 
peace and vital in war, and to signal officers they 
at times seem to cover the whole field of human en- 
deavor. Doubtless this is an exaggeration; still 
from maintaining with snow-shoe and dog-sled 

ijnal Corps 1884 ° u 

lines of communication over the frozen wastes of 
Alaska, the wireless telegraph across the ice-bound waters of 
Norton's Sound, and the cables south to civilization ; from build- 
ing telegraph lines for the improvement or correction of our lit- 
tle brown brothers in the Philippine Islands ; and from assisting 
to quiet the troubled spirit of Cuba to the highly technical work 
of the fire control of our fortifications; instruction of the men 
at the coast training station on Bedloe's Island ; the school duties 
and service with the mobile army at Leavenworth; ballooning 
at Omaha; and the wireless crying out for installation every- 
where ; it should seem that this field is quite sufficiently extended. 
If it is not cultivated to the highest point of utility throughout 
its vast area, it is because the means are not furnished. The 
crying need of the corps is men, not money. 

In war the field of operations of the signal corps contracts 
strongly, almost fiercely; but the thin layer of work made to 
answer in peace will no longer suffice to meet the strenuous con- 
ditions imposed. Then, indeed, the duties become so imperative 
and exacting that no means may, without danger, be omitted to 
fit the corps to fully meet them. 

To perform the work at present imposed upon the signal 
corps of the army, there is provided an organization composed 

♦Continued from July number. 



i6o MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

of one chief signal officer, nine field-officers, eighteen captains, 
eighteen first lieutenants and 12 12 enlisted men. Of the com- 
missioned officers of the corps at this time, two of the captains 
and seventeen of the first lieutenants are detailed for service for 
a period of four years, but the average service will probably be 
much less on account of promotions and from other causes. Ad- 
ditional officers are added from time to time for temporary duty. 

It will probably be conceded, considering the scope and variety 
of the duties of this corps, that the men who form it should be 
intelligent and well instructed ; furthermore, that both officers and 
men should remain long with the service and make it their pro- 
fession. But such is not now the law, at least for the officers. 
Criticism of the law, however, is injudicious, if not improper, and 
it will be here sufficient to quote, as an indication of expert opin- 
ion,* this remark, "Information service fails especially because 
the world is ignorant of its principles, processes and mode of ac- 
tion. The transmission of intelligence demands special organs. 
Most armies give some telegraphic training to non-commissioned 
officers and troopers ; it is lost time. Those partly informed are 
always incompetent ; special trained men are necessary." This 
brief statement contains, in the opinion of the writer of this ar- 
ticle, the wisdom of volumes ; it might well be considered a mili- 
tary axiom to be placed at the head of all treatises and laws 
affecting the army. 

It is not intended, however, to discuss here the commissioned 
personnel of the signal corps, a subject which has its own place; 
and we will therefore pass on to a brief consideration of the con- 
ditions affecting the work of this corps in peace, and to its services 
and probable strength and organization in war. These considera- 
tions will, no doubt, prove dry and technical, but they are not to be 
avoided. It has been the experience, not only of the writer, 
but of many officers of rank with whom he has talked, that in 
the field the value of a signal corps is not so generally understood 
as it might be by officers of the Regular Army and of the militia, 
and for this reason its use is frequently neglected or contemned 
in maneuvers. When war comes it is reasonably certain, unless a 
change takes place in this respect, that many officers who will 
be called upon to use the communications will not be sufficiently 

*General Lewel, the author of whom Maj.-Gen. A. W. Greeley, in the articles 
before mentioned, says: "By all means, the most forceful and far-seeing writer on this 
subject (lines of information) is General Lewel, whose "Etudes de Guerre" are among 
the most thoughtful and comprehensive, especially as to practical details, of any modern 
essays that have come under my notice." 



MILI7ARY INTELLIGENCE. 161 

familiar with them to employ to their full measure of useful- 
ness the appliances which are now provided for the service, and 
preferring the traditional note-book and orderly to the telegraph 
will make as little use of modern lines of communication as the 
Russians appear to have done. It has been assumed that progress- 
ive officers in these days appreciate to some extent the importance 
of the subject; and it is known that general officers, especially 
those credited with the long service which alone entitles them to 
the rank, have, as the name implies, the experience and knowl- 
edge necessary for the control and direction of the combatant 
arms and of their staff service. But it by no means follows that 
even experienced and capable officers know all about the use 
of auxiliary corps which are often of recent creation and unap- 
preciated importance. Chief among these auxiliaries is the signal 
corps of the army, which, though by no means new in esse is 
very new indeed in posse. Its importance has been proved, but 
its modern value is not yet known even to itself, perhaps, for who 
can tell what part in the future the balloon, the wireless and 
other devices may play in the operations of mobile armies, or 
what may be the field of usefulness of electricity as applied to the 
coast defenses ? But whatever these may accomplish, it is reason- 
ably certain that their value will depend almost wholly upon the 
men who use them. Not upon the actual manipulator alone, be it 
understood, but upon the directing brain, the man whose plans 
the communications are designed to carry out. He it is who 
must give life to systems of communications, for without the 
directing mind they are mere inert collections of useless material, 
valuable in theory alone. 

It should be remembered that, like all staff and auxiliary 
troops, a signal corps is merely an adjunct to the line of the army 
and can have no separate existence. Its value depends solely 
upon the use made of it by the line, and this in turn upon the 
knowledge and capacity of commanding officers to whom famil- 
iarity with its scope and power is vital. If, as has been said, 
this knowledge is far less common among officers of the army 
and of the National Guard than it should be, it is a condition 
by no means due to neglect, but rather to lack of opportunity. 
In peace the means of acquiring knowledge of the use of a signal 
corps in a practical way are few, for the field exercises are about 
the only school; and when war comes the time to learn has 
passed. The theory at least may be acquired by other means than 
maneuvers and should be insisted on, but instruction should not 



i6 2 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

begin and end with senior officers. As with other military studies 
the commencement must be made far down the scale of rank; 
that the general may put in use instinctively, perhaps, knowledge, 
the beginnings of which were acquired as a subaltern. In this 
the school at Leavenworth is doing notable work, and it is hoped 
that West Point will some day see the importance of teaching 
fully the lesson of the communications and not merely its alpha- 
bet, to the lads who stand at the very threshold of the military 
career. 

It is believed that the signal corps in peace should be associ- 
ated as closely as possible with the line of the army in whose 
methods and service the signalmen must be trained, and with 
whom his duties are most intimately connected ; and that a force 
of signalmen should be present at all exercises and maneuvers 
of line troops. It follows that an efficient force of signalmen 
should be placed at large garrisons, and held in readiness to take 
part in all movements and exercises. Similarly, detachments of 
signalmen should be placed at the coast artillery districts, where, 
in addition to the use and care of permanent lines of intelli- 
gence and fire control, they should be ready at need to take their 
place at observing stations and on scout boats to use the wireless, 
flags, lights and other signals during exercises and drills, and 
with field wire and buzzer to carry on the communications in con- 
nection with the supporting forces of infantry ; usually the militia 
in the exercises of peace. This is a tolerably large field even in 
peace, but in addition there remains to be performed the staff 
duties of the corps which exist both in peace and war, the supply 
and purchase of material and maintenance of permanent telegraph 
lines and cable systems, and the technical training of the men 
themselves. The signal corps in reality, though not in law, is 
both a staff and a line corps and must be trained in the duties of 
each ; but the latter training can only come through association 
with the line of the army with which when war comes the signal- 
men are bound as closely as are the three arms of the service to 
each other. They must be instructed and equipped accordingly. 

In what has been said there is no intention on the part of the 
writer to magnify the signal corps, or to sing its praises. Its 
work must speak for it. But there is the strongest desire to em- 
phasize here the importance of the field opened to a corps of 
the communications by modern science and its appliances. This 
field corresponds closely to that covered in peace by the press, 
the telegraph, the telephone and, in part, by the mails ; but in 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 163 

war it possesses the added importance of including in its extent 
the greatest of human events, and control of actions as swift in 
occurrence and as shifting as the lighting. The field both in 
peace and war is that of mental control. 

In addition to a general knowledge of the methods of trans- 
mitting military intelligence, it appears that reasonable famil- 
iarity with the instruments and methods employed under varying 
circumstances must be possessed by officers who will use them, 
and especially by those in control. For instance, no soldier about 
to assume command of an army or of an expeditionary force for 
service in a distant country would willingly lack information 
regarding the kinds of communication that should be used in the 
field and of the types of instruments needed for his work; nor 
would he care to leave the selection of his means of communica- 
tion solely to the judgment of a subordinate, perhaps a stranger. 
He must know, or at least he should know, from the nature of 
the country and the probable scope of his future operations, the 
character of the communications that he will need, and the kind 
and amount of material that he will use. As an example, he 
would not knowingly carry the wireless into a wilderness where 
his batteries could not be recharged; nor provide much visual 
signal apparatus for use in flat tropical jungles. On the other 
hand he would provide himself, within the limits of his transpor- 
tation, with everything that experience and knowledge might 
suggest as useful, and for that reason he should know generally 
what amount of material to select, character of communications 
and the number and kind of men necessary to use them. The 
commanding officer will have a signal officer on his staff, no 
doubt, to whom all details should be intrusted, as he will have an 
ordnance officer and an engineer; but he should assure himself 
personally that his means of communication are sufficient for the 
work ahead, that they conform to his plans and to the probable 
field of action, just as of his own knowledge he will make sure 
of the arms carried by his men, the character of his artillery, the 
amount of his ammunition, and the size of his pontoon train. 

This preparatory work of a commander implies some knowl- 
edge of the service of the communications and of the instruments 
used, but only knowledge of a general nature. It is after he 
takes the field that his capacity and experience are called fully 
into play. Then, indeed, in addition to his own knowledge he 
will require all the assistance that the most skilful of his signal 
officers can render in determining the character, scope and plan 



164 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

of the communications, distribution of the men and location of 
stations. On the march, in camp and in contact with the enemy, 
such dispositions must be made by him as not only to secure the 
best service possible for himself as commander of the troops or 
expedition, but as to give, also, to those in subordinate command 
the fullest advantage of the communications and the quickest 
transmission of information and intelligence. 

A military force no sooner takes the field than its lines of 
communications are determined, its methods of signaling desig- 
nated, its stations located and the whole command linked to- 
gether and connected with the home country or capital by these 
nerves of the army. 

It is difficult, if not impossible in a paper of this kind, to 
specify the courses and objectives of telegraph and telephone 
lines and the location of visual and wireless stations under the 
varying conditions of field service and the many phases of war. 
On this subject a commentator remarks : 

"Every tactical problem varies in its details and the cam- 
mander of each force is constantly confronted with new situa- 
tions which cannot be met automatically by any set rules. Judg- 
ment must be used in applying the essential principles which gov- 
ern. So with tactical lines of information, judgment must dic- 
tate when and where to lay the lines, and what methods to use. 
The acumen for this judgment comes only from practice and ex- 
perience. The primary object is to secure and maintain constant 
and unfailing communications. Then economy and the powers 
and limitation of each distinct method as well as their adaptation 
to the particular problem must control."* 

In general, it may be said that lines of communication will 
take the direction needed and be established where useful. How- 
ever, a few more definite suggestions may be offered. 

The main reliance of an army in the field will be placed upon 
the wire telegraph, or, for short distances, upon the telephone; 
but visual signaling will, by no means, be neglected, for although 
comparatively slow and of no great range, it is an indispensable 
auxiliary, and at times may afford the only means of communica- 
tion. The field wireless, if attached to army, corps and division 
headquarters, and used in connection with suitable observation 
stations at the front or on the flanks, should also prove of great 

*This remark appears in a very excellent paper by First Lieut. W. N. Hughes, Jr.,. 
Thirteenth Infantry, entitled "The Signal Corps in Maneuvers," prepared at the Infantry 
and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. This paper is well worth the attention of all 
officers concerned with the transmission of military intelligence. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 165 

value in the intercommunication of an army or corps ; and that a 
balloon train should be attached to the headquarters of the 
army seems obvious. 

The more permanent lines of the army will be carried on 
lances ; but in temporary camps, on the march, or in contact with 
the enemy reliance will be placed upon the field or buzzer lines.* 

The wireless in its present stage cannot be considered as a 
primary means of communication for the mobile army, as it has 
not passed, in all its phases, the experimental stage. In addition, 
on account of interference, interruptions, delicacy, cost and other 
objections, it can probably never be used over land with the cer- 
tainty and frequency of wire lines. But the use of the wireless 
with the coast defenses is another matter altogether ; in this serv- 
ice it is assuredly of the highest importance even in its present 
stage of development. However, great advances are being made 
in the construction of the field wireless — as was indicated in a 
preceding paper — and when the various new types of apparatus, 
called mosquito sets, are in use it appears that an army, in the 
opinion of wireless advocates, should resemble, in the field, a 
flock of blackbirds, so general will be the twitter of the instru- 
ments. Maybe, too, it will become as suddenly silent on the ap- 
proach of the man with the heavy wireless weapon. But those 
anticipations must be taken soberly, for no doubt signals will 
drown each other and but few sets will be permitted. Thus far 
field experience does not promise unlimited success. t 

It has been found that wireless communications can be main- 
tained across considerable stretches of country under favorable 
conditions by expert men ; but it appears that not only experience, 
skill and good judgment in the selection of stations are required 
for its success but that the terrain must lend itself to the pur- 
pose. Judgment and experience as well as a high degree of skill 
and technical knowledge are necessary, and everything in con- 
nection with the apparatus must be in condition. In short, to be 



*Descriptions of the field lines and the more important instruments are given here- 
after in this paper. 

tAcross water the case is different, and during the combined exercises of the 
militia and regular artillery in the vicinity of Fort Totten (June, of this year) fairly 
satisfactory results were obtained with the new wireless apparatus, though over very 
short distances, between the picket boat carrying a portable set and a land station at 
Fort Totten. The results were useful, and as the apparatus had been hastily installed, the 
boat antennae somewhat crude in character and the whole used, with only few ex- 
ceptions, by signalmen little familiar with the wireless, the results tend to show that 
as an element of sea-coast defense the portable and mosquito wireless will prove of the 
greatest importance. 



i06 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

successful in wireless communication over land one may say that 
all conditions must be favorable, even the atmosphere. 

It appears, then, that both wireless and visual signaling, 
though important, may be classed as auxiliary to the main system 
of wire telegraph and telephone communication for an army, to 
be used when the wire cannot be installed or is interrupted, and 
for communication across a country included in the enemy's 
theater of operations. But visual signaling appliances, at least, 
should always be at hand at telegraph, telephone and wireless sta- 
tions to be used when needed. No doubt the most important use 
of all air-borne communications is in connection with boat ex- 
peditions and the navy. 

With an army in camp or on the march, or in contact with 
the enemy, the problem is to maintain touch with a few definite 
points, and no great amount of detail will be required. In gen- 
eral, with an army in the field the headquarters will maintain 
communication with the base with field wire, a lance or semi-per- 
manent telegraph line, and through its base with the home coun- 
try or capital by commercial telegraph systems or cable. From 
army headquarters the military telegraph (using commercial 
lines with signal corps operators when possible) will run to corps 
headquarters and from there to headquarters of divisions, of in- 
dependent brigades, and of artillery, cavalry and other com- 
mands under the immediate control of the corps commander. 

An excellent example of a military telegraph system on an 
extended scale is furnished by the Japanese who had, at the con- 
clusion of the Asiatic campaign, a network of lines touching the 
coasts of Korea and Manchuria at every important town and in- 
let from Chemulpo to the Gulf of Liao Yang and beyond Muk- 
den ; the whole forming a network of telegraph lines in some lo- 
calities as close together as the commercial systems of the United 
States. Lines of this kind follow, of course, the railroads and 
wagon roads of the country where they are most needed and more 
readily maintained.* 

In the United States Army the division is considered the tac- 
tical unit to which are assigned all arms and auxiliary troops of 
the service. The ordinary lines of communication of a division 
under the three conditions of the camp, the march and contact 
with the enemy are therefore worth a word of consideration, 
although they cannot, of course, be definitely fixed. Assuming 

*"Stragetical map of part of Corea and Manchuria," prepared by the Second Division, 
General Staff. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 167 

that this command is to be assembled at some suitable locality, an 
officer of engineers will, no doubt, first be sent to select sites for 
the encampments of the various units ; quartermaster and com- 
missary officers will locate their depots ; and the medical officer the 
field-hospitals. It will then become the duty of the chief signal 
officer of the division to install the lines of communication. He 
will first establish at headquarters a central signal station and 
connect this with the most convenient telegraph and telephone 
offices through which communication may be had with the com- 
mercial systems of the country or with the base. He will es- 
tablish a signal camp and depot where will be stored all material 
needed for extended and varied service. Next he will connect 
by telegraph, corps or anrry headquarters (if such exist), and 
for convenience will carry telephone lines to the chief quarter- 
master, commissary and surgeon, as well as to the depots, hospi- 
tals and corrals. As the troops arrive at their camps lines will be 
run from the division central to brigade headquarters, to the camp 
of the engineers, the signal corps, to the cavalry and field-artil- 
lery, and to independent commands at a distance, but it is not 
thought to be good practice to extend electrical communication, 
in ordinary cases, below the brigade, as otherwise the troops are 
apt to have too easy and enervating service. Within the divis- 
ional camp itself, the telephone will be the ordinary means of 
communication between fixed stations, the telegraph being re- 
served for more distant work ; both will ordinarily be carried by 
lance lines. In addition to these more permanent lines temporary 
buzzer or field wires will be carried to changing stations, such as 
outlying observation points, temporary balloon camps and wire- 
less stations designed to operate at the front or on the flanks, and 
to the outposts. In short, every important point will be con- 
nected with division headquarters and the whole command linked 
together and connected with the base and the larger units by wire. 
In camp, then, there should be little difficulty in using fully the 
communications, .since the system is known and the stations are 
easily found. 

On the march the lines of communication and the stations for 
a division become fewer and the latter more difficult to reach. 
Some general considerations may be noted. First, a division on 
the march must at no time lose connection with its base through 
the last station occupied; and as the advance continues a flying 
or buzzer line will extend forward to the commanding general, 
that is, to some position designated by him as his own during the 



168 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

day or night. This position becomes, so far as the communications 
are concerned, the headquarters. As the buzzer or field wire ad- 
vances it should be followed by the signal train with the neces- 
sary material for a lance line to replace the field or buzzer wire, 
for the former is expensive and the latter very liable to injury 
from passing troops and transport if left lying on the ground or 
bushes, and the resulting faults are not readily located. However, 
so rapid at times is the advance of a lance line that no field cable, 
or very little, need be used on the march. Later, when material 
is at hand, the lance line may in turn be replaced by a semi- 
permanent system erected by the (so-called) base line (or 
etape) troops and the lances recovered; but this construction is 
necessary only when the system is to be used for a long period. 
On the march a buzzer wire may very well follow the general 
line of advance of the commander by extending from one con- 
spicuous station to another designated by him. 

The units of command should, in the advance, be kept, so far 
as possible, in touch with each other ; but as these units frequent- 
ly move by different routes and as cross lines are impracticable 
except at halts, and always objectionable, field or buzzer wires 
must stretch from the last field station maintained at the rear to 
corps headquarters and to brigades and important commands, as 
the ribs of a fan expand. As also wire communication, if possi- 
ble at all between the general and detached commands, or cavalry 
at the flanks, will usually be maintained in this way or by visual 
or wireless signals. It may be possible on the march to keep the 
advance guard and even the point in touch by buzzer with the 
headquarters station but the problem is not easy, for the wire is 
almost certain to be interrupted by passing troops, and the moving 
headquarters station must probably be equipped with a take-up 
cart unless the wire is abandoned.* During halts, however, such 
lines can quickly be thrown out, but here visual signaling may 
be used to advantage and above all the field wireless, especially 
of the mosquito type. Communication with the* flanks may also 
be obtained by the last two means. Probably the balloon train, 
if well to the front (which it should never be in the presence of 
the enemy), will offer the greatest advantage as a headquarters 
signal station. The balloon in air can move forward rapidly 
enough to maintain its place in column, certainly at a trot,f and 

*Great care must be taken in campaign to recover every inch of wire lest the supply- 
be expended. 

tThe writer has seen, with the Italian Army, the balloon wagon, with the balloon well 
in the air, follow cavalry at a trot. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 169 

since observations from it are telephoned continuously to the train ' 
they may be communicated without loss of time to the command- 
ing general if near, or through the buzzer line, if distant. The 
buzzer wire is readily controlled and carried by a balloon wagon. 

The day's march over the division eats and rests; not so the 
signal men. Then buzzer lines from the advance guard, from 
the flanks, from the corps headquarters and from the rear must 
be carried to division headquarters, and others laid to the outposts 
and reserves, and still others to detached posts, to observation 
stations and important points where pickets are maintained. A 
central station will be established and from it as many secondary 
lines laid to brigade headquarters, auxiliary and detached troops 
as the general may deem necessary, a matter which will undoubt- 
edly depend upon proximity to the enemy and the length of time 
the camp will be occupied. 

In a retiring movement lines of communication will be as few 
as possible, and mainly used to connect the rear guard with the 
general commanding. Provision should be made, however, to 
tie flanking parties thrown out at important intersecting roads 
with the marching columns and to recall those troops as the rear 
passes. It will be important, also, to connect retreating columns 
moving by different roads and this can be more readily done 
than in the advance, since lines extending to the front of the 
retreating force will not ordinarily be in danger of interruption, 
except from a very active and overwhelming cavalry. Thus, in 
the retreat, central stations may be thrown out far ahead and 
wires led back to the marching columns like the ribs of a fan, as 
in the advance, to be taken up as the columns pass, if not aban- 
doned. Of course if the retreat follows the line of the advance, 
stations on that line that have been maintained will become the 
central through which various units may be reached. In the re- 
treat a balloon train should render important service as an ob- 
servation station, but it must be placed on a flank. 

As the period of actual contact with the enemy approaches the 
most serious of the problems of the communications arise. Then, 
indeed, it becomes necessary for a commanding general not only 
to know what he can reasonably expect from his communications, 
but to weigh their chance of maintenance and the extent to which 
they may be usefully employed. He must know the terrain and 
the best means of sending messages across it ; he must know his 
enemy and the probability of successful attempts on the latter's 
part to cut the wires or drown the wireless ; and in difficulties he 



170 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

must try every means of signaling that offers a chance of suc- 
cess. An active and numerous hostile cavalry will, if unchecked, 
make communication by wire difficult, if not impossible, outside 
the limits of control ; while on the other hand an inert cavalry 
need hardly be considered. It seems probable, for instance, that 
the Japanese owed much of the success of their communications 
to the lack of energy or direction of the Russian cavalry.* 

However, as the division approaches the enemy the com- 
mander will make as certain as possible of his communications 
with corps and army headquarters, with supporting and reserve 
troops and with the rear ; and before actual contact comes buzzer 
lines will be carried to brigades and, in some cases, to regiments. 
The troops engaged, buzzer wires will be carried forward to the 
firing line, where trained observers, perhaps officers (as was done 
by the Japanese), with buzzers or the field telephone, will be 
placed to send back important information as regards control and 
fire. It may be practicable at the beginning of the action to main- 
tain touch by wire between the smaller reserves and the main 
bodies; but this is doubtful, as a great multiplicity of wires on 
the field of battle is hazardous, for all cannot probably be main- 
tained in the face of marching troops, and untrustworthy lines 
may do actual harm by failing when most needed and overthrow- 
ing calculations or defeating movements the opportuneness of 
which depends upon rapid transmission of orders and informa- 
tion. But this objection applies to all communications. 

Regarding communication on the field of battle the writer 
before quoted, says : 

When the attack is once launched, little control can be had by superior 
commanders over the troops making the attack, but the lines of informa- 
tion are still of value for quick- reports as to the success attained. There- 
fore, the lines of information, while not advancing in the actual final 
infantry assault, should be pushed up under cover as far as possible in 
order to see and report the result to the commanding general as quickly 
as possible. Then, again, lines of information should be used to notify 
the artillery when to cease firing, which should fire, however, until the 
infantry has advanced to its range. A quick order is needed here. Field 
Service Regulations should settle who is to give the order. The Japanese 
sent artillery-officers with telephones on the firing line to accomplish this. 

Of course, before the division is actually engaged against the 
enemy its commander will extend his field or buzzer lines to the 
positions occupied by the cavalry and artillery commands and will 
maintain touch with the former as long as possible, and with the 

*See report of Major Kuhn. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 171 

latter throughout the action. The artillery will, no doubt, in ad- 
dition to its other lines, establish between batteries a system of 
fire control to enable the chief of artillery or the division com- 
mander to concentrate or disperse the fire as needs demand. In 
addition to all this, and one of the most important of the measures 
to be taken, the commanding general will early establish com- 
munications by field telephone or by buzzer, by wireless and by 
visual signals between some fixed position (designated as his 
own) and the observation stations and balloon. From these 
should come the most timely of his information regarding the 
movements of friend or enemy, and notices of the changes taking 
place in the shifting panorama of war which no single observer 
can perceive. 

It should be noted that in action the balloon will attract fire, 
and to avoid the effect of dropping shots upon reserves and other 
troops at the rear, it must be carried well back or to a flank. 

So much for the communications of the larger bodies of 
troops ; in the case of a small independent or expeditionary force, 
the problem is easier but not less important. If operating in an 
enemy's country, especially if the movements are connected with 
a boat expedition or with the navy, somewhat less weight must 
be given to wire communications and more reliance be placed 
upon visual signaling and (if carried) on the portable wireless, 
perhaps of the mosquito type. With all such expeditions a sup- 
ply of day and night rockets should be carried, for they are of 
value as preconcerted signals or to indicate location and time. 
The field acetylene lantern will also be extremely useful, for its 
range under favorable conditions is easily twenty miles and it 
can be used by hand even from a boat on quiet water. But in ad- 
dition buzzer and field wire in necessary amounts must be carried 
and probably both buzzers and field telephones. The amount of 
material will be small, however, if pack train or light transport 
alone can be used, and all large wire and heavy material must be 
omitted. If the force is to maintain communication with its base 
or main body, or is placed on the coast as an independent infantry 
support to the artillery, lance lines should be thrown forward to 
meet its necessarily limited field lines, which must be used for 
the safety and success of the expedition as it advances. For this 
purpose the necessary light wire and instruments to maintain 
touch with the advance guard, outposts and other important 
points will be carried. 

Enough, perhaps too much, has been said regarding lines of 



172 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

communication in the field ; but the subject is interesting and vast. 
A commander who can profit by his communications to the full 
extent possesses great ability, if not genius, but there are degrees 
of benefit to be derived and an ordinary man provided with these 
aids to success is far better armed than genius without them. 
The commander, then, aided by his chief signal officer, must plan 
and direct, but the signal officers and men under them must ex- 
ecute ; on their energy and ability will depend the value and suc- 
cess of the communications. 

One other factor of importance enters the problem, and that 
is familiarity on the part of those authorized to use the com- 
munications, not merely with their character and scope, but with 
their objectives, their value and location of their stations. Of 
what use, for instance, to an officer having important information 
to forward, is a network of field wires going he knows not where ; 
or of signal stations hidden or inaccessible that he has not time 
to find ? It follows that systems of communication must not only 
be skilfully established, but be as well known and as familiar to 
those who have to use them as the mail and telegraph offices to 
the average citizen. As a consequence the commanding general 
should not keep himself alone informed regarding the systems 
established and the location of stations, but he should send this 
information through the proper channels to those in command 
under him, who should in turn transmit to all who are entitled 
to receive it; and in addition he should take every opportunity, 
by orders or circulars, to impress upon his subordinates the im- 
portance of familiarity with the systems as established, and a 
knowledge of the location of stations and of the quickest way to 
reach them. As a rule, then, signal stations will, as far as possi- 
ble, be placed at points readily accessible and, unless exposed to 
the observations of the enemy, they will be as conspicuously 
marked as a telegraph office or a telephone booth in town. But 
often they will necessarily be placed in exposed positions, es- 
pecially buzzer stations which are habitually located at the out- 
posts or frequently with the firing line. Whenever possible sta- 
tions will be sheltered, as far as practicable, in order that the at- 
tention of the operator may be wholly given to his work. Their 
approximate locality will be selected by the general himself with 
the advice of his chief signal officer, but the exact location will be 
fixed by the signal officer on the ground. The main thing to be 
considered in the establishment of stations is proximity to local- 
ities where events are occurring and where intelligence is needed 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 173 

or at which information is obtainable; a second point is accessi- 
bility to persons authorized to use them. 

In visual signaling the establishment of stations is more diffi- 
cult than with electrical communications, since the stations must 
have a wider range of view and are seldom near or accessible to 
commanding officers. In the camp or on the march the main sta- 
tion of the division will, of course, be at headquarters or at some 
other point designated by the general, but the lines will reach 
many points, and secondary stations will become so numerous that 
memory cannot be relied on. It is suggested then that telegraph 
or signal maps be prepared under the direction of the chief signal 
officer and corrected as frequently as may be necessary. These 
sketches should show lines and character of communications and 
signal stations, possibly the roads leading to them and but little 
else. They should be supplied to the proper persons, certainly to 
each headquarters of brigade and independent command with 
which communication is maintained, to all signal officers, and 
most important of all, to each commanding officer within whose 
lines such stations are placed. Of course it is not meant that 
no signal stations will be established except those foreseen by 
the commanding general and chief signal officer and fixed by 
them. On the contrary, temporary stations in great numbers will 
be constantly established and used, especially for the buzzer, wire- 
less and visual signaling. But what is meant is merely to em- 
phasize the importance of familiarity with what may be called 
the regular systems of communications of the army and its sta- 
tions and the best manner of securing the highest degree of use- 
fulness from them. If it be impracticable to frequently make the 
sketches suggested, though this should not be the case, as they 
are designed merely to show the location, lines, roads and signal 
stations, and can be made, no matter how roughly, by signal of- 
ficers or non-commissioned officers in charge of stations, a memo- 
randum should be sent, every day if necessary, to each officer in 
command at or near these stations, indicating the system and the 
location of stations for the day; the object being to prevent the 
loss of time in transmitting important intelligence, since it not 
infrequently happens that the value of information received from 
reconnaissance, from scouts, pickets, from prisoners or from 
chance observation is lost by delay in transmission. Signal of- 
ficers and signalmen should, also, as a matter of course, inform 
themselves of the location of all field stations and the lines and 
objectives of the system. 



i74 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

The proper officers of the army being thus informed of the 
location of their signal stations should thoroughly acquaint them- 
selves with the means of communication there installed and use 
them to the utmost limit. To do this some little knowledge of 
the possibilities of transmission is necessary on their part. For 
instance, when these means are merely visual, flags, the helio- 
graph, or the acetylene lantern, whose rate of transmission is 
probably not more than three or four words per minute with the 
flag, and double that with the heliograph or light, it would be ab- 
surd to send from such stations long messages over short dis- 
tances to points that a mounted orderly could more quickly reach 
than could the completed message. On the other hand, across 
long distances or the enemy's territory, over his head or inter- 
vening obstacles, all messages must be sent by signal. When 
electrical transmission is provided and speed is desirable, the 
messenger, of course, should not be thought of. But often it may 
be the natural impulse of a commanding officer to call an orderly 
and send a verbal or hastily scrawled message rather than to give 
the manner of transmission a thought. Care in this matter should 
be enjoined until familiarity with systems of communication and 
stations causes the use of the lines to become instinctive and the 
messenger to be forgotten. The subject of the communications 
requires some study and thought on the part of all. 

In endeavoring to present the foregoing practical considera- 
tions the writer has, perhaps, tried the patience of such readers as 
may do him the honor to peruse this paper. Nevertheless, faulti- 
ly as these ideas have been presented, he believes it unwise to cur- 
tail or omit them, trusting if defective in themselves they may in- 
spire better efforts on the part of others. The demand upon all 
military men of the day is work, and work applied to the develop- 
ment of the great field offered by the service of the communica- 
tions cannot help producing an abundant harvest. The signal 
corps cannot do this work alone ; it needs the best assistance that 
the army as a whole can give, and that assistance can best be 
given the corps by service with the line troops. 

As has been said, the signal corps of the army is now com- 
posed by law (omitting temporary assignments) of forty-six of- 
ficers and one thousand two hundred and twelve enlisted men, a 
strength which bears the proportion of about one and three- 
quarters per cent, of the present authorized enlisted strength of 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 175 

the army at large. Before the promulgation of the recent order* 
increasing the army to approximately seventy thousand men, 
the proportion of the signalmen to the total enlisted was about 
two per cent., but the increase reduced this to the present pro- 
portion of about one and three-quarters per cent. It should be 
evident, if allowance be made for absentees, the sick, changes 
of details from and to the Philippines and Alaska, and other 
losses, that the actual number is far too small to carry on 
properly the duties that the mobile army, the coast defense, the 
schools and the military authorities in Cuba, Alaska and the 
Philippines have a right to expect from a signal corps in peace. 
Should hostilities break out it would be too small to even leaven 
the large mass of men that must be called into the service of the 
intelligence communications. In reality, the present authorized 
force of the signal corps is about one-half the number propor- 
tionate to the maximum strength of the Regular Army, fixed at 
one hundred thousand men. The army may be increased to that 
number by executive order at any time, but the signal corps can 
only be increased by legislation. 

The order referred to affords an excellent illustration of the 
faulty working of the present law as regards the signal corps, 
which should at all times have a just proportion to the total of 
the army as authorized by the President. In peace the smallest 
ratio that can be considered satisfactory is believed to be two and 
one-half per cent, of signalmen to the total enlisted; in war this 
must be increased. It must be exceeded, also, should the army 
be largely reduced in numbers, since many of the duties of the 
corps, such as fire control, telegraph and cable service in Alaska, 
do not depend directly upon the size of the army, while others 
do so depend. It follows that a maximum of two thousand five 
hundred signalmen should be authorized to correspond with a 
maximum of one hundred thousand men for the army at large ; 
and that within limits the proportion of the first should vary 
with the last. Under the existing law, if need should arise while 
Congress was not in session to increase the army to one hundred 
thousand men the signal corps must remain at one thousand two 
hundred and twelve and bear a proportion of but little more than 
one per cent, (about 1V5) to the total effective; a quota ridic- 

*Number 130, of June 12, 1907 — before this order, omitting the Porto Rican Pro- 
visional Regiment, and the Philippine Scouts, the army had an authorized strength of 
3869 commissioned officers and 62,516 inlisted men, 121 2 of whom belonged to the signal 
corps, a proportion of about two men to the hundred. By the order above noted, the 
strength of the army was increased, by direction of the President, by 6460 men, giving 
a total of 68,975. 



i76 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

ulously small. In addition, it may be remarked that when com- 
mands are broken into small detachments, as often happens with 
our army, or when expeditionary forces are dispatched, as may 
at any time become necessary from the needs of our peculiar 
situation as regards distant regions, the percentage of signal 
troops must be greater than required for large bodies of troops 
serving in garrison or operating as units in the field, since each 
unit, large or small, must be provided with intelligence lines, 
and since the control of cables and base line stations must be 
given to signalmen. It should, therefore, be evident that in 
peace two thousand five hundred men ought to be allowed as 
a maximum for the service of the communications and that in 
war this number must be increased as the army is increased. 

In war, under modern conditions, it is the belief of the writer 
that the proportion of signal troops, including balloon train and 
wireless, should not fall below four per cent, of the total. This 
would give seven hundred and twenty signalmen to a division 
composed of three brigades of infantry (of three regiments 
each), one regiment of cavalry, nine batteries of field-artillery, 
and the usual auxiliary troops, say eighteen thousand men in all. 
In other words, it would provide six companies of one hundred 
men each in addition to the balloon company of one hundred and 
twenty men. Or, if we consider the balloon train as a separate 
unit, outside the service of the communications proper, the per- 
centage of signal troops becomes a trifle more than three. Prob- 
ably about a just proportion, but not excessive, since it should be 
remembered that signal companies are constantly depleted by 
detachments assigned to commands operating independently, by 
others left at important positions on the flanks or at the rear, or 
placed at outlook stations at the front, and by still others as oper- 
ators at the rear or with the field wireless telegraph. 

Considering the division as the unit the six companies above 
mentioned would be equipped and designated as 

One base line company, 

Two telegraph companies, 

Two field companies. 

One wireless company, 

One balldon company. 

Or if the wireless is included in other companies, as indi- 
cated below, then 

Three field companies. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 177 

The organization and equipment of these companies is out- 
lined in the following provisional scheme :* 

The signal corps troops to serve with each division should 
consist of one battalion of three companies, organized as follows : 

A battalion : 

1 Major, chief signal officer of the division, 

1 Captain, adjutant, quartermaster and commissary, 

1 Sergeant, 1st class, sergeant major, 

1 Field company, 

1 Telegraph company, 

1 Base line company, 
Total enlisted, 301. 

A company: 

1 Captain, 

3 Lieutenants, 

3 Master signal electricians, 
10 Sergeants, 1st class, 
10 Sergeants, 
10 Corporals, 
45 Privates, 1st class, 
20 Privates, 

2 Cooks, 

Total enlisted, 100. 

Companies of the signal corps to be classified according to 
equipment and duties as follows : 

Field companies, 
Telegraph companies, 
Base line companies, 
Balloon companies. 

In general, the distribution of duties should be considered as 
follows : 

Field Company. — To provide lines of communication for 
tactical use during combat, maneuver, rapid marches, etc. 

Telegraph Company. — To provide lines of communication 
for administrative purposes, such as camp telephone systems, 
serving staff departments, supply depots, hospitals, etc. 

Base Line Company. — To provide the lines of communication 
from the base of an army along the route of supply to the distri- 
bution points, connection to commercial telegraph and cable 
systems, etc. 

Each cavalry division should have a battalion consisting of 

*Furnished the writer from Washington; and though not, so far as known, adopted 
at this time (July 15, 1907,), still having the approval of the Chief Signal Officer of the 
Army. 



178 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

two field companies and one telegraph company — the telegraph 
companies, in this case, should all be mounted. 

To the headquarters of each army corps and each unit larger 
than an army corps, there should be assigned one additional 
field and one additional telegraph company to furnish communi- 
cation service for such headquarters. 

These companies should serve under the immediate direction 
of the chief signal officer of the headquarters to which they are 
assigned. 

The base line companies of each battalion should usually be 
assigned for duty under the direction of the chief of telegraph 
and telephone service of the base and lines of communication in- 
stead of serving with the division. 

A balloon company should be assigned to each army corps, 
army or expeditionary force, as circumstances warrant. The 
balloon company should serve under the immediate direction of 
the chief signal officer of the army in the field. 

At present time the ballooning experiments have not been 
sufficiently complete to determine the most suitable equipment and 
transportation for a balloon company. 

Each field company should be provided with equipment to 
furnish communication for a division by visual signals, wireless 
telegraphy, field and buzzer wire lines. 

The amount of the equipment should be sufficient for the 
field company to construct, operate and maintain twenty miles 
field lines, forty miles buzzer line, four field wireless stations, 
consisting of one station and three pack sets with twenty miles 
radius, and six visual signal stations. 

Transportation for a Held company: 

20 Riding horses, 
3 Wire wagons, 4 mules each, ) Special wagons supplied by 

3 Instrument wagons, 2 mules each, > the signal corps ; to be 
3 Lance trucks, 6 mules each, ) driven by signalmen. 

3 Construction wagons (quartermaster escort), 4 mules each, 
2 Escort wagons (quartermaster) for company transportation, 
4 mules each. 

The Quartermaster's Department should furnish the follow- 
ing civilian employees : One assistant wagonmaster, one farrier 
and blacksmith and five teamsters. List of articles appended, 
12,000 pounds lances, 4000 pounds wire on wire wagons and 
10,000 pounds other supplies; total 26,000 pounds. 

Each base line company should be provided with suitable 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 179 

equipment to construct, maintain and operate telegraph and long- 
distance telephone over permanent or semi-permanent lines, fifty- 
miles of three wires, and one wireless telegraph station capable of 
operating to 100 miles. Details from the base line companies 
will assist in the administration of signal corps depots of sup- 
ply at bases and distribution points. 

Transportation for a base line company: 

20 Riding horses, 
3 Instrument wagons, 2 mules each, ) Special wagons supplied by 
2 Wire wagons, 4 mules each, > signal corps ; to be driv- 

2 Lance trucks, 6 mules each, ) en by signal corps men. 

2 Construction wagons (quartermaster escort), 4 mules each, 
2 Escort wagons, 4 mules each. 

The Quartermaster's Department should provide the follow- 
ing civilian employees : One assistant wagonmaster, one farrier 
and blacksmith and four teamsters. In this case wagons for gen- 
eral transportation and construction; total weight of supplies, 
two million pounds. 

The preceding paragraphs, which prescribe organization and 
equipment of various companies, may be amended to conform to 
exceptional conditions of service. 

No means of communication will meet all conditions, there- 
fore the signal corps will provide as great a variety of means 
of communication as practicable, and the signal corps officers in 
charge must determine what means to use for each particular 
case, to provide the most efficient service. This usually requires 
duplicate lines of different types and routes to insure against 
interruption. 

The kind of lines, type of instruments or signal apparatus 
which ought to be carried by a signal corps detachment serving 
line troops in the field should not be prescribed. It should be 
left to the judgment of the senior signal officer present, and the 
amount would usually be limited by the transportation available. 

A division in camp, when the duration warrants, should be 
supplied with the following telephone service by the signal corps : 
One telephone at each brigade headquarters, headquarters of di- 
visional cavalry, headquarters of divisional artillery, engineer 
battalion, quartermaster supply depot, commissary supply depot, 
signal corps headquarters; two telephones at division headquar- 
ters, each field hospital, corral of ammunition and supply train, 
and to each regimental headquarters when the amount of ma- 
terial on hand warrants. 



180 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 

It is believed that the organization above given will answer 
well the needs of the Regular Army, but should war come and the 
great army of volunteers be called into service, the work of 
organizing and equipping a corps of the communications will be 
no slight task. This work has not been neglected, but space is 
lacking for more than a suggestion as to the numbers that will 
be required for the service of the communications in a great war. 
A fair estimate has been made of the strength of the volunteers 
that will be called to the colors, by an officer of the General Staff, 
but even he, in the opinion of the writer, places the number of men 
too low for the service of the communications. He remarks : "In 
any future war with any first-class power, and acting purely on 
the defensive, the United States will require a volunteer army of 
at least five hundred thousand men, in addition to the legal maxi- 
mum strength of one hundred thousand men in the Regular 
Army. Of all the great nations of the earth, including even 
China, our country is the only one that has no system by which 
its forces can be rapidly placed upon a war footing. 

"We have, on paper, about one hundred and twenty thousand 
men in our organized militia or National Guard, of whom only 
about thirty-three per cent, would be available for service in the 
volunteer army. Our regular establishment can supply the neces- 
sary complement of both line and staff-officers for the maximum 
strength of the Regular Army alone, and officers, line and staff, 
for four hundred and sixty thousand volunteers will have to be 
forthcoming. It has been usual in the past to allow one and one- 
half per cent, of the total strength for the service of the lines of 
information, and for six hundred thousand men we would then 
require nine thousand trained technical men for such service. 
The proper complement of officers for such a force is, in round 
numbers, four hundred and fifty."* 

In the opinion of the writer, as indicated above, this esti- 
mate should at least be doubled. For a force of six hundred 
thousand men no less than twelve regiments of one thousand five 
hundred men each should be provided for the service of the com- 
munications. If the estimates above *made are accepted as a 
criterion of the needs of the armies of the United States in war 
in the matter of the personnel of the intelligence communications, 
it appears evident that difficulty will be experienced, not only in 
supplying the men needed, but in obtaining the officers necessary 



*Lieut.-Col. S. R. Reber, Signal Corps, in a paper read in 1906 before the Telephone 
Society of New York. 



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. 



iSl 



for their control and direction. Nevertheless it is believed that 
the men will be found and that the small nucleus of the peace 
establishment, aided by experienced officers of the National 
Guard, will sufficiently leaven the whole mass. 



Note. — At present, signal companies exist for administration only. G. O. No. 146, 
War Department, Washington, D. C, July 5, 1907, gives the following as the normal 
organization of a signal company assigned to a division in the field : 
1 Captain. 

3 First lieutenants. 

1 Sergeant acting as first sergeant. 

1 Sergeant acting as quartermaster-sergeant. 
20 Sergeants, first-class. 
41 Sergeants. 
10 Corporals. 
74 Privates. 

4 Cooks. 

150 Total enlisted. 
This company is to have charge of visual signaling, telegraphy, telephony and wire- 
less communications. 



[TO BE CONTINUED.] 





A 



NOTES ON THE NEW JAPANESE INFANTRY 
TRAINING. 

Collated by Captain T. H. LOW, U. S. M. C. 

[From translation in Journal Royal United Service Institution of an article by Major 
Ishiura Kenjiro, Imperial Japanese Infantry.] 

NEW provisional infantry training superseding 
the former one of 1898 was promulgated in 
Japan last December. Embodying as it does 
the ''lessons of the war," a comparison of it is espe- 
cially interesting. 

The innovations are few and tend toward uni- 
formity with the British infantry training. Practical 
performance in the field is made the test. Essen- 
tials are emphasized, as well as the cultivation of 
individual intelligence and initiative. Following the 
lines of all recent revisions, the feature of this one 
is curtailment of all formal movements, with simplification and 
clearness of methods. Extended order is made more elastic to 
enable the ever-changing emergencies of war to be met. Great 
latitude in choice of methods is allowed leaders in field-training. 
Indeed, in all that part of the drill book relating to fighting, gen- 
eral principles are made to take the place of rigid rules. It 
is the end, rather than the means, that is constantly em- 
phasized, and much is left to the judgment of the officer, to be 
decided according to the exigencies of the moment. Thus, more 
responsibility is thrown on the officers, in spite of the youth of 
most of them. 

Though the importance of extended order drill and prac- 
tical exercises is greatly increased, the value of close-order drill 
is fully recognized. No attempt is made to weld them together, 
but the essentially distinct character of each is indicated. While 
the polish of the old drill may be lacking, any tendency of the 
rougher and readier methods toward carelessness or slackness is 
combated by requiring the greatest uniformity and precision 
in close order. To further discourage slackness, all the prac- 
tical exercises must be preceded by clear explanations of the 
object to be attained. This must be followed by detailed in- 
struction on how best to accomplish the objective, together 
with warning, as to the probable difficulties that must be over- 



JAPANESE INFANTRY TRAINING. 183 

come. Finally, as an additional means of tightening the bonds 
of discipline, and strengthening the morale, strictness in the 
interior discipline of barrack life is relied on. 

Reduced length of services in the ranks is met by reducing, 
as well as simplifying the movements of close order. All 
those, whose use in practice is comparatively rare, are cut out, 
while the distinct character of "Ceremonial" is emphasized by 
its publication in a separate book. In battalion drill, double 
column of companies is abolished, and the normal formations 
of the battalion reduced to two, line of company columns and 
column of sections. Both of these are practical marching forma- 
tions, enabling troops to take advantage of natural cover, and 
conveniently march over broken ground, while allowing full 
control by the battalion commander. Moreover, there are, ap- 
parently, no fixed methods laid down for gaining these forma- 
tions, but methods may be adopted suitable for the occasion. 
In the regimental drill, all commands of the colonel, both pre- 
paratory and of execution, are superseded by either written 
orders or verbal instructions. 

In company drill, forming square is canceled, as its prac- 
tical usefulness was found to be rare. Only one method is pro- 
vided for changing direction instead of two, as formerly. Dress- 
ing is simplified to accord with our methods. The former prac- 
tice required every man to cover off by file to the front when in 
column, and was most intricate. As also in our own case, the 
introduction of a distinct movement to reduce front in column 
of squads is cut out. 

On the other hand, new movements are authorized in ex- 
tended order. Additional instructions are laid down as to the 
deployment of a battalion, and means are provided for as- 
sembling its skirmishers to any desired formation, column as 
well as line. The general principles of attack, such as keeping 
one company in reserve, are also elaborated. The interval be- 
tween skirmishers is now fixed at two paces approximately, in- 
stead of from one to two, as in the old drill. Indeed, the in- 
crease in distances and intervals in the new drill is significant. 

In the marchings, the same tendency toward simplicity and 
practicability is apparent. The old modified goose step is super- 
seded by a more natural one. "Stepping back" is altogether 
omitted, also the special charging step, which, formerly, im- 
mediately preceded the charge. Though the normal length of 
the rushes is still set at about a hundred yards, it must now be 



184 



JAPANESE INFANTRY TRAINING. 



made at the fastest pace (on the run), instead of at the double, as 
formerly. 

It is curious to note that the old position of attention for 
the Japanese soldier, with feet at 90 degrees and palms turned 
out at 45 degrees, has been changed to conform with our own 
position as being more natural. On the other hand, their new 
kneeling position is made more dissimilar by requiring the right 
leg to rest on the ground. While for us this would be an al- 
most impossible position, for them it is a more natural one, being 
a half sitting position. 

The detailed instructions as to the firings are most interest- 
ing. For all of them extended order is laid down as the normal 
formation. The old slow fire, executed alternately by file, is 
now dropped, and instruction in volley firing is decreased. Only 
two forms of individual fire are recognized, the ordinary and 
the rapid. Special stress is placed on the fact that effectiveness 
of fire is more dependent on steadiness and deliberateness than 
on rapidity. The value of quickness, however, is emphasized in 
loading, in assuming easy positions, suitable to the ground and 
range, in picking up targets, no matter how obscure, and in the 
proper adjustment of sights. The importance of choosing the 
right moment to fire is also noted. On halting skirmishers, the 
position is no longer designated, as the impracticability on varied 
ground of uniformity in position is recognized. Loading on the 
move is canceled, as it was found liable to cause delays and to 
be injurious to discipline. 




NOTES ON RIFLE PRACTICE IN AUSTRALASIA. 

By Major W. C. BROWN, Third Cavalry. 




w 



HAT we are attempting in the United States 
through the means of the National Rifle As- 
sociation is an established fact in Australia. Every 
town of any considerable size has its rifle club and 
target range. The Randwick range, near Sydney, 
N. S. W., is equipped with ninety targets with ranges 
up to iooo yards. I had no means of judging of the 
efficiency of the Australians as rifle shots, but the ef- 
forts to this end which are being made fully war- 
ranted the assumption that they are rapidly developing 
an army of expert shots. The membership of their rifle clubs, I 
was informed, is no less than 40,000. 

More attention is paid to moving or disappearing targets 
and to field firing than with us. 

The writer was present at the Launceston range on the last 
afternoon of the preliminary practice of the Tasmanian Rifle 
Association for the Federal Rifle Match, which took place De- 
cember 26-29, 1906. Riflemen had gathered here from all over 
Australia. Their program called for fourteen matches. 

Nos. 1 to 6, inclusive, and Nos. 11 and 14, were ordinary 
known distance fireing at ranges from 200 to 900 yards. 

No. 7, rapid firing at disappearing targets at 200 yards dis- 
tance, the target a disc eighteen inches in diameter, colored khaki, 
with a bull's-eye, invisible to the firer, eight inches in diameter, 
counting four points, remainder of target two points. The tar- 
get to appear eight times for four seconds, with intervals of six 
seconds between appearances. 

No. 8, moving target, continuous. The target being the pic- 
ture of a crouching man colored khaki. 

No. 9, team snap shooting. Rapid firing at a figure of a man 
appearing and disappearing at intervals and at unknown dis- 
tances. Team advancing on the target somewhat as in our skir- 
mish firing. Targets appearing for ten seconds, intervals of dis- 
appearance from twenty to forty seconds. 

No. 10, skirmish firing at irregular and unknown distances, 
the line commencing to advance at about 1200 yards. 



1 86 RIFLE PRACTICE IN AUSTRALASIA. 

b. Teams to advance at the trail at three paces interval, by 
command of the umpire. 

c. On the appearance of the targets, teams will halt and fire 
in any military position, as many rounds as they choose. 

d. On the disappearance of the targets the men will unload 
and the teams will advance with trailed arms. On the reappear- 
ance of the targets the teams will halt and fire as before. 

e. A third advance will be made on the same condition. 

f. A fourth advance will be made at the double time, halting 
and firing as before. 

g. Teams will then be marched to a flank and fronted by the 
umpire. On the appearance of the targets, teams will fire again. 

h. Magazines not allowed. Forty rounds of ammunition to 
be issued to each man. 

i. Targets will appear five times at irregular and unknown in- 
tervals at the discretion of the umpire. Each hit to count one. 

No. 12, open to teams of ten men each. Targets 6x6 feet, on 
which is (during the first stage) the figure of a man colored 
khaki, and (during the second stage) the head and shoulders of 
a man colored khaki, apparently in the act of firing; the targets 
will appear and disappear at intervals. 

Scoring : Every hit on the figure of a man, or on the head 
and shoulders, to count one point. 

In the first stage teams will be formed up at 700 to 800 yards 
from the targets, and will advance with arms at the trail, by order 
of the executive officer. 

a. At a given signal, the targets will appear for twenty sec- 
onds, during which every man will load and fire as many shots as 
he thinks fit. 

b. Immediately on the disappearance of the targets, the men 
will unload and the whole team will advance with trailed arms. 

c. Targets will appear four times more, each time for fifteen 
seconds, and the interval of disappearance will be varied between 
twenty and forty seconds, at the discretion of the executive officer. 
As soon as the targets appear the teams will halt, and every com- 
petitor will fire as many shots as he thinks fit; as soon as they 
disappear the men will unload and advance as before directed. 

d. When a point about 400 yards from the targets has been 
reached, the teams will halt (on the bugle sounding) and lie 
down, but not load. 

Instructions. — Second stage : On the command from the ex- 
ecutive or range officer, the team will advance and at a given 



RIFLE PRACTICE IN AUSTRALASIA. 187 

signal the head and shoulders targets will appear for forty sec- 
onds, during which time the competitors will halt, load and fire 
as many shots as they please. 

On the disappearance of the targets the whole team will re- 
tire in quick time, unload, and at a given signal from the executive 
officer, will halt, lie down, load and watch for the appearance of 
the targets. The targets will appear at unknown and irregular 
intervals, five ( 5 ) times, for five seconds each time ; and at each 
appearance every competitor will fire one shot or more as he 
thinks fit, and need not unload or move from his position until 
the last disappearance of the targets, when on the bugle sounding 
"Cease Fire" every man will unload, rise and stand at ease. 

It will be seen that the five matches last mentioned contem- 
plate firing under quite difficult conditions, more so than any- 
thing found in our firing regulations, or which takes place at our 
annual competitions. 

It must be admitted, however, that this is exactly the kind of 
work which we must do in war — therefore why not practice it in 
time of peace. Our firing regulations are excellent as far as they 
go, but they do not go far enough. 

At Christchurch, New Zealand, the writer witnessed a com- 
petition between teams selected from the various companies of 
Volunteers in the Canterbury Valley ; the competition being open 
to squads comprising an officer, two sergeants, a bugler and six- 
teen privates. It was a combined tactical maneuver and rifle 
contest; the targets, part of which were of the disappearing 
order, represented a small party of the enemy with a Maxim gun, 
which had taken up a position on a hill from which they were 
to be dislodged by a combination of direct and flank attacks. 
Umpires followed the movement awarding points for the com- 
mand of the squad, method of conducting the attack, taking of 
cover, control of fire and number of hits recorded on the target. 
The firing was all done under service conditions and the whole 
exercise was of an extremely practical nature, thirty rounds of 
ball ammunition per man being used. 

An examination of the "English Musketry Regulations," 
edition 1905, shows that our English cousins are fully alive to the 
fact that rifle practice should be made as practical as possible. 
Their methods are doubtless more or less the outcome of their 
experience in the Boer War. No less than twenty-eight schemes 
for field practice are outlined in these regulations. These are sim- 
ple tactical schemes which afford progressive training to all con- 



1 88 RIFLE PRACTICE IN AUSTRALASIA. 

cerned and serve to illustrate the various phases which may be 
expected on active service, and test the capacity of non-com- 
missioned officers for leading and controlling the fire of their 
squads. 

Quoting from their musketry regulations : "After the usual 
known distance firing the soldier is trained in taking up an in- 
distinct target such as is likely to be presented in war, in esti- 
mating its range, in rapidly opening fire and in making the best 
use of ground." * * * "In war the unforseen often 

happens and the more all ranks are practiced in peace to act in 
unexpected circumstances the better they will be prepared to 
meet them if the occasion demands." * * * "Tar- 

gets are arranged so as to contain an element of surprise. Tar- 
gets should at first be sufficiently exposed to be distinctly visible, 
and gradually become more difficult; and arrangements should 
be made to demonstrate the results of effective fire by the em- 
ployment of targets which can be lowered when struck, or which 
fall automatically. These latter targets are provided for in the 
falling iron target, made of ^-inch plate about 12 inches square, 
provided with a slight base so that it will stand on any ground 
and fall when struck by a bullet. The plate may be colored as 
required." 

In the judging distance test, the observer is required to esti- 
mate from behind cover in a kneeling or lying position and is 
allowed but half a minute in which to make his estimate. In 
the range practice the instructor is not permitted to set the re- 
cruit's sight but every effort is made to develop his intelligence 
and reasoning powers. The Commonwealth Forces in Australia 
comprise approximately 1300 permanent troops, 15,000 militia 
and 5000 volunteers. The pay of the Australian militia is about 
$12.50 per man per year and for this he performs about eight 
days' service in camp, with weekly drills the remainder of the 
year, about the same as our National Guard. The volunteer 
troops serve without pay. 

Much attention is paid to the military training of the youth 
of the country by the organization and training of cadet corps in 
boys' schools. 



THE GERMAN IDEA OF THE USE OF FORTRESSES 
IN MODERN WAR. 

{From the Revue Militaire des Armees etrangeres.) 

Translated by Brig.-Gen. FRANK TAYLOR, U. S. Army. 




T 



HE fourth part of the "Studies of History and 
Tactics," published by the German General Staff, 
is devoted to "Fortresses in the Wars of Napoleon and 
Wars of Modern Times." The preamble sets forth 
that "The General Staff has been guided in the choice 
of this subject from the conviction that at the present 
time it is the object of the greatest interest in all parts 
of the army." This would seem to be confirmed by the 
fact that a great number of works have lately been pub- 
lished in Germany discussing the subject from most 
diverse historical, strategical and technical standpoints. 
With the same reserve characterizing their former publica- 
tions the German staff, although having made notes on the 
narrative of each event, cautiously refrain from generalizations. 
They leave the reader to adapt to modern times the instruction 
he derives from the wars of the past. Comparing the work with 
the writings of the military leaders who have imbibed from the 
same source, it is of great interest. It may contribute materially 
to the settlement of certain points of the German doctrine on a 
subject which the General Staff declares to be the question of 
the hour. 

It cannot be denied that a sudden change has taken place in 
the German idea of the usefulness and importance of fortresses. 
"The importance attached to fortresses in the wars of the 
last centuries fluctuates a great deal. Naturally the amount of 
resistance that fortifications are capable of opposing to attack, 
influences, 'in great measure, the conduct of the war. The un- 
interrupted progress of science will not produce uniformity of 
opinion in the future any more than in the past. It claims at 
one time temporary superiority for the attack, and at another for 
the defense, which results in incessant fluctuations of the value 
attributed to fortresses. 

"But military history also teaches that technical improve- 
ments are not the sole cause of these fluctuations. The spirit 



igo GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 

governing a war exercises a preponderating influence in that 
domain. In a general way the predilection for fortresses cor- 
responds with the periods when the conduct of the war has been 
timid, limited to the pursuit of geographical objectives, whereas 
in great decisive epochs the destruction of the enemy's forces is 
sought and attained, in spite of all obstacles of fortifications." 

It would appear that in the estimation of the Germans there 
are exceptions serving to confirm this general rule; for if in 
these days they evince a greater predilection for fortresses, we 
cannot discern in them — as we shall see later on — the slightest 
tendency to the more timorous mode of warfare, nor less eager- 
ness for the decisive. 

During the twenty years following the war of 1870, the 
Germans have never ceased criticizing our infatuation for the 
fortress and the extravagance of our defensive organization. 

It may be said that with the exception of Strasburg, they 
constructed no stronghold during that period, and the most 
eminent military writers viewed this as a manifestation of 
strength and preference for the offensive. 

"Extensive plans of fortification," says von der Goltz, "de- 
note a sense of weakness. A nation imbued with the offensive 
spirit will use them in moderation. The nation seeking safety 
behind intrenchments and ditches has no consciousness of 
strength. 

"It is more convenient," says Blume, "for a people to seek 
its salvation from walls than to endeavor by arduous work to 
preserve that spirit and activity which induces the skilful use 
of the sword. An exaggerated tendency to the use of fortifica- 
tions grows out of an unconscious sensation of weakness, fort- 
resses being of service only with an enemy of superior strength." 

And technical men, arguing from what happened at Plevna, 
join in the cry against permanent fortifications. 

"Fortified places," says Sauer, substantially, "very imper- 
fectly fulfil their task. They no longer protect a frontier, no 
longer interdict invasion, no longer assure the shelter of the 
great army depots. In the future they will be used only for the 
momentary protection of the great war establishments and as 
provisionary barriers to the keys to railway systems, which the 
enemy would be unable to turn." According to that it would 
be logical to abandon all the fortified positions not answering 
these conditions. On the other hand, the improvised fortifica- 
tions designed to second the operations of the army in the field 



GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 191 

will, in the future, probably play the part which the old fortifica- 
tions are now incapable of doing. 

Since 1888, however, there has been a reaction. In his work 
on the "Conduct of War" von der Goltz expatiates on the power- 
ful aid (he cites Metz as an example) which permanent fortifica- 
tions can give to operations, and the theories of Sauer begin to 
be looked on as a day-dream. Whatever may be the causes — 
which we shall attempt to discover in the course of this study — 
the fact is undeniable that for several years past great activity 
has been displayed in fortification work in Germany. Speaking 
only of the western frontier of the Empire, numerous works 
have been erected in the valley of the Rhine at Molsheim, Neuf- 
Brisach and Istein. In Lorraine a fort has been constructed at 
Guentrange, near Thionville; the perimeter of Metz has been 
extended toward the west and south by the works at Saulny, 
Point du Jour and Saint-Blaise. It is well known that the de- 
fensive system of Alsace-Lorraine has been completely trans- 
formed. 

The changes in ideas are well marked in the successive 
budgets of the German Empire. Up to 1893 the trifling sums 
appropriated for fortifications were for "keeping up and per- 
fecting existing works." In 1893 the budget sets forth that 
"the appropriations made up to this time are no longer sufficient 
for strengthening important fortified positions and for profiting 
from the recent technical progress in that domain." 

From that period, and up to 1899, the annual appropriations 
for fortifications were increased from 3,000,000 to 7,000,000 
francs. For the year 1899, ' m one bound, they reach the sum of 
12,500,000 francs; they become, normally, for the years follow- 
ing (1900 to 1906) 18,750,000 francs, "to which is added the 
proceeds from the sale of the land and material of the abandoned 
enceintes," a sum amounting to from 22,000,000 to 25,000,000 
francs. Despite objections made at the beginning, these credits 
were regularly granted by the Parliament, the Minister of War 
having affirmed the necessity of repairing little by little the laro-e 
fortified places, of transforming and perfecting the defensive 
system of the Empire to adapt it to the new conditions of modern 
warfare. 

****** 

Among the many causes attributed to this return to favor of 
fortifications there is one purely technical, which should be first 
mentioned in its true order of importance. It is that relating to 



192 GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 

the development of resistance in the means of defense. Indeed, 
the General Staff has come to the conclusion, as in the time of 
Frederick the Great, that "Despite all the work done on for- 
midable looking fortifications, those of our day are no longer 
impregnable." Sauer's theories are very little honored, since 
concrete and armor-plating have demonstrated their powers of 
resistance to explosive projectiles. It it no longer disputed in 
Germany that the great modern fortifications, well constructed 
and armed, abundantly supplied and energetically defended, are 
capable of a long resistance. But this argument would not in 
itself explain the necessity of constructing an extended network 
of fortifications which elsewhere have been objected to as great 
disadvantages. 

"That which is of the greatest importance," says Bernhardi, 
"is to prepare operations as completely as possible by making all 
the material means of the State contribute to that end. Every 
other consideration should be subordinate to this primordial 
necessity. This truth is particularly applicable to fortifications, 
a means of defense bound to the soil, useful only if attacked and 
having the disadvantage of diverting from the theater of de- 
civive action enormous resources of personnel and materiel." 

"If it is true that maneuvering is perhaps even more neces- 
sary in the defense than in the attack, then the only fortresses 
having a reason for existence are those which, according to the 
forecast, will be of positive service in conducting the operations." 
Any fortress that does not respond to these conditions, and whose 
cost in resources is more than it should be to that end, seems to 
me to be useless, since its action is outside the field of decisive 
battle, and, setting aside exceptions which prove the rule, I can- 
not deny that the laws of Sparta, which forbade every sort of 
fortification, appear to me to have a profound significance from 
a military point of view. The resources economized by the re- 
duction of fortifications effect an important gain for the prepara- 
tions of the war in the field." (Conference of the Military So- 
ciety of Berlin.) 

Von Moltke had already said more succinctly : "The strategic 
value of a fortress is the only point to consider in deciding 
whether there is occasion for devoting large means toward re- 
storing or enlarging it. So far as construction is concerned, its 
condition is only a secondary consideration in determining what 
should be done for it, according to the requirements of the time 
being." 



GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 193 

It would be the utmost childishness to insist on the idea that 
the Germans have erected fortresses, not because they are strong, 
but rather because they are useful. It is, therefore, only by in- 
vestigating the German doctrine on the eventual employment of 
fortresses and the part they may be called on to play under the 
various circumstances of war, that the reasons determining their 
construction can be explained. 

We must, first of all, refute the idea that the extension of 
fortification would be a symptom of weakness in the offensive 
tendency of the German Army. Never, perhaps, since the time 
when the great king exalted that tendency in pompous verse, 
urging the attack at all times and declaring that "Bellone an- 
nounces a happy destiny and brilliant deeds so long as your 
troops are the assailants," has the spirit of the offensive been so 
strong in the Germans as it is to-day. There is no end to the 
diverse manifestations of this ultra-offensive spirit among 
German military writers. But it will be interesting to fix the 
attention on the one who from official connection would seem 
to reflect most exactly the present doctrine of the German General 
Staff. 

"To sum up, the principle governing all the art of war rests 
in the offensive. * * * The offensive is the mistress of 
every issue in war ; it is the primordial principle thereof. ' * * * 
The offensive, either direct or indirect, is the law on every side ; 
it is first and last the determining principle. * * * Even 
though tactically in a battle of firearms, the defensive should 
appear to be the stronger mode of combat, the offensive is much 
the better way of making war. * * * The strategic and 
moral superiority of the offensive will always carry the day. 
* * * The superiority of the offensive resides in the fact 
that audacity is its birthright, a creative might whose true birth- 
place is the offensive. * * *" 

These aphorisms are justified by a more concise argument: 
"The offensive is the favorite child of Bellone. It counts with 
relative superiority, while the other, the defensive, counts with 
absolute superiority; the first acts with entire liberty, while the 
other is bound down by the extent and configuration of the 
theater of the war. The offensive is conducted with all its forces 
united, whereas the defensive is forced by the different possi- 
bilities of the attack to separate them ; on the one side the object 
is precise and plain, on the other it is problematical ; on the part 
of one, active will; on the other, passive; here boldness, there 



i 94 GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 

prudence, Hannibal versus Fabius Cunctator. Who can doubt 
that the great Carthagenian would have been victorious if his 
country had not abandoned him?" 

Finally, leaving the serene region of generalities to face the 
concrete case, the author again affirms his opinion, at times in 
phrases flavored with threatening language: "We are facing 
to-day a much greater crisis than the strife for German unity. 
The question then was whether Germany would succeed in 
uniting and acquire a place among the great Continental powers ; 
but now the question is, shall Germany command a place among 
the great powers of the world, or shall she allow herself to fall 
back to the second rank ? If all signs do not fail, that question, 
in spite of all the arbitration treaties and peace congresses, will 
be settled by blood and steel. For myself, I am convinced that 
we shall come out of the struggle victoriously, whoever may be 
our adversary, if we only succeed in keeping up and fortifying 
the warlike spirit of our people, in developing our military 
strength in the direction of offensive warfare, in pushing them 
to the highest degree of production, that is to say, in increasing 
to the utmost, among our troops, the aptitude for operations 
and boldness in battle. We must convert all the useful means at 
our command into live proficiency, not indirectly, but directly 
looking toward offensive zuar. We must, in fact, put into prac- 
tice everything tending to form independent characters, men 
who will act with confidence and wide liberty of judgment; in 
a word, men capable of acts of boldness." 

While recognizing, in general, this evident predilection for 
the offensive, one might ask, for instance, if the construction of 
a fortified network on the western frontier of the Empire has 
not been occasioned by a modification, supervening about the 
same time, in the grouping of the great European powers, and 
if in the event of a war to be carried on in two distinct theaters of 
operations, Germany would not adopt a defensive attitude on 
that frontier. However that might be, it is safe to say that the 
use of fortresses would not lead the Germans to maintain their 
army in a defensive attitude protected by them. It even seems 
certain that the fact of being menaced on two of their frontiers 
would, on the contrary, determine them all the more rapidly to 
seek decisive action in the direction where the enemy would be 
more within their reach. 

And when the necessity of covering a frontier of the Empire 
causes numerical inferiority on the principal field of operations, 



GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 195 

it would be another reason for seeking decisive action by taking 
the offensive. This idea, which to some may appear paradoxical, 
is forcibly expressed by Bernhardi : "The defensive should only 
be employed where the offensive has lost all the advantage which 
belong to it ; that is to say, where it would be bound down to a 
well-fixed direction of attack, or where, fighting only to gain 
time, the object is to avoid decisive action. History teaches that, 
thanks to the offensive, armies have inflicted decisive defeats on 
adversaries much stronger than themselves, and though on the 
defensive inferior numbers have been well able to successfully 
repulse the attack of considerably stronger forces, they have 
never been able to obtain a positively decisive success. There is 
no doubt that there are limits. In seeking victory with an in- 
ferior force, that force should invariably be strong enough to 
fight a sufficiently considerable part of the enemy's force in a 
decisive manner so as to establish the equilibrium by defeating 
it. It is the law of numbers. But, acting within the limits fixed 
by that law, to be logical, the weaker should always act on the 
offensive. The weak and wavering only can, in such case, act 
on the defensive." 

In this theory (offensive by the weaker) — reference to which 
will be made later — we may discover an especially judicious 
utilization of fortified places. 



All the preceding abundantly proves that German fortresses 
are not expected to play a passive part. We may safely predict 
that they will be used for the protection of more or less extensive 
portions of territory, in the possession of which the Germans 
undoubtedly, outside all strategical considerations, attach par- 
ticular value. To conceive a passive part for them would be 
going backward 300 years, to the time of the wars in the low 
countries and the Thirty-years' War, "when, as the General 
Staff says, for reasons justified by existing circumstances, the 
existence of a people was not the question, but the possession of 
localities and fortresses in the contested provinces." In the 
eyes of the General Staff, "one of the principal merits of Fred- 
erick the Great was in having overturned the methods of so- 
called cabinet warfare and of having realized that in the new 
conditions anxiety to keep the fortresses should exercise no in- 
fluence whatever in operations, so long as there was an enemy 
to fight in the open field." 



1 96 GERMAN IDEA OF FORTRESSES. 

The allotments made by the German military authorities for 
fortresses are more easily explained by the part they may have 
to play as depots. "A large army," says Blume, "needs depots 
of all sorts when it is extended beyond the frontier. These depots 
should be protected against the enemy, and when he is active and 
energetic, if recourse is not had to fortifications, the demand for 
forces is so great that the main action of the troops is crippled. 
Therefore, on national territory the depots for war material 
should be inside fortified places, when not sufficiently secure by 
their distance from the scene of operations. In the case of an 
offensive war in an enemy's country it is of advantage to possess 
one or several fortified depots on the frontier." 

The same opinion is expressed by Schroter, whose argument 
is more objectively fitted to the French frontier : "Acceleration 
of the strategical deployment can be obtained by diminution of 
railroad transport for concentration movements. This would 
happen, for instance, if a part of the war material, such as the 
heavy artillery and its stores, had been deposited since peace 
times, near the frontier. But they should, during that time, be 
protected against any attempt of the enemy, and that requires 
that they be shut up in fortresses." 

Moltke has always denied the necessity of fortified places for 
depots in the immediate vicinity of the frontier, notably in 1867, 
when he showed all his circumspection on the subject of the 
enlargement of Sarrelouis : "I cannot rate its value so much as a 
depot in case of the offensive. A good railway system in our 
rear, which we absolutely must establish on the Rhine, will com- 
pletely assure our base of supplies, even if our depots are in 
fortresses bordering on the river. I must renew the advice I 
gave on that subject, which is, that we must use all the means 
at our command for the country's defense, in the construction of 
strategic lines of railway." 

Blume, somewhat in contradiction of his former opinion, 
develops the same idea : "In a war where a complete railway 
system can be utilized, the necessity for fortified depots is less 
apparent. With railways we can rapidly, at the needful moment, 
draw from the country every description of supplies, even from 
the most distant points, which, without them, would have to be 
placed near the theater of the war and collected in depots, so as 
to have them at hand in ample time." 



PRACTICE MARCHES IN THE TROPICS. 
By Major S. J. ROCKENBACH, Philippine Scouts. 




u 



NDER the provisions of G. O. 23 and 44, 
W." D., 1906, and G. O. 19 and 34 Philip- 
pines Division, 1906, the infantry has had 
a year's experience in marching' with the field- 
kit. This has been of great benefit, and will 
' result, unless the writer's experience has been 
^ peculiar, in a decided change for tropical service 
in the method of carrying the pack and in the 
articles which compose it. 

In the Fifth Battalion of Philippine Scouts a 
rigid compliance with the orders revealed men physically unfit 
for service and others so lacking in esprit or knowledge, that 
they were an impediment on the march. Formerly, every com- 
pany could put from thirty to sixty per cent, in the field able 
to make good marches, but in one way or another the old and 
weak escaped field-service, and field-service authorized the em- 
ployment of cargadores, so that till the enforcement of the 
orders for practice marches it was not known what one hundred 
per cent, of the company could do carrying- the field-kit. Men 
were found with asthma and subject to heat exhaustion. Neither 
can march, and their discharge was obtained. The burden of 
war is much lightened if we start on it with only men physically 
fit for campaigning; our Regular Army must be ready for cam- 
paigning. The percentage necessary is 100. 

It is harped on in the cavalry that the rate of march is 
that of the slowest horse; that the horses must be uniformly 
gaited. It is essential in the infantry to work on the slowest 
man and bring him up to the required step and cadence. Com- 
panies must be gaited over a measured course until they march 
uniformly, if the battalion is to march well. 

In the dry season there should be no marching between 9 
a. m. and 4 p. m. More can be accomplished, and with a mini- 
mum of fatigue, between 1 a. m. and 9 a. m. In the rainy sea- 
son circumstances modify the time, but the essentials are the 
same. Under a tropical sun and a cloudless sky men cannot 
stand marching, when that sun is over forty degrees high; they 



198 MARCHING IN THE TROPICS. 

must have daylight to cook in, to care for their persons and 
to prepare camp in order to get the necessary rest. 

Marching largely depends on the mental condition of the 
individual. Probably due to racial characteristics, we make less 
appeal to the sentiment of our men and teach less patriotism 
than do foreign nations. It is another of the things that we 
leave till war overtakes us, confident that the American will 
do all that is required of him. In time of peace we must ap- 
peal to their pride. Get a company to believe it can march an- 
other off its feet, and you will have to keep sharp watch that 
it does not do so. No one ever fell out of the advance guard. 
A scouting party sent out in advance of the battalion with 
orders to seize and hold a ferry goes, with the same halts, 
seventeen miles in an hour's less time than the battalion. The 
men of the second rate and rear companies are wearied by 
the monotonous view of the backs of the men in front of them. 
Those companies require the strong, cheerful officers to in- 
pire them. Music, a song, or a tune whistled are inspiring. It 
is a question if not keeping step is resting; there is a swing 
to a column in step that helps it along, frequent changes of 
step are believed to be more beneficial. Weeding out, considera- 
tion and study of the circumstances of climate and of the mental 
attitude has in a year produced a battalion (380 men) able to 
march without straggling seventeen miles in seven hours on the 
road, or five and one-quarter hours actual marching. This was 
impossible a year ago. 

THE FIELD-KIT. 

The Shoe. — None of the shoes furnished — the old shoe, the 
garrison shoe, or the field-shoe — are suited for service in the 
tropics. The old shoe, made fuller, so as not to press the toes, 
of moccasin, or foot form, the sole not less than one-half inch 
thick and hob-nailed, the upper of canvas, or of as light leather 
as the requirements of strength will permit, without bellows 
tongue, and two holes one-eighth of an inch in diameter, punched 
at the bottom of the counter on either side of the rear seam, so 
as not to hold water, makes the best shoe. The care of the 
shoe is of but little less importance than the shoe itself. If 
after using the shoe in mud and water, a tree is put into it, or 
it is stuffed with hay, grass or leaves, or rags, cleaned, dried 
in the shade and then coated with neats foot oil, its life is 
trebled. Very little oil is required. If each squad is provided 



MARCHING IN THE TROPICS. _ 199 

with a three-quarter inch flat paint brush, one dipping of the 
brush into the oil will suffice to coat a pair of shoes. A shoe 
thus treated half a dozen times in garrison gives the soldier 
a shoe for the field that is comfortable and will wear till the 
thread rots ; then it is not expensive to repair. In cold climates, 
for warmth, a shoe must be large enough to take the yarn-ribbed 
sock without the least constraint on the foot. In the tropics 
a shoe must not bind the foot, nor must it be large enough to 
rub. This requires a shoe to be close fitting on the start and 
to be tightened by the laces after an hour's march through mud 
and water. 

Socks.— The. light woolen sock is the best. It furnishes a 
cushion to the foot, absorbs perspiration, keeps off leeches and, if 
when wet it is taken off and wrung out, it can be put back on 
and slept in without taking cold. 

The Legging. — A legging suitable for all tropical service is 
an impossibility, for it would have to be light for comfort, heavy 
and strong to protect the legs, of canvas or leather to keep from 
getting snagged, of wool to be noiseless and protect from leeches. 
The only solution is to have a woolen spiral woven puttee for 
stalking and where there are leeches, and a canvas legging for 
other service. The legging should be taken off on reaching camp. 

Breeches.— It costs, in the United States, from eighteen to 
thirty dollars to get a pair of breeches made that will not hinder a 
man in scaling a ten-foot wall. It is impossible to issue breeches 
that will not do so. Send out a cut of the desired shape and let 
each man have his breeches made ; it won't cost the man any more 
and he will get better material and workmanship. The enlisted 
man, if he takes off his leggings, as he should do on returning 
to garrison, must stay in quarters, as khaki trousers are not 
issued. 

The Flannel Shirt. — This is the shirt for tropical marching and 
is hard to improve. A light woolen sweater that cannot be 
opened at the chest prevents sudden chilling and,' when the belt 
is taken off, the body is cooled gradually and pleasantly from 
below. At night men should be required to take off, or loosen, 
belts, and pull the shirt out of the breeches. The clothing of the 
Oriental is ideal for repose ; we can imitate it on reaching camp 
by pulling the shirt out of the breeches. Our provincial ideas on 
the subject would not be shocked, if the shirt were a sweater. 
The difficulties in the way of keeping the soldier looking natty 



200 MARCHING IN THE TROPICS. 

in the field in the tropics are many more than it would be to 
make the salt marsh snipe hunter look dressed up. 

The Service Hat. — The $5 Stetson hat cannot be improved 
on. One has had constant tropical use since August, 1903, and 
is still a good hat and looks well. It has been cleaned, resized 
and a new band put in once a year; this can be done almost 
everywhere in the Philippines at little cost. One good hat is 
better and as cheap as three low-priced ones. 

The Blanket. — There is little variation in temperature in the 
tropics; cool or hot depends on the breeze and shade. The 
native has little clothing and no cover. He closes his hut tight 
at night, all the air comes through the floor and there is no 
draft. Both the native and foreigner are very sensitive to cold ; 
neither can endure warm clothing; the thing to do is to avoid 
the draft. The soldier cannot be shut up in huts, but he can 
be put on the leeward side of a clump of bamboo and his belly 
protected. Half the light woolen blanket is all that is needed, 
this gives a blanket five feet six by three feet ten inches. 

Mosquito Bar. — In the Philippines a mosquito bar is essential 
not only as protection, but also to obtain the quietness neces- 
sary for sleep. But why carry a bar designed for spring beds in 
barracks. A piece of netting three feet square, held off the face 
by the hat, or two pieces of bamboo like the bows of a wagon, is 
all that is necessary. 

The Mess Kit. — The canteen, meat can, cup, knife, fork and 
spoon should be of aluminum and nested in a sack as the Pres- 
ton Mess Kit. A very few trials stops one carrying meat in the 
meat can; it gets dirty and molds over night. The meat can 
is a poor cooking utensil. The cup is mainly used as a boiler 
and it is not a good one. It is a nuisance wherever carried. 
The knife should have a first-rate steel blade and aluminum 
handle. 

Mounted officers should have the Preston Kit with both the 
infantry and cavalry canteen strap, for they will frequently walk. 

The Haversack — should be a knapsack with suitable carrying 
straps and straps for attaching the roll. All armies, except the 
Russian, Spanish and the United States carry the pack on the 
back. This, it seems, should be sufficient reason for us to change. 
In addition, hunters, trappers and the scout, if left to himself, 
carry the pack on the back. Recently, after two days' march, the 
writer asked an officer, whose endurance is noted, how he felt. 
He replied, "As if I had a toothache where the roll crosses my 



MARCHING IN THE TROPICS. 



20I 



shoulder." That we can carry anything in any way, that the 
knights of old wore armor, is no reason for a man in the tropics 
wearing a sweat jacket, as the roll is, and carrying things de- 
signed for the climate of the United States. That the Philip- 
pine scout, whose average weight is under no pounds 
should carry forty-six pounds, seems unreasonable. The 
heat from the roll, and the haversack flapping against the legs, 
frequently as low down as the knees, is not conducive to getting 
him where needed in good condition. Left to himself, the scout 
would only carry his rifle, cartridge belt, ammunition, canteen, 
haversack on the back containing all the rations he can get into 
it and a good bamboo cutting bolo. Thus equipped, he is a valu- 
able fighting machine. 

San Isidro, N. E., P. I., March, 1907. 




TO INSTRUCT A RECRUIT HOW TO SHOOT* 
By Corporal JESSE W. BARRY, Company A, Tenth Infantry. 




T 



O instruct a recruit how to shoot with 
any degree of accuracy, we will all have 
to admit, is no small task and requires much 
time. No doubt many things will arise to 
discourage him before he has accomplished 
the end desired ; he may be of a disposition 
to sorely try the patience of his instructor, 
or a man whose interest it is hard to main- 
tain, or he may be slow to grasp the points 
as they are explained, and we may have to 
repeat many things to him which others would easily learn 
before he is able to thoroughly understand the benefit to be de- 
rived from a course of instruction. Therefore it is necessary in 
the beginning for the instructor to understand his man, study 
him, as to his disposition, temperament, habits, etc., and above 
all things, if it is possible to do so, gain his confidence ; for until 
this is done 'twill be difficult to hold his attention any great 
length of time, which is very essential in order that rapid progress 
may be made. The instructor should constantly impress upon the 
mind of the recruit the importance of becoming a good shot ; not 
only that it is a qualification for a good soldier or for the pride of 
being able to shoot well, but to be a good shot is a means of self- 
defense that will also add to his pay, which is a very important 
factor, and that the most important of all is that he will be a 
most valuable soldier upon the battle-field ; and to be dreaded by 
the enemy upon the battle-field often leads to victory. 

In the first place the instructor should point out to the recruit 
the different parts of the rifle, the use of each, and the parts that 
are the most easily broken or damaged, and give him an idea 
of the general principles governing the motion of projectiles. 
Following this he should then be taught the care and preservation 
of his piece ; the fact must be made clear to him that good shoot- 
ing cannot be accomplished unless this is done, and done prop- 
erly. He should also have it explained to him that many poor 

*Read before the School of Musketry, Pacific Division, by the Author, a Member of 
the First Class. 



TO INSTRUCT A RECRUIT HOW TO SHOOT. 203 

scores are constantly being made from causes which, if the truth 
were known, could be traced to the .fact that the rifling had been 
damaged by some one not knowing how to properly care for the 
piece, or that it has become damaged through some carelessness. 

Now that the recruit has been properly instructed as to the 
importance of having his piece in the very best of condition at all 
times, the next step to be taken in instruction is to teach him the 
different sights, the advantages and disadvantages of each; he 
should not only be told the difference in the sights, but should be 
shown by a diagram upon a blackboard or a large piece of paper. 
Then he should be thoroughly instructed in the different tripod 
exercises. The instructor should be very careful to impress 
upon his mind how to bring the object aimed at and the line of 
sight in the same straight line, also the importance of always tak- 
ing the same amount of front sight and having it aligned on the 
target at six o'clock with just a small line of white between the 
front sight and the object aimed at. After the recruit has be- 
come acquainted with the different sights and is able to properly 
and correctly align them upon an object he should then be given 
the position and aiming exercises (commonly called "push and 
pull") . This being one of the most important drills prescribed in 
the small arms firing regulations, therefore should be dwelt 
upon and a thorough course given to the recruit. He should 
be taught to know that unless the muscles are trained that they 
cannot be properly controlled and are unable to perform their 
proper functions without giving forth certain convulsive move- 
ments that are sure to deflect the piece from the target, and as it 
is the purpose of this drill to overcome this fault and to es- 
tablish an intimate connection between the trigger finger and the 
mind it is necessary that several weeks' preceding the firing on 
the range should be devoted to this exercise. It should be con- 
stantly impressed upon his mind the importance, after drawing 
a moderately long breath, of being able to pull the trigger with- 
out disturbing the aim by any convulsive movement of the 
muscles, body, arm, or hand, and to never lose sight of the fact 
that the eye must be focused upon the target and not closed at 
the moment of discharging the piece, which in itself is a form of 
flinching — a very difficult habit to overcome. 

After being thoroughly instructed in the position, aiming 
and trigger-pull exercises, the recruit should be taught by careful, 
systematic practice how to combine rapidity and accuracy in the 
rapid-fire exercise, never losing sight of the details of the position, 



2o 4 TO INSTRUCT A RECRUIT HOW TO SHOOT. 

aiming and trigger-pull exercises, so that in actual practice the 
minor details which are all important will be carried out so that 
the correct position can at all times be quickly and easily taken, 
and that the purpose of the rapid-fire exercise is to so train the 
soldier in quickness as to enable him to get in several well directed 
shots upon a target in a prescribed number of seconds. 

As a further means of teaching the recruit the correct posi- 
tions, gallery practice is taken up with the same careful attention 
to details, so as to demonstrate to the recruit the advantage of 
holding fast at the moment of discharging his piece, and the 
utter impossibility of being able to hit the mark aimed at if any 
unnatural movements of the muscles, body, arm or hand, or any 
form of flinching which tends to divert the aim has taken place ; 
also the importance of holding the aim during the discharge and a 
moment after, so as to be able to call the location of the hit. The 
recruit should be taught that the great advantage to be derived 
from gallery practice lies in the opportunity to become familiar 
with the trigger pull, as there is no recoil to induce nervousness 
or flinching. Every effort should be made to encourage gallery 
practice so that the recruit will learn to look forward to gallery 
and range practice not as a disagreeable duty, but, to the con- 
trary, as a pleasure. 

Another most important thing that should at no time be ne- 
glected during the course of instruction is the constant use of the 
gun sling in all the different positions. The recruit should be 
shown all the different ways in which the sling can be arranged, 
and the one selected by him which will give him the most steady 
and comfortable position; as the aid of the sling is such an im- 
portant factor in learning to shoot, the recruit should be allowed 
at no time to practice holding the piece without using the same. 

Following this the recruit should next be taught that the 
ability to correctly estimate distance is an essential characteristic 
of the good shot. This can be done by range-finding instruments, 
by sound, by the eye, and by trial or volley shots. It should be 
brought to bear upon his mind that in many cases upon the 
battle-field he will have to depend upon the eye to judge the dis- 
tance ; while it is true that in the controlled fire the distance will 
be given by the company officers, yet there will no doubt be many 
instances, such as when acting as scout, an outpost, skirmishing, 
when he will be compelled to rely entirely upon his own judgment 
in regard to certain distances. Therefore he should receive a 
thorough training in the different methods and means for esti- 



TO INSTRUCT A RECRUIT HOW TO SHOOT. 205 

mating the same ; certain trees or posts near the barracks should 
be at different times pointed out and the recruit required to pace 
the distance. This will not only give him an idea as to the dis- 
tance but will also give him the number of paces he takes to the 
one hundred yards. Teach him what changes are made in look- 
ing downward or upward at an object, when looking over depres- 
sions in the ground, over plane surface, water, snow, etc. ; what 
effect a bright or dull light will have upon an object. In fact, 
explain all the different conditions to him, encourage him in this 
line of work and the instructor will find the recruit out with 
others in a short time, without being told, guessing the distances 
of different objects. 

Now when the recruit arrives upon the range for instruction 
practice he should still be in the presence of and under the indi- 
vidual care of the instructor. The first shots will be of the great- 
est importance, for this is the time that the gentle recoil, of which 
we all are so familiar, will first be felt. .Therefore he should be 
carefully watched to see that the butt of the piece is placed well 
against and in the hollow of the shoulder, that a tap upon the 
nose or chin, will not only cause an unpleasant sensation but will 
in all probability cause a large number of red flags to be brought 
into view. The instructor should at all times, while upon the 
range, make, or cause to be made, whatever corrections that are 
necessary upon the sights in regard to windage, elevations, etc., 
at the same time fully explaining the reasons for making such 
corrections. Not only explain, but at the same time show him; 
there is nothing like the eye as a helper in remembering things. 

During all the time the recruit is undergoing the course of 
instruction the strictest discipline should be observed and main- 
tained, for in the absence of discipline but little benefit can be de- 
rived from the whole course of instruction. 

Now the instructor has taken the recruit through a thorough 
course of instruction, including : the care and preservation of his 
piece, the tripod exercises, position, aiming, trigger pull and 
rapid-fire exercises, gallery practice and estimating distances. 
And now we find him upon the range firing for record, making 
excellent scores. Let us hope that he will always continue to 
do so, and I further hope that some day he will go to Chicago 
and from there to the National shoot, and if any one should ask 
him where he came from, he can reply, "I'm from the School 
of Musketry." 




NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE RHINE 
AND MAIN IN 1805. 

From Original Documents in the Archives of the French War 

Office. 

By FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.* 

THE Treaty of Amiens (March 25, 1802) 
lasted less than sixteen months and the 
declaration of hostilities between France and 
Great Britain marked the opening of the wars 
which did not end until Waterloo — a conflict 
unique in history and unparalleled in modern 
times in respect to the numbers of soldiers en- 
gaged, to the production of more able men than 
have yet characterized any other one epoch, to the 
development of the most consummate general of 
all ages and to achievements unequalled both on land and sea. 
After the outbreak of war in May, 1803, Bonaparte, the First 
Consul, hastened to occupy Hanover and,, for the purpose of 
threatening England with invasion, assembled a formidable army 
in the immediate neighborhood of Boulogne, the wings of which 
were composed of detached corps in Holland under General Mar- 
mont and at Brest under General (subsequently Marshal) Auger- 
eau. This "Army of the Coasts of the Ocean" was drilled until, 
as a modern historian has aptly said,f "it became one of the most 
efficient fighting machines ever known in the history of the world, 
its discipline being perfect and its enthusiasm unbounded." On 
August 26, 1805, it received the name of "The Grand Army" 
and for the next ten years the history of terrestrial war is the his- 

*'I herewith send you another article entitled "Napoleon's Concentration on the 
Rhine and Main in 1805." This article was written from original documents in the 
archives of the French War Office and will form part of one of the chapters of "The 
Campaign of Austerlitz," on which I have been at work now nearly ten years. This, 
together with "The Surprise of the Tabor Bridge," which you published in the Journal 
of the M. S. I. for March and May, 1905, and the article on "Austerlitz — A Most Re- 
markable Forced March," published in July-September, 1906, ought to give one a fairly 
thorough understanding of this remarkable campaign. I can only trust that your Board 
may find the present article interesting enough to publish in the Journal of the M. S. I. 
Napoleon's preparations for war have always been considered marvelous, but in reality 
they were very far from being so and it seems to* me that this fact only makes his subse- 
quent and astonishing victories still more remarkable. — Extract from letter to Editor. 

tStephens, "Revolutionary Europe," p. 242. 



Wu 






2o8 NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

tory of this superb force; the glory of its achievements will be 
imperishable so long as men are stirred by deeds of courage, self- 
sacrifice and devotion to a leader, but it is highly improbable that 
any other troops will ever be given the opportunity of winning 
undying fame to such a degree as were "the Emperor's soldiers." 
Napoleon himself considered "the Grand Army of Austerlitz" su- 
perior to any other he ever commanded,* and General Marmont, 
under whose orders the Second Corps fought during that cam- 
paign, in nowise exaggerated when he declaredf that 

This army, the finest that had ever been seen, was even less re- 
doubtable on account of the number of its soldiers than by reason of 
their nature. Almost everyone had made war and had won victories. 
Something of the enthusiasm and the exhaltation of the -campaigns 
of the Revolution were still left, but this enthusiasm had been sys- 
tematized. From the commander-in-chief, the heads of the army corps 
and the divisional commanders down to the common officers and 
soldiers — everyone was hardened to war. The eighteen months spent 
in splendid camps had produced a training, an ensemble which has 
never since existed to the same degree, and a confidence which knew 
no bounds. In all probability, this army was the best and the most 
redoubtable that modern times have seen. 

On December 2, 1804, the First Consul crowned himself 
"Emperor of the French" and, during the next six months, de- 
voted no small amount of energy to producing a rupture with 
Austria. By midsummer the threat of an invasion of England 
was maintained by Napoleon merely as a simulacrum to cover 
his real intentions, although it must be confessed that the French 
officers and soldiers were quite as convinced that the expedition 
would embark at any moment as were the English, who literally 
slept on their arms. With consummate skill, the French Em- 
peror forced the House of Hapsburg into war, nolens volens, and 
on August 26th and the days immediately following, without even 
a declaration of hostilities and before Francis II was aware of 
what was happening, the orders were issued by Marshal Berthier, 
the "Major-General" (i. e., Chief of Staff) and Minister of War, 
which set 185,000 French troops in prompt motion toward the 
Rhine and the Main. 

The concentration of Napoleon's army in 1805 on these two 
rivers — which formed its rectangular base during the masterful 
maneuvers about Ulm and during the entire campaign of Aus- 
terlitz — has heretofore been considered a model of its kind; it 
has often been cited as worthy of being studied carefully and, 

*Gourgaud, Journal inedit de Sainte-Helene, II, p. in. 

fMemoires du Marechal Marmont, Due de Raguse, II, pp. 302-303. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 209 

under similar circumstances, of being copied exactly because of 
the skill and precision with which it was effected. Why the true 
facts are not known is indeed inexplicable; for, in reality, this 
concentration was very far from what a model ought to be. It 
cannot, of course, be gainsaid that the skill with which the French 
divisions were directed to their destinations and the precision 
of their arrival were most remarkable ; but, on the other hand, the 
preparations for the opening campaign had by no means reached 
that stage which is always desired — but, unfortunately, seldom 
attained. The fault must be attributed to the shortness of time 
between the departure of the Grand Army from Boulogne and the 
date set for its crossing of the Rhine rather than to any negligence 
on the part of the general officers who did all that could be ex- 
pected of them. To be sure, the reconnaissances by Prince Murat 
and Generals Bertrand and Savary were thoroughly made, and 
their reports, in conjunction with the information furnished by 
the French diplomatists and agents, enabled Napoleon to form 
a correct estimate of the direction, scope and object of the Aus- 
trian movements. The march of the French corps to the Rhine 
and the Main was made with a celerity and order truly marvelous, 
considering their large numbers, and a very short rest was amply 
sufficient to enable them to recuperate completely, so that they 
were in superb condition physically for active campaigning. 

On the other hand, many essential preparations were in a de- 
cidedly backward state. Although General Songis, the Chief of 
Artillery, had collected 169 boats, it was impossible for him to 
get ready so that the bridges over the Rhine opposite Spire, Pforz 
and Schelestadt would be constructed before the morning of Sep- 
tember 25 ;* some of the prefects of departments had been unable 
to furnish the requisite number of wagons and horses for the 
artillery trains ; many of the drivers who had been requistioned 
were sick in the hospitals, some had already deserted and a large 
number took "French leave" directly after the Rhine was 
crossed. f Thanks to Songis' untiring efforts nearly all the am- 
munition was ready at Strassburg,f but the conditions were by 
no means satisfactory at Wiirzburg, which was "to be considered 



^General Songis to Marshal Berthier, Sept. 220! ; Prince Murat to the Emperor, 
Sept. 22d. 

tSongis to Berthier, Sept. 18th; Songis to Murat, Sept. 19th; Murat to Napoleon, 
Sept. 21st; Songis to Berthier, Sept. 22d and Sept. 29th, and Pion des Loches, "Mes 
Campagnes," p. 140. 

tSongis' report of Sept. 26th. 



2io NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

as a position from which the army is to supply itself."* As Otto, 
the French Minister to Bavaria, reported, the citadel was abun- 
dantly provided with guns and powder, and the manufacture of 
cartridges, begun on September 12th, was hastened as much as 
possible, 100 men being employed daily at this work; but the bul- 
lets existed in small quantities only and did not fit the calibers of 
the guns mounted in the citadel. f After the 25th, the number of 
workmen was increased to 150 and 1 10,000 cartridges turned out 
daily, but, notwithstanding the insistence of Captain Dessalles 
that the number should be doubled, the lack of hands made it 
impossible to comply, so that the amount actually furnished fell 
greatly below the 5,000,000 ordered by Napoleon, i On September 
28th, Bavaria could furnish only 168 guns and thirty-eight how- 
itzers — of which only thirty field pieces and six howitzers were 
actually with the Bavarian army — and the amount of serviceable 
ammunition was extremely meager, §. so that, as a matter of fact, 
it would be impossible for the Elector's forces to engage in any 
considerable campaign, nor could they furnish any artillery sup- 
plies to Marshal Bernadotte and General Marmont. Prior to his 
departure from Munich, Otto had been requested by General Son- 
gis to obtain 2000 artillery-horses, but the advance of the Aus- 
trians had reduced the available territory from which these horses 
could be drawn to the province of Wiirzburg; and this district 
had already been exhausted by the requisitions of the Bavarian 
army which had proved futile to procure the horses which it 
alone required. Otto was promised 500 horses to be delivered on 
October 5th, but was compelled to enter into an agreement with 
a Wiirzburg dealer named Hirsch to furnish 2000 horses, the last 
of which were not to be delivered until November 12th. || In- 
deed, the only details that were fully prepared for war were the 
bridges, equipages and the boats to be used for transports on the 
Main,ff coupled with the fact that Wiirzburg, armed with forty- 
six guns and thoroughly provisioned, was properly defended and 
could serve as a good depot for the Grand Army. 

The lack of officers, particularly for the staff, was another de- 
terrent factor in expediting the preparations, but, although it 



*Berthier to Songis, Sept. 19th, 1 A. m. 
fOtto to Berthier, Sept. 21st. 
{Dessalles to Songis, Sept. 26th and 30th. 
§Dessalles' reports to Songis, Sept. 26th and 28th. 

HOtto's reports to Berthier, Sept. 21st and 25th; Songis to General £ble, commanding 
artillery of the First Corps, Oct. 5th. 
KDessalles to Songis, Sept. 30th. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 211 

was partly rectified by the Emperor's order of the 16th, many 
vacancies still existed and not a little trouble was incurred there- 
by. The day after reaching Strassburg, Prince Murat, command- 
ing in the Emperor's absence, complained that he had no chief 
commissary, no chief of engineers and no chief of artillery for 
his corps, and he was twice compelled to reiterate his request that 
these important places should be filled at once.* There was, 
furthermore, a lack of gunners for the garrisons of the armed 
places along the Rhine, t and the very day before the Reserve Cav- 
alry and Oudinot's grenadiers crossed the river, some of their 
artillery companies had not yet arrived nor had the general com- 
manding the reserve parks put in his appearance. $ As late as 
the 2 1 st, Marshal Soult appealed to General Songis to know the 
organization and composition of the artillery assigned to him, 
and complained that he was "without one single staff-officer of 
artillery," nor did he know the name of his new chief of artillery 
and the director of his park.§ The conditions existing in the 
French corps before — and even after — it crossed the Rhine are 
admirably told by a captain of artillery :|| 

At Metz, on the 4th Complementary Day (September 21st), we 
learned that the Emperor had appointed our general, Macors, to the 
command of the fortified place of Lille and that he had replaced him 
in the army corps by General Lariboisiere. Instead of proceeding 
to Strasburg, we are directed on Landau. I delivered General Macors' 
horse, on which I had made the entire trip, to Colonel Senarmont,t| 
when a general of division commanding the artillery of an army corps 
of more than 25,000 has only one horse, an attached captain is allowed 
to go a-foot; I was none the less dismounted on the banks of the Rhine 
at the moment of entering the field. However, I found a small horse 
in the train, and a few days afterward I bought an excellent mount 
for sixty francs from a gunner who had stolen it. 

At Spire (6th Vendemiaire, September 28th), I joined General 
Lariboisiere; he was without aide-de-camp, without chief of staff, with- 
out officers. The Lorraine, Alsatian and Comtois drivers and horses, 
requisitioned by His Majesty for the transports of the park, being no 
longer retained, returned home; for us it was a great loss which made 
itself felt throughout the campaign. 

At Heilbronn, on the 9th Vendemiaire (October 1st) Colonels 
Duchesnoy, director of the park, and Demarcay, chief of staff (of the 
corps artillery) arrived. * * * 



*Murat to Berthier, Sept. ioth, 14th and 15th. 

tSongis to Bethier, Sept. 15th; Marshal Soult to Songis, Sept. 21st. 
J Songis to Murat, Sept. 24th. 
§ Soult to Songis, Sept. 21st. 
||Pion des Loches, pp. 139-140. 

H Subsequently Chief of Artillery of the Army of Spain — one of the greatest artillery- 
men of the Napoleonic era. 



2i2 NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

That these officers did not report for duty until several days 
after the Fourth Corps had crossed the Rhine is merely another 
demonstration of the lack of organization in the Grand Army at 
that time, and the failure of Marshal Berthier to ascertain what 
vacancies existed and to fill them in proper time to prevent such 
an unfortunate state of affairs. But, bad as the conditions in the 
Fourth Corps were, they were fully equalled by those in the Re- 
serve Cavalry, for, the day it crossed the Rhine, Prince Murat 
found himself compelled to write to the Emperor : 

Sire, we are far from being organized ; there is scarcely a single staff- 
officer with the army (corps) ; the generals' wagons are far behind 
them ; no hospital wagons ; the battalions of the train are still en route; 
our artillery is being hauled by requisitioned horses.* 

The subsistence, too, was manifestly deficient in quantity for 
such an army, was indifferently administered and frequently of 
inferior quality. The Vanleberghe and Delannoy companies had 
bound themselves to furnish the provisions and forage for the 
army,t but, as has always been the case with army contractors, 
their management produced inferior service which gave rise to 
considerable dissatisfaction and many just complaints, and ended 
in bankrupting both companies. The transports supplied by the 
Breidt company did not reach Strassburg until September 29th 
and consequently did not overtake the army until long after- 
ward ; this company did obtain the requisite number of horses, 
but the government took upon itself to furnish the wagons and, 
although the Emperor had ordered a large number of them to be 
constructed at Sampigny,t and anxiously inquired when they 
would reach the Rhine, § this work was so very backward that, 
as late as September 18th, the Intendant General reported only 
one-fourth of the necessary wagons were ready and that the re- 
mainder would not be finished for several months. Some wagons 
were manufactured at Strassburg on the model of those made at 
Sampigny,|| but the number thus obtained was most insignificant, 
and, to cap the climax, the wagons belonging to the "Army of the 
Coasts" were directed to Sampigny and these stopped, instead of 
being permitted to proceed directly to Strassburg,^ so that the 



*Murat to Napoleon, undated, but unquestionably Sept. 25th. 

t Berthier to the various Marshals, Aug. 27th. 

JNapoleon to Dejean, Aug. 28th. 

%E. g., Napoleon to Murat, Sept. 18th. 

||Murat to the Emperor, Sept. 21st. 

\Napoleon to Dejean, Sept. 26th. Napoleon Corresp. No. 9267. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 213 

supply service had to be clone along the Rhine with the 1000 
wagons requisitioned in conformity with the decree of September 

2d.* 

According to the orders issued on September 20th, the army 
was to be supplied with bread for four days and biscuit for the 
same length of time ; the latter was to be kept intact for emergen- 
cies, while the bread was to be replaced as fast as it was used in 
order that the troops should always have provisions for eight 
days.f To make certain of the necessary amount of biscuit, Na- 
poleon had ordered Marshal Bernadotte to obtain 100,000 rations 
at Gottingen before beginning his march! and the Elector of 
Bavaria had been requested to have 500,000 manufactured at 
Wiirzburg and 500,000 at Ulm,§ while Dejean was to have the 
same amount at Strassburg and 200,000 at Mayence ready on 
September 23d, || and on the 16th orders were sent to Otto to 
have 300,000 rations made at Wiirzburg. ff In spite of the Em- 
peror's careful provision most of the biscuit was not furnished 
when the army crossed the Rhine ; the 200,000 rations at Mayence 
were supplied but not until the 29th, so that the Second Corps 
had to be quartered on the inhabitants and to make requisitions 
during its march to Wiirzburg, because no stores had been formed 
and because the agent sent to Wiirzburg had not made any pur- 
chases nor had he had either bread or biscuit baked,** while Otto 
reported that the native bakers hardly knew what biscuit was, 
that flour was much dearer than in France and the watch kept 
over them by the Austrian Minister necessitated such secrecy that 
it would be preferable to have the biscuit manufactured in France 
and transported to Wiirzburg by the Main.ff 

At Strassburg the situation was equally bad. Until the ar- 
rival of the Intendant General on the 18th, the commissary Chat- 
elain had been so lax in organizing the means of subsistence and 
in having biscuit made as to provoke comment on the part of the 
Emperor. %% Petiet was unremitting in his efforts to rectify the 
backward state of conditions; he promptly requisitioned work- 
men, had bread made in the bakeshops of individual tradesmen, 

*Petiet to Berthier, Sept. 18th. 

fAlso Order of the Day, Sept. 26th. 

JNapoleon to Berthier, and Berthier to Bernadotte, Aug. 23d. 

§Napoleon to the Elector of Bavaria, Aug. 25th. Napoleon Corresp. No. 9134. 

IINapoleon to Dejean, Aug. 23d and 28th. Napoleon Corresp. Nos. 9122 and 9150. 

IfNapoleon to Berthier, Sept. 15th, and Berthier to Otto, Sept. 16th. 

**Marmont to Berthier, Sept. 22d and 30th. 

tfOtto to Berthier, Sept. 21st. 

JtNapoleon to Dejean, Sept. 10th. Napoleon Corresp. No. 9197. 



2i 4 NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

made use of fourteen military ovens — although he was unable to 
utilize twelve others for lack of funds for repairs — had 200,000 
rations brought from Lille and 100,000 from Soissons and Land- 
recies, and promised to have 1,200,000 rations of biscuit ready by 
September 29th.* The day after Murat and Lannes had crossed 
the Rhine and the very day of the Emperor's arrival — September 
26th — the total number of rations of biscuit — weighing eighteen 
ounces each — which had been made was only 180,000, and not 
more than 15,000 were being delivered daily; Huningue and 
Landau had furnished 20,000 and 30,000 rations respectively, but 
neither place was turning out more than 5000 per diem, and, al- 
though ovens were being established at Weissenburg and Hag- 
uenau, they did not begin active operations until the 28th and 
6000 rations a day was their limit. Of the 200,000 rations for 
which Petiet had sent to Lille, only 120,000 were expected to 
reach Strassburg on October 14th, so that, in reality, there exised 
on September 26th only 230,000 rations ready to be served out 
to the troopsf — a deficit of 270,000 as compared with the 500,000 
demanded by the Emperor. For lack of transports the Vanler- 
berghe company was unable to deliver the supplies collected at 
Metz and Nancy with the result that, as late as the 21st, its agent 
suggested that requisitions of wheat be resorted to as the only 
means of remedying the deficiency,! and on the following day 
Marshal Soult complained that unless additional measures were 
taken to supply the Fourth Corps, it would consume all its bread 
by the time the Fourth (Suchet's) Division arrived. § The food 
supplies collected by the inhabitants in the hope of selling them at 
a profit were levied upon by the chief commissary at Strassburg to 
the despair of the inhabitants who saw themselves forced to ac- 
cept the arbitrary prices set by the supply companies, || and the 
forage ran so short that, even on the 22d, Petiet was obliged to 
call upon the prefect of the Department of the Upper-Rhine to 
supply what was urgently needed by means of requisitions. U 

Early in September Napoleon was informed that the clothing 
of the army was "generally in good condition" ;**he had previous- 
ly ordered that cloaks should be distributed to one-third of the 



*Petiet to Berthier, Sept. 18th. 

fReport of Delebecque, Sept. 26th. 

% Soult to Murat, Sept. 21st. 

§Soult to Murat, Sept. 22d. 

||Savary's report, undated. 

HMurat to Napoleon, Sept. 22d. 

**Dejean's report to Napoleon, Sept. 4th. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 215 

troops of the Grand Army,* but by September 12th he had come 
to the realization that this amount was quite insufficient and had 
ordered another one-third to be distributed;! one-third of the 
troops therefore wore great-coats which had been served out in 
1804 and none had more than one which was fit for campaigning. 
Great strategists have always been great maneuverers and the 
ability to maneuver depends upon the marching ability of an army 
which, in turn, is dependent upon the good condition of the sol- 
diers' feet. Shoes consequently are an important factor in war, 
and no general has ever been more solicitous that his soldiers 
should be properly shod than was Napoleon, who insisted that 
his troops must always have three pairs of shoes. In addition to 
the two pairs which the soldiers had in the Armed Camps, a third 
pair was distributed to them prior to their departure, but, as the 
march to the Rhine was expected to wear out the pair on their 
feet, two pairs were to be manufactured in the Fifth Military 
Division, one of which was to be served out to them upon their 
arrival on the Rhine and the other held back until after the army 
had crossed that river. Each soldier would thus have four pairs 
of shoes; one on his feet, two in his knapsack and the fourth 
stored in the corps depot.! The 14.537 P airs which had been kept 
in the magazines at Boulogne, Etaples and Ambleteuse were con- 
sequently shipped from Boulogne on September 3d by the Breidt 
company under the supervision of Captain Lejeune,§ but, al- 
though it was expected that they would reach Strassburg on the 
28th at the latest, !| Napoleon was compelled to issue orders to 
hasten their arrival^ and, as a matter of fact, Lejeune did not 
overtake the army until the maneuvers about Ulm were nearly 
ended,** so that some of the divisions were in need of shoes when 
they crossed the Rhine. ft 

But the greatest of all the difficulties which had to be over- 
come was the lack of ready money. Notwithstanding all the 
Emperor's efforts, the army's finances could scarcely have been 
worse administered than they actually were, and it is indeed small 
wonder that they gave rise to innumerable complaints. Ade- 
quate funds to pay for shoes, cloaks, provisions, horses, fortifi- 

*Order of the Day, Aug. 29th. 

fNapoleon to Dejean, Sept. 12th. Corresp. inedite de l'Empereur. 

JOrder of the Day, Aug. 29th. 

§Lejeune's report to Berthier, Sept. 6th. 

||Murat to Napoleon, Sept. 21st. 

UNapoleon to Dejean, Sept. 26th. 

**Lejeune, Memoires, I, p. 28. 

tfMurat to Napoleon, Sept. 28th. 



2i6 NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

cations, wagons, military ovens, artillery and engineer supplies, 
etc., were not furnished at the proper time, so that the officers 
at the front were subjected to countless vexations and found 
themselves hampered with exasperating frequency in the colossal 
preparations which they were expected to make in such a short 
space of time. Upon arriving at Strassburg, Murat was obliged 
to pay the courier whom he sent to Paris out of his own pocket,* 
and five days later he reported that the quartermaster of the 
Fifth Military Division would be unable to obtain the necessary 
forage because he could not get possession of the funds upon 
which he sought to draw.t while Songis complained that the 
paymaster had exhausted all the cash in his chest and was reduced 
to paying in checks instead of money. I On the 18th the In- 
tendant General declared that the lack of funds had prevented a 
dozen ovens from being utilized for baking biscuit, § and as late 
as the 22d Murat pointed out that it would be impossible to ob- 
tain more forage from the Department of the Upper-Rhine unless 
the first supplies were paid for. | j 

Then, too, the pay of the officers and men was in arrears. 
Even before Napoleon left Boulogne he found himself obliged to 
permit 600,000 francs belonging to him to be turned over to the 
army chest and, as this amount was quite insufficient, recourse had 
to be had to "the funds destined for extraordinary operations" in 
order to insure the pay up to September 2d.^| Barbe-Marbois, 
the Minister of the Treasury, exceeded his instructions by allow- 
ing funds which should have been placed at the Emperor's dis- 
posal to be sent to the Paymaster-General of the Army and by 
diverting 4,000,000 francs from the sinking fund to the pay of 
the army — proceedings which drew upon him a vigorous censure 
from Napoleon, who complained that the preparations were there- 
by "paralyzed and retarded for fifteen days" because 4,200,000 
francs were needed immediately for extraordinary expenses and 
for the purchase of artillery-horses, cavalry remounts, cloaks and 
shoes.** In default of other resources, the Emperor permitted 
the amount received from the sinking fund to be applied to the 

*M'urat to Berthier, Sept. ioth. 

tMurat to the Emperor, Sept. 15th. 

JSongis to Berthier, Sept. 15th, 7 p. m.; also Napoleon to Berthier, Sept. 18th, about 
midnight; Napoleon Corresp. No. 9239. 

§Petiet to Berthier, Sept. 18th. 

|| Murat to the Emperor, Sept. 2.2A. 

UNapoleon to Barbe-Marbois, Aug. 28th and 30th. Napoleon Corresp. Nos. 9146 
and 9162. 

**Napoleon to Barbe-Marbois, Aug. 30th and 31st. Ibid, Nos. 9162 and 9168. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 217 

pay of the army, but insisted that he must have 4,000,000 francs 
for the supplies before September 7th, as well as the necessary 
money to pay the troops up to October 23d in order to prevent 
the pillage and devastation of neutral countries which would 
otherwise be inevitable.* The decrees of September 6th and 17th 
contributed 30,000,000 francs to war expenses, but it was im- 
possible to distribute all this money as speedily as could have 
been desired, although it does appear that the army's pay up to 
October 23d was, conformably to the decree of the 6th, f ex- 
pected to be discharged on September 27th, and Songis did actual- 
ly receive 500,000 francs for the artillery and 288,100 for 
harness.! Nevertheless, the army's pay was still in arrears when 
it crossed the Rhine and for several days afterward, § so that it 
is by no means surprising that Napoleon, who foresaw what act- 
ually happened, complained that if the Treasury continued to 
discount paper of the Bank of France in circulation, he could 
count upon nothing; and that if Roger, the chief clerk of the 
Treasury who had charge of the business relations with the con- 
tractors, and Desprez, the representative of the firms of Vanler- 
berghe and Ouvrard which had combined under the title of 
"United Merchants," meant to make all his measures fail they 
were "assuredly taking the right road." Indeed, he declared that 
the condition of the finances was worse than in i8oo,|] but, al- 
though a good deal of blame may rightly be laid at Barbe- 
Marbois' door, the true cause antedated 1805. Mollien, then 
Director-General of the sinking fund, says|j that 

The Treasury was in a veritable state of exhaustion as a result 
of two years of ruinous preparations. This exhaustion was such that 
Napoleon was only able to make up what he called the treasury of his 
Grand Army out of several millions, the greater part accruing from 
his personal savings. The contractors of ministerial supplies, who 
claimed everything in advance and became more exacting because they 
were the more necessary, had threatened to suspend their deliveries. 
In order that the provisions, wagons and artillery necessary to an 
army of 100,000 men might follow it in its flight from the coasts of 
Picardy to the heart of Bavaria, it had been obligatory to come to the 
relief of the principal suppliers, and, in default of other means, we 
were reduced to give them 10,000,000 of national domains in payment. 
The Public Treasury had already pledged part of the revenues of 1806 



*Napoleon to Barbe-Marbois, Sept. 2d and Aug. 31st. Ibid, Nos. 9175 and gi< 

fMurat to the Emperor, Sept. 21st. 

$ Songis to Berthier, Sept. 22d. 

§Order of the Day, Sept. 27th and 28th. , 

|| Napoleon to Barbe-Marbois, Aug. 30th. 

HM'emoires, p. 407. 



2 i8 NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

by negotiating the obligations underwritten by the Receivers-General on 
the payments of that year. The Bank was assailed with demands for 
the payment of its notes, because it had been too liberal with its 
discounts in favor of the men who, under the title of suppliers, sold 
their delusive credit to the Treasury, as well in regard to the new 
houses which loaned on their signatures and flooded the place with col- 
lusory drafts. The embarrassment thus spread from the public wealth to 
private affairs, and all the symptoms of a grave approaching crisis was 
already manifested before Napoleon's departure for Germany. 

The sequel is told by Miot de Melito :* 

He had scarcely quitted the capital when considerable alarm was 
evinced at the Bank concerning the exchange of the notes which it had 
put in circulation. There was a deficiency of specie; the rate of ex- 
change had to be lowered, and on the 3d Vendemiaire (September 
25th), the day after the Emperor's departure, the Bank could only 
give cash to the amount of 300,000 francs, accepting only one note for 
1000 francs from each creditor who presented himself. The discontent 
was grave. The Bank, or at least the principal shareholders, were 
accused of trading in the specie and of having exported a large quantity. 
Others laid the scarcity of money on the shoulders of the Government 
and on the loans made by it to the Bank. But the last accusation was 
quite unfounded; we of the Council of State were satisfied that such 
a proceeding had never even been contemplated, and that the evil must 
be attributed to the greed and the ill-judged speculations of the Governors 
of the Bank. 

The difficulty of the public finances lasted nearly the whole time of 
the Emperor's absence. Several councils were held to devise means 
for lessening the attendant consequences, and various measures, more 
or less adapted to diminish the evil were decreed. 

During the whole time that this crisis lasted, the Public Exchequer 
was in a very strained position, and its difficulties were yet further 
increased by an extraordinary bounty granted by M. Barbe-Marbois, 
then the Minister of the Treasury. In order to save the firm of Ouvrard 
and Vanlerbergh, who supplied the commissariat, from impending 
failure, he entrusted to them upon the whole of the bonds of the 
Receivers-General, then in the Treasury, a sum of 85,000,000, which 
the contractors deposited in the Bank. On this deposit the Bank in- 
creased its issue of notes, and that operation was partly the cause of 
the impossibility of paying them on sight. 

In granting so great a favor to speculators, M. Barbe-Marbois was 
doubtless influenced by no blamable motive, but he was wrong, in the 
first place, to consent to it without authorization, and, in the second, 
not to have acquainted Prince Joseph (the President of the Senate) 
with what he had done, for the Prince was thus left without any knowl- 
edge of the cause of an evil for which he was obliged to seek a remedy. 

While it is true Prince Joseph did not have any expressed 
authority over the Treasury and Barbe-Marbois was not, strictly 
speaking, compelled legally to render any account to him, as Meli- 



f Miot de Melito, Memoirs, II, pp. 142-143. 



NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 219 

to goes on to say,* "the singular part of this transaction is that 
it was for a considerable time concealed from the knowledge of 
the Emperor." The mismanagement did, however, continue to 
the very end of the campaign and, on Christmas day, Napoleon 
in transmitting to Joseph an unsealed letter which he was to 
read, then seal and forward to Barbe-Marbois, wrote that "the 
Coalition had no more useful ally than my Minister. * * * 
As a matter of fact, I believe the man has betrayed me."f This 
was the climax; but even in August the signs pointed so unmis- 
takably to the mismanagement which reigned throughout the en- 
tire campaign that it would be impossible to stigmatize the ad- 
ministration of the Treasury during the whole time better than 
Napoleon himself did when, before leaving Boulogne, he declared 
that "as for the system of finances, it could not be worse."! Mol- 
lien says that the Emperor made no attempt to hide the fact, but 
that "in victory alone he saw and sought the remedy" ;§ in truth, it 
needed all the eclat and prestige of the unbroken chain of victories 
which marked this war to make amends for the defective systems 
of supply and finance, and for the unnecessary hardships which 
the officers and men were forced to endure and the privations to 
which they were subjected in consequence of the irregularity with 
which their supplies were served out and their pay discharged. 

We are all prone to contrasting the shortcomings of our own 
day and generation with what we are pleased to call the perfection 
of by-gone days and centuries, and the glamor with which we in- 
vest the past is too often allowed to destroy the true perspective 
and to render us blind to things as they actually were. Unques- 
tionably the most brilliant character in all history, Napoleon's 
achievements must forever be the marvel of men, and the petty 
defects are necessarily lost in the obscurity of the past and eclipsed 
in the halo of glory which surrounds the marvelous results he 
obtained. One of his future aides-de-camp pithily said that 
"these great armies, just like colossi, are only good to be seen at 
a distance from which many of the defective details are impercep- 
tible" || and, perhaps, no greater tribute can be paid to Napoleon's 
genius than to realize the countless defects existing in many of 
his armies — defects so great that they would have proved in- 

*Ibid, pp. 143-144. 

tNapoleon to Joseph, Schoenbrunn, Dec. 25th. Confidential Correspondence of 
Napoleon with Joseph Bonaparte, No. 105, Vol. I, p. 76. 
{Napoleon to Barbe-Marbois, Sept. 2d. 
§Memoires, p. 407. 
|| De Segur, Memoires, I, p. 188. 



22o NAPOLEON ON THE RHINE. 

surmountable obstacles for most commanders — and to understand 
that his victories were achieved in spite of them. In no case, save 
in 1796, was this more forcibly illustrated than in 1805, but, on 
the other hand, had this latter war been marked by defeats, and 
had it culminated in disaster instead of continuous victories end- 
ing with one of the most decisive battles in history, might not the 
cause be reasonably ascribed, in part at least, to the insufficient 
preparations at the opening of hostilities ? We answer, "Decided- 
ly yes!" and, since the question of subsistence, supply and army 
finances are always most important factors in military success, 
we must not permit the splendid strategical and tactical lessons 
which can be learned from the Campaign of Austerlitz to blind us 
to the fact that it must by no means be taken as a model in respect 
to the preparations made, because they were woefully deficient, 
and in the hands of the average commander-in-chief might 
readily have led to defeat and disaster. 




WANTED— RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 

By Lieut.-Col. CHARLES J. CRANE, Adjutant General. 




T 



HE army needs relief in various ways and for 
various reasons. It is not proposed to attempt 
to fully set forth all our wants in this short article. 

It is hoped and believed that an effort will be made 
to induce Congress to increase our pay, and it is be- 
lieved that such increase will be obtained with least 
opposition if advocated in the form of an allowance 
for rations, and one for clothing and equipments, based 
on careful computation, giving company officers the 
same allowances ; also other and identical allowances 
to field-officers, and similarly with general officers. 
The allowance for rations could reasonably be put at two 
rations for company officers, three for field-officers and four 
for general officers, or the equivalent money thereof. 

The allowance for clothing and equipments should, in like 
manner, be for company officers three times the annual clothing 
allowance of a non-commissioned staff-officer, that for field- 
officers four times as much, and that for general officers five 
times as great. 

It is believed that a great majority of civilians and even 
Congressmen have always considered that similar allowances, 
also those for fuel and light, have been allowed us, or that 
we enjoyed them, and no great opposition would be raised to 
our actual enjoyment of the allowances so long believed by 
our law-makers to have been really possessed by us.* 

We also need a reorganization which will give us an in- 
crease of officers sufficient to supply the details for the General 
Staff, the personal staffs of general officers, for instructors at 
onr service schools and the Military Academy, for military at-, 
taches, for recruiting service, for detail with colleges, etc. 

This reorganization should most especially provide for a 
mobile army of 100,000 men and for a chief of infantry. 

This article will be devoted to showing our need for a 



*Colonel Crane desires to state that "while still believing that an increase of pay 
for officers can easiest be obtained in the form of ration and clothing allowances, he sees 
how that interferes with any scheme for the equalization of pay, and advocates the latter 
proposition instead." 



222 RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 

chief of infantry, in the hope and belief that the other wants 
of our army will be fully, explained by others better supplied 
with the necessary data. 

We know that it is practically impossible for those who 
have been doing our thinking to remember equally well all those 
for whom their thinking and planning and acting is done, but 
that does not make us any more willing to accept less thought 
and consideration than what we believe is our right. 

We, therefore, feel sure that if we are represented by an 
infantryman at Washington, our welfare will be better looked 
after in the discussions of questions which mean so much to us, 
and, therefore, to the army and to our country. 

We of the infantry ask for only those things which we firmly 
believe should rightfully belong to us. 

For many years we have gone on, in a good-natured way, 
conscious of our strength and our merit, and imagining that 
the balance of mankind were equally cognizant of the fact and 
respected us accordingly. 

All these years we have allowed others to select our arms, 
equipments and clothing. Not so very long ago even our drill 
regulations and infantry tactics were compiled for us by others. 
Only a few months ago we were, without our knowledge or con- 
sent, armed with a weapon which, years ago, we had tested and 
rejected, i. e., the rod bayonet. It is better than no bayonet at 
all, and we can, therefore, appreciate its advantage to a cavalry- 
man, who cannot encumber himself with a regular bayonet, but 
we do not understand what possible reasons could have prompted 
the adoption, at this time, of the rod bayonet for our infantry. 

In similar manner other important changes have been made 
affecting and, so far as we know, without consulting us. 

Why is it? Have we been "weighed in the balance and found 
wanting" in intelligence, industry and efficiency, that others so 
calmly assume the prerogative of thinking and doing for us ? 

We of the infantry do not believe that the records will 
support an affirmative answer to that question. If not, then we 
have not received all that should have been coming to us. 

The great majority of the infantry of our army have come 
to the conclusion that we have slumbered on our rights, but that 
it is not yet too late to rectify the mistakes which we have 
allowed. 

We have noticed that in the natural progress of military 
matters it has been found necessary to add to the department 



RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 223 

chiefs already allowed by law, an additional one, i. e., one for 
the artillery, and we were glad to see that step in the right di- 
rection, and would welcome separate chiefs for the two branches 
of artillery, also one for the cavalry. 

The branches of artillery are so different in so many im- 
portant particulars that some day there will be chiefs for both 
the field and coast artillery. 

The cavalry, too, will have a chief. 

But no part of the line of our army needs a chief so urgently 
as do we of the infantry. 

From patient observation of the progress of events for the 
past ten or fifteen years, we have gradually been aroused to 
the knowledge that from lack of a representative — a chief of in- 
fantry at Washington — we have been ignored to an extent that 
has been very humiliating to us. 

We, who practically furnish the dead for both sides on al- 
most every battle-field, feel that we have not been properly 
and sufficiently recognized, and we believe that it has been due to 
the lack of a representative in Washington — a chief of infantry. 
In the absence of such an official to properly represent the largest 
and most important part of the army, we of the infantry feel 
that our proper status and importance has not been fully and 
correctly appreciated and recognized. 

We need a chief of infantry at Washington to represent us 
whenever there arises any question affecting the administration 
of the Infantry and Cavalry School, the Staff College, the Army 
War College and the United States Military Academy. 

Captain Helmick's article in the "Infantry Journal," pub- 
lished in April, 1905, sounded a note of alarm which has never 
been satisfactorily answered; and the fact that since the last 
infantry commandant at West Point there have been appointed 
two cavalrymen and one artilleryman ; and since the last in- 
fantry superintendent there we have had two engineers and two 
cavalrymen — is sufficient to convince us that we have not been ac- 
corded the recognition which we believe is due us. 

Captain Helmick, in the article mentioned regarding, the 
selection of instructors at the Infantry and Cavalry School, said, 
"If equally efficient instructors cannot be found in the infantry 
there is no reason for complaint." To that may be added a simi- 
lar reason regarding the selection of commandant and superin- 
tendent at our National Military Academy without detracting 
one little bit from all that is due the fine officers who have been 



224 RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 

selected from other branches of the service for those important 
duties. 

We ask for only those things which we are firmly convinced 
should, in justice, be accorded us, and we believe we have good 
reason for complaint. 

As the one solution for all this, I believe that I represent 
the far greater part of the infantry when I say that we need 
and ask for a chief of infantry and will continue to work for 
a "Chief" till we are given one. It is believed that we will in 
this instance be more united than we have been in any previous 
undertaking, and we hope and believe that we will have our 
"Chief" before the lapse of many months. 

No other arm can have any interest in opposing us, and 
it is more than likely that our example will soon be followed 
by the cavalry and by the two branches of the artillery. 

But in order to obtain that, which we claim is only justice 
to the army, we of the infantry must pull together and pull 
hard. 

To all I have said so far, I believe that very few infantry- 
men will differ in opinion. But as regards the proposed grade 
of the "Chief," how he shall be appointed, what shall be his 
tenure of office, etc., there will naturally arise differences 
of opinion, which must be settled soon, and we should all loyally 
support the scheme finally adopted and presented to Congress 
through the proper military channels. What should that scheme 
call for ? My suggestions are as follows : 

We should ask for a chief of infantry who shall have the 
rank, grade and emoluments of brigadier-general; who shall be 
appointed by the President from the colonels and lieutenant- 
colonels of infantry; who shall be appointed only once and for 
a term of six years; who shall, after such service, be either re- 
tired with such grade or without exception be returned to the 
grade which he would have if remaining continuously in the 
line ; who shall be ex-oMcio an additional member of the General 
Staff and of the Army War College and shall live in Washing- 
ton. 

It is not believed that the chief of infantry should be subject 
to reappointment. It is thought that his best energies will be 
given in the six years allotted him as "Chief" and that com- 
paratively small benefit would result from a longer term of office. 
If absolutely barred out by the law from a second tour he would 
undoubtedly be more likely to give to his work the best that 



RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 225 

he is capable of, with no division of interests to distract him 
from his proper duties. 

We cannot obtain our chief of infantry with merely the 
expression of a wish, even if we all wish together the same 
wish and with all our heart. Much more will be necessary, much 
work from many of us. 

We of the infantry are sure of what we need and should 
have, but we must convince many others of the justice of our de- 
mands. If each of us does his little best it is believed that we 
will be granted a "Chief" and that we will never regret the crea- 
tion of the office. 

If we need a chief now, how much more will we need him 
when our numbers are increased, as they are sure to be in the 
near future. It is evident from the signs of the times that our 
mobile army must soon be increased to a peace strength of 
100,000 men, and that cannot be without a considerable increase 
of our numbers in the infantry. We have been glad to see our 
artillery more than trebled during the last ten years, but the be- 
lief is abroad that in the next increase of the army the infantry 
is not going to be neglected or partially ignored. Our increase 
should be along the lines laid down by our field-service regula- 
tions. 

In the reorganization which must bring us up to a mobile 
army of 100,000 men, we should make some provision for our 
officers of the Porto Rico Regiment and for those with the Philip- 
pine Scouts. They should, in such increase, be commissioned 
in the Regular Army in their present grades, and be subject 
to the same examinations for promotions as are the rest of us, 
those failing in such examinations to remain where they are at 
date of examinations. 

The status of these officers — at least, those of the Porto Rico 
Regiment — has presented a glaring inconsistency and lack of 
justice to them. If one of them should be crippled in battle 
there is no place on our retired list for him. Nothing less than 
an act of Congress will help him to a pension or retired pay, 
no matter what may be the nature or degree of his disability 
incurred in the line of duty — as in battle. It is believed that 
the same is true of the officers with our Philippine Scouts, ex- 
cepting, of course, those detailed for such service from the 
Regular Army. 

The question of an increase in our numbers will be fully 
discussed by others better prepared on the subject. 



226 RELIEF FOR THE INFANTRY. 

To offer any resistance to any respectable power, our first 
line must be at least 200,000 strong to begin with. We cannot 
depend at the outset on more than 100,000 organized militia, and 
will have to wait many weeks and even months before any as- 
sistance can reach us. 

The idea, so undeservedly popular with the masses, that to 
make a soldier, especially an infantryman, it is only necessary 
to place a rifle in his hands, will bring terrible disaster on us 
in our first struggle with any great power. An infantry soldier 
is not created in a week, nor in a month, nor in a year, except 
under most favorable circumstances. 

That instruction and especially the discipline of our army 
that is most essential to success in any campaign likely to be 
thrust upon us, will demand months and months and months of 
hard work, such that no officer, without experience, is qualified 
to be of much assistance. 

A large part of the discipline of an army is founded upon 
confidence in the superior officers. This confidence is the growth 
of time, of long experience in command of men, of actual knowl- 
edge of the hardships placed upon the soldier, so that the rank 
and file feel that their leader is with them. It is the very es- 
sence of that soldierly spirit which obeys without question and 
cannot be acquired by selection or favoritism. 

Enthusiasm and youthful vigor are necessary in their places, 
but they are as chaff before the wind in creating that feeling 
of reliance which comes from experience and judgment. Ex- 
amples are without number, the most recent having been sup- 
plied from Manchuria. 

Our chief of staff has recently called attention to the great 
importance of well-trained infantry in time of war, saying, 
"Japanese success was largely due to the careful peace training 
of their infantry and to the fact that they were able to put over 
300,000 officers and men in the field, all of whom had had three 
years' careful and systematic training." 

To enable us to escape sure disaster, which may possibly 
be of lasting effect, our Regular Army must be increased, and 
with the increase in numbers comes the growing necessity for 
a special chief to devote his entire energies to that arm for which 
the balance are, no matter how important, only accessories. 

Therefore, gentlemen of the infantry, let us be up and doing 
for our own arm, therefore, for the army and for our country. 




FROM CITY POINT TO APPOMATTOX WITH GENERAL 

GRANT. 

By Brigadier-General M. R. MORGAN, United States Army' 

FORMERLY COMMISSARY GENERAL. 

WE naturally look up to persons whose character for worth in 
their profession, or special calling, we respect, and it gratifies 
our pride as well as our sense of justice to make such characters 
known and to have our names connected more or less intimately 
with theirs. 

Two of the most eminent Americans who were prominent in the 
great Civil War, which lasted from 1861 into 1865, were Abraham 
Lincoln, President of the United States, and Ulysses S. Grant, General- 
in-Chief of the Armies of the United States. I had the good fortune 
to meet them both while in the performance of my military duties 
in that Civil War. My remarks herein on General Grant are based 
on my knowledge of him, gained by his side in the field, in 1864-65, 
when he was forty -two to forty-three years old. 

President Lincoln for three years had sought a fitting commander 
for the Union Armies. 

General Grant was a graduate of the United States Military 
Academy at West Point, N. Y. He had been a captain of infantry, 
had resigned his commission in the army, gone into civil life where 
he was not a success, and on the breaking out of the Civil War offered 
his services to the Union cause. His services were accepted by the 
State of Illinois, which commissioned him a colonel of one of her 
volunteer regiments. 

General Grant was so successful in war that the general govern- 
ment made him a Brigadier-General of Volunteers and later a Major- 
General of Volunteers, and because of the capture of Vicksburg, 



228 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

July 4th, 1863, by his troops, he was made a Major-General in the 
Regular Army. Because of Grant's success at Vicksburg, as well 
as because of his other military successes before and after July 4, 1863, 
President Lincoln believed he had found the General he had been 
seeking to put in command of the Armies of the Union. 

In February, 1864, Congress revived a law establishing the grade of 
Lieutenant-General in the army, and on March 1st, following, Grant 
was nominated, and the next day was confirmed to fill the place, 
and March 9th he was made General-in-Chief of the Armies of the 
United States. 

When in March, 1864, Lieutenant-General Grant assumed com- 
mand of the armies, he told no one of his plans; not the President, 
the Secretary of War, nor Major-General Halleck; there was no one 
to suggest to him better plans than his own. He decided that the 
best place from which he could direct and supervise the movements 
of his great subordinates was away from Washington, in the field, in 
Virginia, and near the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, and 
this position he took up March 26th at Culpepper Court House. 
May 4th was the day fixed by him for the simultaneous movement of 
all the armies in active campaign. 

General Lee with the Army of Northern Virginia was the life of 
Richmond. General Lee exhausted, Richmond would fall. Grant's 
object in Virginia was to exhaust Lee. 

May 5th the fighting began and continued until June 14th, when 
Grant with the Army of the Potomac commenced the crossing to the 
south side of the James, at a point ten miles below City Point, where 
the river was very wide and deep, but out of Lee's sight, by means of 
pontoons sent in advance to City Point and by transports that had 
carried " Baldy " Smith's corps from White House to City Point. Here 
General Butler was in position with an army, 30,000 strong, composed 
of the Tenth and Eighteenth Army Corps (the Army of the James). 
Butler's Army was across the Appomattox, and between that river 
and the James, Meade with the Army of the Potomac having pushed 
on after crossing until he was stopped by the Army of Northern 
Virginia under Gen. R. E,Lee in front of Petersburg. Grant had 
crossed the James at Wilcox's Landing. It was at this crossing, on 
the north side, that I met General Sheridan after a separation of 
eleven years — since Sheridan had left West Point. We had been 
together at the Military Academy for three years, from the time I 
entered until he was graduated. 

Grant with his headquarters encamped at City Point. 

I first saw General Grant in June, 1864, as his troops had arrived 
at the James and were preparing to cross that river to the south side. 

We were at General Butler's headquarters near Bermuda Hundred, 
where I was Chief Commissary of Butler's Army. He was alone, as I 
was; we looked at each other without speaking; I didn't notice his 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 



229 



shoulder straps and so did not know who he was. After looking at 
me a few moments, he entered General Butler's tent, and I mounted 
my horse and rode to the headquarters of the Tenth Corps. A day or 
two later I received a copy of Special Orders No. 35, Headquarters, 
Armies of the United States, June 16, 1864, announcing me as Chief 
Commissary of Subsistence of the Armies operating against Rich- 
mond, on the staff of Lieut. -Gen. U. S. Grant. I at once reported 
for duty to the general at his headquarters at City Point, Virginia. 

From this time on I served pleasantly and satisfactorily with 
General Grant in the field, to the Surrender of R. E. Lee and his 
forces at Appomattox Court House, April 9, 1865, and on until in 
August of that year when, at the very earnest solicitation of the 
Commissary-General of Subsistence of the Army, I applied to be 
relieved from further 
duty with the Lieut. - 
General, and ordered 
for duty to Fort 
Leavenworth, Kan- 
sas. While this order 
broke up my inti- 
mate, official and so- 
cial relations with 
General Grant, there 
was nothing that ever 
happened to inter- 
fere with the respect 
and admiration I al- 
ways continued to 
have for our great 
Commander. 

General Grant's 
mess being too large 
for comfort, I estab- 
lished my own mess 
and felt at home at 
once. Starting out 
March 29th, on the 
campaign of 1865, I, 
on the invitation of 
the General, joined 
his mess and so re- 
mained until the 
close. 

General Grant 
was a man about five 
feet seven inches in 




GEN. GRANT. 



2 3 o TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

height, well proportioned ; a good face, full brown beard and hair neatly- 
trimmed, and with a decided stoop to his shoulders ; of gentle manners 
and not over careful in dress, his uniform coat or blouse being always 
open. He was a plain but refined man; he would smile, but rarely 
laughed. I never heard him use a profane word or one to which any 
one might not listen. He had no small talk, unless it was in reply 
to something that one of the staff said as we sat around and chatted 
every evening into the night, or occasionally of old times, of old ac- 
quaintances, of old friends, and, as a rule, old acquaintances were all 
friends. 

The General sat up late ; he could not get to sleep at an early hour. 
I liked to sit up, too, and we often would be the only ones at the 
camp-fire at a late hour. He suffered greatly from billious head- 
ache, such attacks lasting two or three days and sometimes inter- 
fering with the due performance of his duties. He loved to speak of 
old times, and then little things were amusing; he would laugh and 
evidently enjoy himself. I had served on the Pacific Coast where 
he had been and was familiar with some of the old scenes and char- 
acters that interested him, and although I was many years his junior, 
he used to say that I looked as old as he did, and we had some subjects 
for conversation in common. 

General Grant was prompt and energetic in action, but patient 
with the seeming lack of those qualities in generals under him. While 
a general may be a good corps commander, he cannot always get his 
divisions to arrive at a given point in a given time. While, as a rule, 
Grant was patient with his lieutenants, it seemed to me at the time 
that he did not evince his usual patience with Gen. George H. 
Thomas in December, 1864. Thomas was deliberate; his fastest gait 
was a "slow trot." (Sherman in his memoirs mentions that General 
Thomas once got his horse into a gallop.) But "Pap" Thomas was 
brave and true and his troops had the greatest confidence in him. 
Thomas had been one of my instructors at West Point, and I shared 
in the feeling his men had for him. , 

After the Battle of Franklin, between the forces of Hood and 
Schofield, had been fought, the latter, under orders from Thomas, 
who was intrenched at Nashville, continued his retreat to join Thom- 
as. Grant was afraid that Hood would go north into Kentucky, 
causing as much trouble there as Sherman was causing in the South, 
and urged Thomas to attack and lame the rebel commander, if not 
destroy him. The roads were very bad, the ground being covered 
with ice, and Thomas did not move. Grant grew impatient, and sent 
repeated dispatches urging Thomas to attack Hood, who was now in- 
trenching himself to invest Nashville. Grant telegraphed Thomas 
he would remove him if he did not act promptly. The latter replied 
that he could not help it ; he would move as soon as he could. General 
Logan happened to be at City Point at this time, and Grant, losing 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 231 

all patience, designated him to supersede Thomas in case the latter 
had not moved when Logan reached Nashville. General Logan 
started, but Grant was not satisfied; he could not rest, and set out 
himself to visit Thomas, taking me with him. When we reached 
Washington, Grant received a dispatch from Thomas, stating he 
was ready to move ; General Grant decided to go no farther, but to 
wait there the result. Thomas did move December 15th, and Logan 
went no farther than Louisville. "All is well that ends well." It 
was "Pap" Thomas' fight, and his troops went in with a will, and 
on the 15th and 16th of December they fought Hood's forces and 
defeated them. Grant was glad not only at the result, but that the 
"distinguished" General Thomas had not been humiliated. 

I met General Thomas in Washington just at the close of the war. 
We were in the office of the Surgeon-General of the Army; I was in 
one room talking with the Assistant Surgeon-General, Crane, and 
Thomas in the next room with the Surgeon-General, Barnes — they 
had both been stationed at West Point when I was a cadet — when I 
heard the general say, "Excuse me, Barnes, I think I hear one of 
my 'plebs' talking out there." He came in and we shook hands; we 
had not met since I was a boy. He said to me, "I expect you are 
very mad with me, I used to 'skin' you so at West Point." I could 
not at the time recall his ever being other than kind to me ; but after- 
wards I remembered an occasion on which he had given me a severe 
report, which I deserved, and deserving it I forgot all about it. 

General Grant was shy and reserved ; he spoke so little that it was 
difficult to get to know him. He was one of those quiet men whom 
to know you must live, eat and drink with. While he seemed to have 
no humor himself he enjoyed humor in others. I remember hearing 
him tell of an incident when a few of Sherman's men were out trying 
to add to the commissary's supplies, and vary their every-day 
monotonous diet ; coming to a house occupied by a lady where they 
discovered some chickens under the house — this was better than 
hearing them crow up in the attic where they were sometimes hidden 
from the "Yanks." — the fate of the chickens in either case would 
be just the same. The soldiers proceeded at once to appropriate 
the chickens. Sherman was so far from his base of supplies that 
every little addition of fresh food counted. The lady of the house 
made piteous appeals to have the chickens spared. The soldiers 
seemed moved by her appeal, but looking at the chickens again they 
were tempted, and one of them replied, "The Rebellion must be put 
down if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy." 

He once asked me how I estimated Sheridan and Schofield ; he had 
never met Schofield at that time. The two were classmates at West 
Point. I replied, " Schofield can plan for Sheridan and Sheridan can 
execute whatever Schofield plans." After this, in September, 1864, 
General Grant took me with him to visit Sheridan at Charlestown, 



232 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

West Virginia, taking with him plans of campaign; but finding 
Sheridan had plans of his own that were satisfactory, he told him 
to "Go in." Sheridan went in and whipped General Early at the 
crossing of the Opequon. General Grant after this, meeting me, said, 
"Well, Colonel, I think Sheridan can plan for himself." General 
Sheridan was to Grant at this time a great comfort and pleasure. 

Before proceeding further in giving my impressions of my general, 
I will describe his camp, our place of abode for more than nine 
months. 

This camp was on a plateau at the junction of the Appomattox 
with the James River, on a bluff sixty or seventy-five feet above the 
meeting of those waters, and one of the most beautiful spots, un- 
adorned, except by nature, I have ever seen, and at the same time 
admirably suited for a small camp. 

There was the old Southern home, with its outbuildings, surrounded 
by a lawn that was a veritable flower garden. I do not remember 
to have seen a place where roses and honey-suckles grew more beauti- 
fully without a gardener's care. On the highest point near the 
Appomattox, with its back to the river, stood the mansion ; from this 
the ground sloped toward the James River and the Point. To the 
front and right of the house, which was used for offices by the chief 
quartermaster and chief commissary, where the sloping land had 
reached a level, were pitched the tents of the headquarters, forming 
three sides of a rectangle, the fourth side being open and formed by 
the bank at the junction of the Appomattox River and the James 
River. I may here mention that the walls of the house had been 
many times pierced by shot and shell from our gun-boats as they 
passed up and down the James, and the Southern flowers peeped in 
through those holes upon the Northerners at work, with not a sign of 
reproach for having been disturbed in their peaceful beds. General 
Grant's tent was in the middle of the longest side with that of General 
Rawlin's, chief of staff, on his left. In front of General Grant's large 
tent was a hospital tent-fly, forming the back of the rectangle, and 
facing the meeting of the waters. The view from the camp, as well 
as from the house, was broad and picturesque. In front was the 
junction of the two streams ; beyond was the James River extending 
up beyond Bermuda Hundred past Hewlet's House Batteries, which 
commanded the long and narrow bend across which the famous 
Dutch Gap Canal was cut, and on past and under Chapin's and 
Drewry's Bluffs toward Richmond, the plum which President Lin- 
coln told Grant he wished him to pluck. To the right of Grant , the view 
extended to Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill; to the left, across 
the Appomattox toward Petersburg, the view was obstructed by 
high wooded bluffs. 

The Dutch Gap Canal being mentioned, I'm reminded of a story 
in that connection. I believe the idea of cutting the canal originated 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 



2 33 



with Gen. B. F. Butler. He cut the canal by the labor of our own 
army prisoners. We had many bounty jumpers in 1864-65. There 
were two captains in the Army of the James ; I was acquainted with 
the parents of one of them. Those captains belonged to a New 
York regiment. The report was, and I believe it to be correct, they 
had just come off picket duty when they were ordered to appear at 
once on parade, where they were required to be in apple-pie order. 
On parade they were reported to be not properly (neatly) dressed, 
and for this cause were dismissed from the service. The first para- 
graph of the order directed their dismissal, while the second para- 
graph of the same order directed that these two men, being civilians 
within the lines of the army without authority, should work at hard 
labor in the Dutch Gap Canal. This 
coming to the notice of the Lieutenant - 
General, the prisoners were at once dis- 
charged. 

It was at City Point in that summer 
of 1864 that I had the pleasure of first 
meeting our great President, Abraham 
Lincoln, who, with Mrs. Lincoln and 
their two sons, lived on the President's 
handsome, well-appointed steamboat, 
the River Queen, moored in the James 
River just under the bluff on which City 
Point is situated. That was a long time 
ago, about forty-two or forty-three 
years. It is not saying too much to say 
I was young at that time and I looked 
upon our President and Commander-in- 
Chief as old — fifty-five years! It does 
not look to me so old now to be fifty- 
five years of age. 

Mr. Lincoln was very tall and thin, 
with a full beard, less a mustache ; a sad and thoughtful face which 
would light up pleasantly and instantaneously when the matter 
under discussion seemed to call for it. He measured six feet four 
inches, and when on horseback with a horse in proportion to his 
size, and with his tall silk hat and long-tailed coat, and in company 
with officers in uniform, reviewing an army corps of twenty to 
twenty-five thousand men, he looked a not very graceful figure. 
Mrs. Lincoln when with the President accompanied him ' to the 
reviews, but rode in an army ambulance or spring wagon. 

In that summer of 1864 Mr. Lincoln had not much reason to be 
cheerful; he desired to be his own successor as President, but the out- 
look was not encouraging. The people of the North had lost much 
of their enthusiasm for the prosecution of the war ; they were becom- 




PRESIDEKT LINCOLN. 



234 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

ing discouraged because of the lack of military successes ; volunteering 
for the army had almost ceased, large bounties were offered for en- 
listment ; one thousand dollars per man being paid ; gold commanded 
a high premium — in July, one hundred dollars in gold bought two 
hundred and eighty-five dollars in "greenbacks" — the people might 
desire a radical change of administration. It was well that the 
election did not take place until November, when things looked 
more favorable for the success of the party of which Mr. Lincoln was 
the Presidential nominee. 

On the day of election General Grant and staff sat up late around 
the camp-fire waiting for the election returns. We had a telegraph 
operator in camp who received the messages — his name cuts no figure, 
but I give it, it was Beckwith. As we sat around smoking our pipes 
or cigars, reports were handed to General Grant, who read them out 
to us. Some of us were ardent admirers of the Democratic candidate. 
Indeed, most soldiers who were acquainted with General McClellan 
liked him personally, There were, however, a few who for personal 
reasons disliked him very much. The reports read by General 
Grant indicated that the country had voted overwhelmingly for 
McClellan. It must have been midnight before the last returns were 
read out. Of course we heard nothing from the States in rebellion. 
Those of the staff who had been outspoken in their opposition to 
McClellan, now that he seemed to be victorious, were very quiet; 
indeed, they were silent, and some of them had retired to their tents 
before we all left the camp-fire, and sought repose in sleep. Then 
General Grant told us that it was all a "hoax," that Lincoln was 
elected for a second term. One old officer who was very deaf and 
very unfriendly to General McClellan went to sleep believing that 
Lincoln was defeated and that the man he disliked was "on top." 
In the morning at the general mess-table, deaf as he was usually, he 
thought he heard his companions talking of the majorities in the 
several States by which Lincoln was elected, and cried out in aston- 
ishment, and with a big sigh of relief, "Oh, I thought McClellan was 
elected." We young men — we were all young — Grant was not yet 
forty-three, rather enjoyed the old man's perturbation. 

General Grant did not often joke, but he did occasionally. After 
the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee, 
Grant with his staff started for City Point, and after riding two days, 
the ioth and nth of April, we reached Burkeville Junction and a 
railroad, such as it was at that time, and, leaving our horses and escort, 
took the train for City Point. At Burkeville a Southern woman 
asked for a passage on our train, of one passenger coach, to City 
Point, where there was a small hotel. The permission to go with us 
was given her, and when about four o'clock in the morning of the 
1 2th, I, feeling friendly to all creation, especially to the Southern 
people because Lee's army had surrendered, offered to escort the 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 235 

woman to the hotel. In the meanwhile, Mrs. Grant was on General 
Grant's boat at City Point, and had invited the wives of her husband's 
staff-officers to visit her and greet their husbands, thus giving them 
an agreeable surprise as they returned from the war. My wife was 
among the number of those who received and accepted the invitation. 
The ladies were all up and ready to receive their husbands. I was 
not there! Mrs. Morgan looked for me in vain among the returning 
officers. General Grant saw her anxiety and disappointment and 
exclaimed, "0 Mrs. Morgan, Colonel Morgan has gone off with a 
Secesh woman!" I soon made my appearance and all was well. 
These were two of the very few occasions on which to my knowledge 
General Grant indulged in facetias. 

Mrs. Lincoln was something of a prophetess. We are told that 
in i860, Mr. Lincoln hurried to his home to inform "that little woman'' 
of his nomination for the Presidency of the United States by the 
Republican party. All who were present learned that the little 
woman had for more than twenty years felt that he deserved to be 
President, and of course would be President. "No man is a hero to 
his valet," but he is often a hero to his devoted wife. After Mr. 
Lincoln was renominated in 1864, Mrs. Grant and Mrs. Rawlins were 
visiting their husbands at City Point. These two ladies were calling 
on Mrs. Lincoln on the President's boat, when this lady prophesied 
that General Grant would be the next President elected and General 
Rawlins would be his Secretary of War. It so turned out, although 
poor Rawlins did not long enjoy the office, as he died in September, 
1869. 

But I must go back to Abraham Lincoln. I, a young man, a 
young officer, one of General Grant's heads of department, in the 
summer of 1864 met the President of the United States, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the armies and navy of the nation. There was no 
dressing up, for we had nO fine clothes, the war having been going 
on for more than three years our clothes had ceased to be fine ; there 
was no presenting, no pretty speeches. It was like being asked to a 
home dinner, "Partake of what we have." There was no saluting 
that would give notice to the enemy, and it was desirable to keep 
them in as much ignorance as possible. We minded our own busi- 
ness and we had our hands full. Mr. Lincoln would come up those 
high stairs from the river bank to our camp that summer time while 
with us; he would stroll up quietly and with his usual melancholy 
look return our salutations, sit down on a camp-chair and talk 
quietly, serenety, with any of the few (General Grant had only a 
small staff) , who might be disengaged, and sitting under the tent-fly 
in front of the General's tent — this was our place of assembly. 

Fortunately for the President and his family, he was not at 
City Point on August 9, 1864, when there was an explosion on an 



236 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

ordnance barge carrying lumber, grape-shot, canister, etc., over our 
camp. 

I happened to be in my tent at the time, and had with me a 
visitor, a great, large cavalry officer. We saw the shells in the air 
exploding, the fragments falling about the camp and some falling on 
and near my tent. I could see our people in the excitement trying to 
protect themselves, getting into the tents, and in one or more cases, 
getting under an office table. I saw General Grant at his usual gait, 
walking up from his tent toward the adjutant -general's tent, taking 
things coolly, and seemingly not thinking anything out of the ordinary 
was taking place. My robust cavalry visitor was very nervous, very 
much like some raw recruit ; he first got under my tent-fly. We had 
been standing talking in front of the tent, and when a piece of shell 
struck the tent-fly, he went into the tent ; then a shell coming down 
on the tent, he placed himself behind the front tent-pole, and again 
having had time to think he got behind a large tree in front of my 
tent. He was not hurt nor was any of us touched by the shells. I 
supposed a torpedo had caused the trouble. This explosion killed 
twelve enlisted men, three civilians and twenty-eight colored labor- 
ers; wounded three commissioned officers, four enlisted men, fifteen 
citizen employees and eighty-six colored laborers. Besides these 
there were eighteen others wounded who did not belong about the 
wharves. The bodies of the killed were many of them torn to pieces 
and thrown up from the wharves to the bluff on which our guard 
was encamped. 

I reported at once to the general, who told me to go down and 
see what was the cause of the disturbance, and report to him. I 
hurried down, and just as I reached the scene of the explosion, some 
men there ran, crying, "There goes another." I stopped at the edge 
Df the wharf, seeing no use in being killed by accident, or as Mr. 
Lincoln once said, "I thought it wise to run no risk where no risk 
was necessary;" but, in a minute, seeing it was a false alarm, I in- 
dignantly called out: "It is nothing: what are you afraid of?" I 
might have said, "What are we afraid of?" 

One of the important incidents that occurred while Mr. Lincoln was 
navigating the Potomac and James Rivers, going between Washington 
and City Point in his steamboat, the River Queen, was a raid made 
by the Confederates while General Grant was absent from his head 
quarters, on a visit he made to General Sheridan in the Valley of the 
Shenandoah. He took his chief commissary with him. 

While at Harper's Ferry, coming back, General Grant heard of 
the raid. Maj.-Gen. Wade Hampton, of the Confederate Army, with 
8000 cavalry had slipped in around to the left and to the rear of the 
Army of the Potomac, moving in near City Point, guided by a faithful 
contraband, and brushing aside the cattle guard of one regiment of 
District of Columbia cavalry and a company of regulars, carried off 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 



237 



our entire reserve herd of 2500 head of beef cattle, and got back 
safely to Lee's Army without the loss of a man or of a hoof. This 
caused General Grant an unhappy quarter of an hour. It was one 
of the three times when I saw from his face that he was troubled, 
that things had not gone to his satisfaction. He got over it. He had 
hardly left Sheridan before that officer at Winchester had whipped 
the Confederates and captured more head of cattle than Wade 
Hampton had carried off from Light House Inlet, near City Point. 
For days after the capture of our herd, so important to Lee's army, 
the "Johnnies" would be heard yelling and imitating the bellowing 
of cattle and calling out, " Hello! Yank, don't you want some beef? " 

General Grant used to say facetiously in this connection, "I 
have the best commissary of any of these 
armies ; he not only feeds my troops, but 
feeds the enemy as well." The chief 
commissary was not good at taking a 
joke, and General Grant soon saw it and 
dropped the subject. 

The Secretary of War, Stanton, was 
greatly irritated by the loss of that 
herd. He telegraphed the general ask- 
ing, "Who is responsible for the loss of 
those cattle?" Grant answered, "I am, 
U. S. Grant." That settled it; the "old 
man" was not afraid of Secretary 
Stanton. 

Having paid my respects to Presi- 
dent Lincoln and to General Grant, it 
is with pleasure I now mention that on 
reporting for duty at City Point I found 
there several acquaintances and friends, 
and among them one of ante-bellum 
days, Brig.-Gen. Rufus Ingalls, Grant's 
chief quartermaster, in company with 
whom I had served in Washington Ter- 
ritory before "The War." Ingalls was a great quartermaster, the 
broadest and most liberal I have ever known. He was willing to 
do by others as he did for himself. Under him his department 
worked smoothly. He was serene at all times. In the heat of the 
months of July and August in Virginia, he sat in his office ready to 
respond to all calls ; he would fall asleep and a small boy would fan 
his bald and well-stored head, keeping the flies from worrying 
him. General Grant and he were classmates and warm friends. 
Grant always called him " Rufus." 

There were also present two fellow campaigners in the Depart- 
ment of the South, at the beginning of the War, on Hilton Head and 




GEN. INGALLS. 



238 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

contiguous islands, in South Carolina and Georgia under Brig. -Gen. 
Thomas W. Sherman, viz., Lieut. -Cols. Horace Porter and Adam 
Badeau. Porter, our late Ambassador to France, was, when I first 
knew him, a Lieutenant of Ordnance on the expedition to capture 
Port Royal Harbor, in the fall of 186 1, \mder Flag-Officer Dupont 
and Brigadier-General Sherman. Porter remained with us after 
Major-General Hunter succeeded Sherman in command, in March, 
1862, and was with us on some of the expeditions undertaken to 
capture the city of Charleston ; but Badeau departed with Sherman, 
who had him appointed a Captain and Aide-de-Camp. He is the 
author of a book entitled, "Grant In Peace," a personal memoir. 

I first met him on the steamship Atlantic, where he was accom- 
panying the Port Royal expedition as a newspaper correspondent. 
General Sherman was the old Captain of Sherman's Battery, Light 
Company "E," 3rd Artillery, with which he distinguished himself 
and the battery, at the Battle of Buena Vista in the Mexican War, 
and I was one of his lieutenants at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, in the 
ante-Civil War days. 

Well, at Hilton Head, General Sherman fretted under the stric- 
tures of the press — the "On to Richmond" newspapers, because he 
did not, they charged, accomplish as much as he should. He believed 
he had done and was doing all that was possible with the means at 
hand, and he asked me, his old lieutenant and friend, how to reply 
to the papers. I advised him to employ Badeau to fight for him. 
General Sherman thereupon appointed Mr. Adam Badeau an acting 
Lieutenant. Badeau at once procured for himself a soldier's coat, 
and putting shoulder straps on it, he made his d6but as a literary 
son of Mars. 

After this Brigadier-General Sherman appointed Capt. Q. A. 
Gillmore, U. S. Engineering Corps, an acting Brigadier-General. This 
action of Sherman was objected to by a Captain of Regular Artillery, 
senior to Gillmore as a Captain, who was something of a wag. He 
told the General that he would not obey the orders of Acting Briga- 
dier-General Gillmore, and that the only way Sherman could remedy 
his act would be to make him, the Artillery Captain, an acting 
Major-General. General Sherman did not act on the Captain's 
suggestion. Gillmore's increased rank was confirmed later, and he 
became in time a Major-General of Volunteers, while the Artillery 
Captain remained such to the end of the war. 

A soldier in war should take what promotion he can get, whether it 
is "acting" or real. He should welcome an additional bar or star. 
The acting one looks as well in a shoulder strap as the other and 
makes an equally good impression on the beholder. 

Winter coming on, we put our tents aside, having replaced them 
by log huts, in which we were very comfortable. 

In the winter, General Grant handed me a complaint, sent to him 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 239 

by President Lincoln, of insufficient food, received by a soldier from 
away down East in the backwoods of Maine. This soldier, in the 
Army of the James had written home to his people stating that he did 
not get sufficient to eat ; the people at home, justly sympathizing with 
their soldier boy, sent the complaint to the President who sent it to 
General Grant to have due inquiry made. I sent the complaint to 
the Chief Commissary of the Army of the James for careful investi- 
gation. That officer, one of the best in the armies, went to the Corps, 
the Division, the Brigade, the Regiment and the Company to which 
the man belonged. He was taken to the dug-out in which the man, 
with two companions, was passing the winter. The Captain got the 
man to drag his great length out of his abode and found him an im- 
mense man, such as were many of the excellent soldiers from Maine. 
When the soldier's companions learned what the complaint was they 
laughed, saying, "A soldier's ration would never satisfy him; he 
would eat as much as three men." This reply was sent back and 
was, I believe, satisfactory, as I heard no more of it. Every com- 
plaint of a soldier was examined into and satisfaction given, if pos- 
sible. 

Here in the James River were a number of navy vessels. Some 
of the officers were old acquaintances of mine of Port Royal days. 
Among them was Rear-Admiral Alden, whom I had known in San 
Francisco when I had just joined my company of the Third Artillery 
at the Presidio. Alden was then a lieutenant in command of the 
surveying steamer, Active. He had with him Waite, Cuyler and 
Phil Johnson, the latter afterward a rear admiral. We had nothing 
at the time — 1854-55 — in the way of a fortification in the harbor, 
except a sand-bag breastwork hastily constructed on the ground 
blasted and cleared off at Fort Point, now Fort Winfield Scott. It 
was at the time of the war between Russia on one side and the 
British, French and Turks on the other — the Crimean War. It 
was apprehended by our military authorities that we would be drawn 
into the trouble on the Pacific Coast, and hence the erection of this 
sand-bag battery. We had plenty of old powder, solid shot and 
siege-guns. I was the only lieutenant at the Presidio, and was per- 
mitted to do all the drilling and give the men all the military in- 
struction they received. I used to take the artillery company at 
the Presidio over the sand-hills to Fort Point and drill the men at 
the siege battery there, loading with solid shot and firing across from 
one side of the Golden Gate entrance to the other. I think the dis- 
tance across may be about one mile. I instructed my men, at any 
rate, how to load and fire. 

One day while I was on drill, the Active was seen coming into 
the harbor; Captain Alden in command. She was armed with one 
gun mounted forward. She was coming toward me and I was going 
on with my drill firing at Lime Point Rock, across her bow. I did 



24 o TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

not cease firing and she did not cease advancing. Finally, I thought 
I would give her one last shot and see how near I came to her without 
hitting her. I came near enough and then held up. A day or two 
later in the city, I met Alden at the Army and Navy resort, " Barry 
and Patten's." Captain Alden at once mentioned the circumstance 
of my firing across the bow and said, " Morgan, if you had fired another 
shot I would have given you a broadside." Then we shook hands, 
and with our friends present partook of "Barry and Patten's best." 

Those were grand times for the Army and Navy on the Pacific 
Coast. We did not put our 'money in banks (and so lost nothing 
when in 1855 so many banking houses in San Francisco failed), in- 
deed, when we had paid our mess bills, laundry bills and "striker" we 
had nothing left. Our pay at that time was the same as that which 
"Prince" John B. Magruder told the British officers upon the Cana- 
dian frontier was a mere bagatelle which he gave to his servant. 

That portion of the Navy that I saw in the James River in 1864 
went down to North Carolina to help the Army in December to take 
Fort Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River and below the City of 
Wilimngton. This was a failure. In January, 1865, General Grant 
sent down another expedition under Brig. -Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. 
Volunteers, which was successful. Fort Fisher, commanded by my 
old friend Gen. W. H. C. Whiting, fell into our hands, and Whiting 
was mortally wounded. He died of his wounds March 10, 1865. 

About this 1 second expedition to capture Fort Fisher there is a 
story not generally known, in which I bore a part, that may not be 
uninteresting because of some of the facts and personages connected 
therewith. 

In the Civil War we had, as in other wars, bad officers as well as 
good. We had some bad officers of volunteers who when made to 
suffer for their offenses charged their fall to Regular Officers, espec- 
ially to "West Pointers," who were, it was charged, jealous of those 
Napoleons in embryo from civil life. If you believed those fallen 
ones you would be convinced that West Point graduated only bad 
men who lay in wait to trip up patriots who were in the volunteer 
service. I, at every opportunity, praised our volunteers whenever 
I found them deserving of commendation, and they were many. 
General Terry was a volunteer with whom I had served for years in 
the Tenth Army Corps ; I knew him and respected him, and at General 
Grant's headquarters I praised him and recommended him for pro- 
motion. I had also praised the fighting qualities of Romeyn B. 
Ayres of the Army of the Potomac, and formerly a Lieutenant in 
the same battery of Artillery with me. 

General Grant was so disappointed at the failure of the expedition 
to take Fort Fisher that upon the return of the troops he sent the 
commander to his home. He now determined upon a second ex- 
pedition with an increased force, but the troops were of the same 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 241 

Corps, the Tenth. Who should command this time? General 
Rawlins sent for me and directed that I go to Fort Monroe and fit 
out a certain number of transports with rations, fuel and water. I 
suppose I was sent because my wife was at Fort Monroe at the time, 
and I could attend to the simple business as well as any other officer. 
While at Fort Monroe on this duty I met the late commander of the 
first expedition to take Fort Fisher on his way to his home, and on his 
invitation accompanied him on his boat to Norfolk. He showed me at 
this time that he resented being sent home, blaming General Grant for 
for this, and in a general way charged West Point graduates with 
being unfriendly to him. While Grant was not unfriendly to General 
Butler, I did not, under all the circumstances, blame him for this 
feeling, but could not allow him to blame General Grant for his 
failures. I was convinced from what he said that if he found an 
opportunity to injure General Grant and West Point he would do so. 
He was an able lawyer, a good friend and a bitter enemy, and might 
strike some vicious blow. It was General Grant's intention that 
General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, would command that first 
Fort Fisher Expedition ; but General Butler, being Weitzel's superior 
officer, accompanied the expedition as it was competent for him to 
do. And so far as I ever knew there existed only the kindliest feelings 
between Butler and Weitzel. 

Before starting for Fort Monroe, General Rawlins warned me that 
if I was asked the destination of the troops I should say they were 
going to Sherman at Savannah. When I returned to City Point and 
reported to the Chief of Staff, he said, "I suppose you know where 
the troops are going?" I replied, "Yes, to Savannah." General 
Rawlins was an earnest, honest and patriotic man, but he was, when 
excited, one of the most profane men I ever knew. He was what 
has been sometimes called "a self-made man." He has told me: 
"Colonel, I was nothing but a poor charcoal burner's boy; I never 
had but six months' schooling in my life." He was a good man, 
loyal and true. Grant made him his Adjutant-General, Captain, 
when he was promoted to be a Brigadier-General, and after this he 
rose as Grant rose. He, Grant and Elihu B. Washburn were from 
the same town in Illinois. He meant no disrespect, no harm by his 
profanity ; he was not an educated man ; he had not free command of 
language, and to express himself earnestly he used profanity. He 
was far advanced in consumption and coughed and swore, but every 
waking thought was for his afflicted country. In talking he was no 
respecter of persons. It was a f agon-de-par ler. You can imagine 
how he received my reply. He said, in effect, "They have gone to 
take Fort Fisher which your friend Butler did not take." I asked, 
"What troops have gone and who is in command?" He replied, 
"Your old corps under your friend Terry." I said, "The Tenth 
Corps will take Fort Fisher." "How did it happen that Terry was 



242 



TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 



sent in command?" I asked. Rawlins replied that "Grant had not 
decided who to send in command when I told him that you spoke 
highly of Terry and of Ayres." But that while the General favored 
sending Ayres, he felt that as Ayres belonged to the Army of the 
Potomac, and the expeditionary force was to be of the Army of the 
James, the Tenth Corps, he would send Terry, who had always been 
with that Corps. Some few days afterward, General Rawlins sent 
for me, and in his hut told me that my old Corps had taken Fort 
Fisher. I was provokingly cool and said, "Yes, I told you the Tenth 

Corps would take Fort Fisher." 
Rawlins, with his peculiar lan- 
guage, interrupted by coughing, 
seemed more interested than I 
was in the good news. He said, 
"You take this mighty coolly." 
I said, "Yes, the Tenth Corps 
knows nothing of war but at- 
tacking fortifications; that is 
what they have been doing now 
for years." Rawlins replied, 
' ' Anyhow they have taken Fort 
Fisher." Then I said, "What is 
to be done for Terry ? " " What 
do you want done for him ? " he 
asked. I said, " I want him made 
a Brigadier-General in the Regu- 
lar Army." He said, "Why so?" 
' ' I want him rewarded for what 
he has done ; General Butler has 
gone home vowing vengeance against West Point, and I want the 
country to know that West Point appreciates merit wherever she 
finds it." General Rawlins stood up and went into General 
Grant's hut, and returning in a few moments, said, "It's 
done." I supposed and suppose now that General Grant had sent 
a telegram recommending as I had advised. I then told Rawlins I 
was not done. He asked, "What more do you want?" I said, "I 
want Terry made a Major-General of Volunteers." Rawlins said, 
"No, he cannot have it; a Brigadier-Generalship in the Regular 
Army is enough reward for anyone." I argued and urged but it was 
no use. However, Secretary Stanton, coming up from Sherman at 
Savannah, dropped in at Wilmington, and was so pleased with the 
capture of Fisher that he gave Terry a provisional appointment of 
Major-General of Volunteers, dated January 15, 1865, the same date 
as his appointment of Brigadier-General U. S. Army. 

It is to be inferred from this case that General Grant did not 
take long to decide what action he should take and that he was willing 




GEN. TERRY. 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 243 

to take advice when he had reason to believe the source of the advice 
to be worthy. 

It is known that he approved of Sherman's cutting loose from his 
base and marching from Atlanta to Savannah; this, against the urgent 
objections of his Chief of Staff, Rawlins, who was so opposed to the 
movement that he wrote over General Grant's head to the authorities 
in Washington, stating his opposition and objections. Ulysses S. 
Grant was not an ambitious man. On July 4, 1863, his army forced 
the surrender of the Confederate Fortress of Vicksburg, for which he 
was appointed Major-General in the Regular Army. He had now 
attained the summit of his soldierly ambition. All he desired in the 
way of rank and position was to be a Major-General in the Regular 
Army and in command of that part of the Army stationed on the 
Pacific Coast. He was not jealous of brother officers. I have heard 
him repeatedly say that he would just as soon be commanded by 
General Sherman or by General McPherson as that they should be 
commanded by him. 

General Grant had been a poor man with a wife and four children 
to support ; but he was a generous man, a liberal man in money mat- 
ters. There was nothing mean about him. I have heard him in 
one of our camp-fire chats tell of Mrs. Grant's pocket having been 
picked of one thousand dollars and making no more ado over it than 
I would now if my wife lost one hundred dollars in the same way, 
and I know that I am better off, financially, than General Grant was 
in 1864. At the time when there was a well-defined rumor to the 
effect that some of the people of Philadelphia were about to present 
him with a house I stated at the camp-fire that it was said that the 
Commissaries of the Armies operating against Richmond were going 
to give me a house in Washington. Thereupon General Grant 
spoke for the first time of the talked of Philadelphia present. He 
said: "Are they, Colonel? If they do and I get the house in Phila- 
delphia that is talked of, I will head the list of subscribers with 
five hundred dollars." 

General Grant was devoted to his wife and children ; he had them 
all with him at City Point during a portion of the summer of 1864. 
He would pass over a slight to himself, but want of respect to his 
wife, where respect was due, was not soon forgotten. 

In 1865 General Grant had no desire for the Presidency; his 
ambition was fully satisfied, and he said, when the matter was spoken 
of to him, "If I supposed that President Johnson believed that I 
desired to be President, I would be so ashamed that I could not look 
him in the face." But he was urged, and by many persons who for 
some of the many causes that influence human beings wished him 
to be President, and to their persuasions he finally yielded and be- 
came a successful candidate. After serving one term it was not 
difficult to persuade him to accept a nomination for a second term. 



244 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

Even Abraham Lincoln, one of the least selfish of our Presidential 
candidates, acknowledged that he felt that gnawing desire for a 
second term as President that he was unable to overcome. 

While Grant was not eloquent in spoken words, he could write 
beautifully and to the purpose. I have seen him in his winter 
quarters at City Point smoke, talk and write all at the same time. 
I noticed this because I could not do but one of these at a time. 
General Grant was respectful to all about him; as considerate of and 
as respectful to the junior officer on his staff as he was to the oldest 
and highest in rank. While the bodily wants of enlisted men com- 
ing into headquarters were cared for by established organizations, 
officers reporting there were suitably provided for. Col. Fred 
Dent, Grant's brother-in-law, saw that no stranger officer lacked a 
meal or a bed. 

I have myself experienced how desolate an officer feels at a strange 
post where, night coming on, no one asks him in, and he is compelled 
to be asked to be taken in. Grant did not neglect old friends if re- 
minded of them. At the request of a brother army officer, I once 
called on President Grant at his hotel in New York, to request him 
to appoint the officer's son a midshipman at the Naval Academy. , 
I had never met President Grant before and had not seen the General 
for years. On my making the request, he replied at once, "Certainly 
I will." That boy was appointed, and is now a Lieutenant-Colonel 
of Marines. The President's daughter passing through the room at 
the time without speaking, he called to her, "Nellie, don't you re- 
member General Morgan ? ' ' 

Grant liked a cheerful, optimistic subordinate, and therefore liked 
Hancock, who was the ideal soldier in battle, always ready, always 
soldierly and always handsome. He disliked a grumbler, and they 
have such in every army; often good-natured, ready for service and 
obedient, but they will grumble. I remember a case where for a 
long time General Grant omitted to forward with his approval a 
recommendation of the army commander for the promotion of a 
prominent, brave and skilful officer who had indulged in much 
fault-finding in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. 
Grant, however, was just and fair, for later he gave this officer sub- 
stantial promotion on being convinced that, notwithstanding his 
grumbling habit, he merited advancement. 

Winter came on, and active operations about Richmond and 
Petersburg were suspended. 

The people of the South, in and out of the Army, were tired of the 
War. Desertions were becoming numerous. The deserters asked 
to be sent North where they could get employment until the close of 
the War. The War Department enlisted all of them who were willing 
and formed them into regiments of U. S. Volunteers, nicknamed 
"Galvanized" regiments. They were officered by Union officers 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 245 

and sent out to the frontier and against hostile Indians. I found 
several of these regiments in Kansas in the winter of 1865-66. 

Our people in the loyal States also were becoming discouraged at 
what seemed the indefinite prolongation of the War. This feeling 
extended to the officers and men of the Army in the field. Grant, 
however, was sanguine, and felt that Lee was nearly exhausted, and 
that in consequence the fall of Richmond was near at hand, when the 
rebellion would collapse. 

Our good and much tried President was back and forth between 
Washington and City Point. He was traveling between the harassing 
politicians and the armies operating against Richmond. The former 
were not quiet themselves and would not let him be quiet. That 
winter the armies in Virginia were quiet. I can imagine the Presi- 
dent, worried by the politicians, felt like a passenger sitting up on 
the box of a coach with the driver of a too spirited team of horses. 
He was not satisfied with the conduct of the team and would take 
the reins himself had he not the good sense to know that the man in 
charge was a more competent driver than he was. 

The fact that the President's son, Robert, was serving on Grant's 
Staff as an Adjutant-General of Volunteers made City Point addition- 
ally attractive for President Lincoln. 

About the close of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the 
enemy, Messrs. Stephens, Campbell and Hunter, reported in front 
of our lines. General Grant admitted them inside and reported their 
presence to the Secretary of War. They were put on board the 
General's boat, where their comforts were provided for until the 
wishes of the President in their regard should be made known. They 
were allowed to wander about our headquarters until, after a few 
days, they were taken down to Hampton Roads and there met the 
President. The meeting seemed to have been fruitless, and they 
returned whence they came. This meeting took place early in Feb- 
ruary, after which the President again visited us. 

As spring approached, Grant became anxious lest Lee, seizing 
what he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might consider the last chance for 
the immediate safety of the Army of Northern Virginia, even though 
the rebel capital must be abandoned, would slip out of his intrench- 
ments, escape South, join Johnston in the Carolinas, and the com- 
bined forces crush Sherman. So the armies commanded by Meade, 
Ord and Sheridan were directed to be on the watch to prevent Lee 
from escaping South, and if he did start, to go after him "hot foot" 
and stick to him, heading him off if possible, and in any event to 
cling to him until he surrendered. 

It had been understood — suggested by Sherman — that Grant should 
wait in front of Petersburg and Richmond until Sherman came up 
with his victorious army, which would make the capture of Lee a 
sure thing if Lee would only wait to be caught. The eastern armies, 



246 



TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 



with the help of Sherman's army, would bag Lee and his gallant 
army that they had been fighting for more than three years. 

Grant's thought that it would be more conducive to harmony in 
the future if the Eastern Armies defeated their gallant, and for a long 
time, antagonist, without the assistance of any others. 

Grant's fear that the Army of Northern Virginia would leave its 
long defended fortifications and go South was well founded, but he 
kept pressing Lee so closely that he could not get off. General Grant 
fixed upon March 29th as the earliest date on which the campaign of 
1865 could open, and on that day we left our winter quarters at City 
Point and moved to the front. The President, although understand- 
ing that Grant was to await the coming of Sherman, shrewdly sur- 
mised from what he saw that the movement commenced March 29th 
meant that Grant was "going in" without Sherman's help. 

The rains had been so heavy that the boggy roads in the vicinity 
of Petersburg, even now, at the end of March, were almost impassible 

for cavalry, and to 
enable artillery and 
wagon trains to move, 
the troops had to lay 
corduroy roads. 

On April 1st the 
forces under Sheridan 
captured Five Forks. 
This was a position 
held by Lee as very 
important, it being on 
his right flank and 
commanding the 
South Side Railroad. 
To hold it he had de- 
tached heavily from 
other parts of his 
front, as Grant had 
expected, and thereby 
rendered less difficult 
the success of the as- 
sault made on his 
center, April 2d, giving us the outer works around Petersburg. 

General Grant was so pleased with our progress that he sent an 
invitation, April 2d, to the President, at City Point, to come out to 
visit us next day. He had ordered a bombardment to be followed by 
an assault early on the morning of April 3d, but the enemy had 
evacuated Petersburg at an earlier hour that morning than that set 
for the assault. 

The rebel government had already, April 2d, left Richmond. 




GEN. SHERIDAN. 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 247 

Grant and Meade with their respective staffs entered Petersburg on 
the morning of April 3d. 

General Godfrey Weitzel occupied Richmond the same day. 
While Petersburg had been evacuated, desultory firing was still 
going on, many shots striking around and near us. I remember a 
cyclone cellar to a house near which we halted and dismounted. The 
cellar seemed filled with women and children. Grant stood by a 
fence calmly writing in his note-book. He evidently thought the 
house protected us from the shots. I did not feel so sure of that 
and was relieved when the general got through with his notes and we 
moved away. He had ordered Meade to push on after the enemy and 
do his utmost to head him off. The President came along on his 
horse after awhile and he and General Grant exchanged congratula- 
tions for the fall of Petersburg. We had not yet heard of the fall 
of Richmond. They went into a large unoccupied house, and there 
on the gallery I saw the President seated looking down on a yard full 
of negroes and they all looking up at him, not a word being spoken on 
either side. 

This was the last time I ever saw Abraham Lincoln, the great 
and good President of the United States. I turned off and joined 
General Grant, who pushed on to pin our troops who were far ahead 
in pursuit of Lee. 

On that 3d day of April, 1865, commenced a race from Richmond 
and Petersburg to the South, General Lee with his gallant, hard- 
pressed veterans, pushing down to join Johnston, and Grant with 
Meade, Ord and Sheridan pushing after him to head him off and 
bring him to bay. The night of April 3d found Grant with his staff 
bivouacked near the troops nearest to Petersburg. Our wagon 
trains had not traveled as fast as the troops, the roads were in very 
bad condition, and some of the troops were out of rations, but the 
spirit of the men was such that they pushed on after Lee trusting 
that the trains would catch up. 

Skirmishing took place each day, and on the 6th occurred the 
Battle of Sailors' Creek, where six Confederate Generals and six 
thousand men were captured. At this time I estimated that Lee had 
remaining a force of not more than 16,000 men. His men were 
dropping out every day, and those who belonged in Virginia went 
home. They had nothing to eat but parched corn. 

On the 6th we went into camp at Burkesville, but next day 
General Grant told us to "mount" and leave our camp equipage, 
messing arrangements, baggage, etc., behind. We rode on to Farm- 
ville where we stopped at the hotel. The night of the 7th was beau- 
tiful after a heavy rain, the moon shone brightly as Wright's Corps 
marched through, singing, "John Brown's Body, etc." The whole 
corps joined in the song. They were happy in singing it, and I en- 
joyed hearing it as I stood with General Wright on the gallery of the 



248 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

hotel while the corps marched past. I have never enjoyed any 
singing as I did that singing that night. I was regularly assigned 
to a room in the hotel, but was awakened in the night by a loud 
rapping on the door, which I made out not to hear. The disturber 
of my rest stated the room was his, that he was a doctor and wished 
to come in. I made no reply. I was not in need of a doctor. The 
room and the one bed was only large enough for me, and after a while 
he went away, leaving me to sleep. I felt perfectly at home. Of 
course, there were other rooms unoccupied in the hotel. In the 
morning we got something to eat and moved on after Lee. April8th, 
where we messed I cannot now recall. I had had one good meal 
with General Gibbon, assisted by "Ed" Moale, off a nice white table- 
cloth spread on the grass. That night I shared the blankets of Col. 
J. C. Duane, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac. On the 
7th Grant wrote to General Lee suggesting the uselessness of further 
resistance, that he stop the further effusion of blood by surrendering 
the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee replied the same date to the 
effect that before considering General Grant's suggestion he desired 
to know his terms on condition of the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. Lee was not ready to surrender; he wished to 
gain time. If he could get South with the remnant of his gallant 
army he would. "All is fair in war." April 8th Grant replied to the 
effect that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for 
taking up arms against the Government of the United States until 
properly exchanged. 

The pursuit was continued, and fighting took place. Lee was 
pushing south. His advance thinking they had only Cavalry to 
contend with at Appomattox Station, where their rations from Dan- 
ville should be, tried to break through our troops, but seeing the in- 
fantry bayonets of Ord and Griffin confronting them they thought 
better of it. "The jig was up." A white flag appeared with re- 
quest for suspension of hostilities with a view to negotiations for the 
surrender of Lee's Army. Had not the infantry been there the 
rebels might have got through, and there would have been no white 
flag at that time. Fighting was going on in front and rear of Lee 
and very much in our favor when the white flag appeared. The 
Union generals feared treachery on the part of Lee, and now that the 
quarry for which they had been striving for nearly four years was 
within their grasp they wanted to close their fingers on it and not 
lose it by a trick. Sheridan told Grant, when he came up, that they 
could whip the rebels in five minutes if he would only give the word. 
But General Grant believed in the good faith of Lee and received 
the flag with confidence. This was the man whom the newspapers 
called "Butcher Grant." Now that General Lee having done all 
that was possible to get through to Johnston and failed, he, a humane 
gentleman, desired to surrender. 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 249 

Generals Grant and Lee met at Appomattox Court House to dis- 
cuss and determine definitely the terms for the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

The meeting took place at Mr. McLean's house, the best house 
in the little town. General Lee with one Staff-Officer, Colonel 
Marshall, had arrived some time in advance of General Grant, and 
when the latter came up complained that he had been kept waiting, 
as he had been ready to meet General Grant since early in the morning. 

I had been well acquainted with General Lee before the war. 
He was the superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy for two 
years while I was a cadet, his son, George W. C. Lee, being in the 
same class with me. Again he was my Commanding Officer at 
Harper's Ferry at the time of the John Brown Raid, in 1859. 

The Staff accompanied General Grant, and when I appeared at 
the house General Lee was standing inside the door receiving the 
officers, who passed in front of him and to his right. General Seth 
Williams, of our Army, was on his left introducing each one as he 
entered. Williams had been Lee's Adjutant at West Point. I 
walked up, shaking hands with the Confederate Commander, and 
mentioning our former acquaintance, which he pleasantly acknowl- 
edged. General Lee was a handsome man of dignified appearance, 
about fifty-eight years of age, gray beard, over six feet in height, and 
dressed in a handsome new Confederate uniform of his rank, a hand- 
some sword and gauntlets. I have already described General 
Grant. His dress was the same as he usually wore in camp, only 
now not looking quite so fresh. A soldier's blouse with the shoulder 
straps of a Lieutenant-General, no sword and soiled thread gloves. 
The "Old Man" paid but little attention to dress at this time. We 
none of us had reason to be proud of our appearance. We had been 
separated from our baggage and all belonging to us for days. The 
contrast in the appearance of the two generals was great, as I have 
thought of it since, but on that day the appearance of our general, 
whom we loved, was good enough for me. 

After the introductions had been made, the two Generals sat 
down. Each had a table near him. Colonel Marshall had a seat. 
Seats in that room were scarce at that time. The Union officers 
stood up and were silent. I smoked my pipe, and I presume others 
did likewise. General Grant, at the request of General Lee, wrote 
out the following as the terms governing the surrender of the Army 
of Northern Virginia: 

"Appomattox C. H., Va. 

"April 9, 186";. 
"Gen. R. E. Lee, 

"Comd'g C. S. A. 
"Gen: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of 
the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. 
Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men 



250 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated 
by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may 
designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to 
take up arms against the Government of the United States until 
properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander 
sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, ar- 
tillery and public property to be packed and stacked, and turned 
over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. This will not 
embrace the side arms of the officers, nor their private horses or bag- 
gage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to 
their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long 
as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may 
reside. 

"Very respectfully, 

"U. S. Grant, 

"Lt.-Gen." 

General Grant tells us in his " Memoirs," "When I put my pen to 
paper I did not know the first word that I should make use of- in 
writing the terms." The language was from his own kindly, generous 
heart. After reading the terms, General Lee mentioned that in their 
army the artillerists and cavalry men owned the horses they used, 
and in this way suggested that these men be permitted to retain them. 
General Grant, reasoning that this would be about the last battle 
of the war, and as most of the men in the ranks were small farmers 
they would need the horses to put in a crop and carry themselves 
and their families through the coming winter he would instruct the 
officers who would remain behind to attend to the parole rolls to 
let every man of the Confederate Army who claimed a horse or mule 
take the animal home. General Lee then wrote out his acceptance 
of the terms of surrender, which were copied by Colonel Marshall 
and duly signed by General Lee. 

General Grant turned over the terms of surrender to his adjutant- 
general, Colonel Bowers, to be written out in fair copy. Colonel 
Bowers was so overcome with excitement that he was unable to 
proceed, and turned over his pen, table and chair to one of Grant's 
military secretaries, Col. Eli S. Parker, who was a full-blooded 
Indian and Chief of the Five Nations. He continued and completed 
copying out the terms, which paper was signed by General Grant. 
When the writings were completed and the copies made, a copy of 
the terms of surrender signed by General Grant, and signed only by 
General Grant , was given to General Lee . ( See illustration facing p . 2 5 2 . ) 
General Lee then asked General Grant to feed his army, saying 
his men were badly off for food, they had been subsisting for some 
time on parched corn. General Grant turned to me saying, " Colonel 
Morgan, feed the Army of Northern Virginia." I had thought the 
matter over. I have hereinbefore stated that after the Battle of 
Sailors' Creek I estimated that Lee's army, present and fighting, 
numbered about 16,000 men. When we went into bivouac the first 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 251 

night out of Petersburg some of the corps were short of rations, 
the roads were bad and the wagons had not kept up with our jubilant, 
victorious troops, and I did not know how we were off for food now. 
When men are busy they give very little thought to eating, but when 
they are idle, for want of occupation, they crave food or drink, or 
both. So I asked General Grant, "How many men are there to be 
rationed?" General Grant then said, "Yes, General Lee, how many 
men have you?" General Lee answered: "We have nothing but 
what we have on our backs; our books are all lost, our companies are 
mostly commanded by non-commissioned officers. We have noth- 
ing." I felt generous, and said to General Lee, "Say twenty-five 
thousand, General." General Lee assented, saying, "Yes, say 
twenty-five thousand men." 

I will mention here that years afterward when Gen. John 
Gibbon and I were stationed at Fort Snelling, the former, who was 
the officer assigned by General Grant, 
with Generals Griffin and Merritt, to 
attend to the paroling of General Lee's 
army, opened a chest, and taking from 
it some papers told me the exact number 
of Confederates paroled. The number 
was about (I depend on my memory), 
25,600. My only doubt is to the exact 
hundreds. 

I left the room at once, and finding 
one of my assistants, Col. Michael Peter 
Small, asked him if he could feed General 
Lee's army. The running of the two 

GEN. GIBBON. 

armies, Union and Confederate, had been 

very rapid, and I did not feel sure that the supply trains with the 
beef on the hoof had been able to keep up with the troops. Small 
replied: "Yes, I guess so. How many men have they?" I told 
him twenty-five thousand. "Give them three days' rations of 
beef, salt, hard-tack, coffee and sugar." Colonel Small jumped on 
his horse, saying, "All right." 

Thus ended the conference between Generals Grant and Lee. The 
latter mounted and left for his headquarters with Colonel Marshall. 
General Lee may have been joined by other officers of his army, as 
some of them were present after the meeting was in progress. I 
met and spoke with his son, Gen. W. H. F. Lee, whom I had met in 
California when he was a lieutenant in the Sixth Infantry. 

General Grant and his Staff mounted and left for his head- 
quarters. On the way, riding by the side of General Grant at the 
head of the column of officers, I discussed with the General some of 
the incidents of the day, among others that I did not believe that 
General Lee had been waiting to surrender, but that he had been 



252 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

doing his very best to escape and join Johnston, and only gave up 
when he saw our bayonets in front and confronting him. General 
Grant said this was also his view of the matter. 

Our column being between the two armies, it was dusk, the 
hour being about six o'clock, and when presently the column was 
halted by the Union pickets, General Grant making no reply, I took 
off my hat and waving it, cried out, "There is no more fighting, 
men, the war is over." The men lowered their muskets and yelled 
with joy. We passed into General Grant's headquarters, where I 
saw Hon. Elihu B. Washburn, Grant's friend, standing in the door 
(between the flaps) of the General's tent. I went on to my own 
tent. 

On the morning of April ioth, as I entered the McLean house, I 
saw, sitting there talking with General Grant, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth 
of the Confederate Army, an old friend whom I had first met at Fort 
Snelling, Minnesota, and whom I had not met for years. I cried out, 
"Hello, Heth, how are you?" He answered, "Hello, Morgan." 
We shook hands. I said, " When you are through talking come out; 
I want to see you." He came out. The war had lasted so long that 
we had become used to it, and those whom we loved prior to 1861 
we loved in 1865. I had some good money, and General Heth 
had none. I offered him all I had, but he declined my offer saying, 
' ' General Grant has been so good as to let us have our horses ; I am 
near my home and will need no money. Then spoke one of our 
Captains, "Well, General, we licked you, didn'€ we?" General Heth 
said, "Yes, you did." "But," said the Captain, "never mind, let us 
have a drink." My friend laughed and accepted the invitation. 

The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia to the Armies 
of the Union under Grant was an accomplished fact. Grant and Lee 
had fought and now had met and shaken hands. These armies had 
fought as no armies had fought before. The defeated legions were 
hungry and the conqueror gave them to eat. The defeated ones 
wanted to go home to their farms, to turn their swords into plow- 
shares, and the conqueror generously, kindly gave them their swords 
with transportation to their homes. 

This day (April ioth) forty-two years ago, General Grant, before 
leaving Appomattox for Washington, rode out with his Staff between 
the two armies and met General Lee, who seeing him came out to 
meet him with some of his officers. We chatted for a while. One 
I remember spoke to me of his apprehension of severe punishment 
for having been a rebel. I told him, what we all believed, that our 
good President would be magnanimous; that they were fortunate 
in that we had so noble a man at the head of our Government. 
Generals Grant and Lee shook hands, and we bowed our good-by 
and left for our long ride of two days to Burke ville, and from there 




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Alt rights ristrvtd. 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 253 

by rail to City Point where we arrived in the small hours of the 
morning of the 12th. 

General Grant believing that the last battle of the Great Civil 
War had been fought left the field for Washington. He wished at 
once to cut down the expenses that were then accumulating and 
piling up taxes to be paid by generations yet unborn. 

The Armies were speedily disbanded, and the farmers, artisans, 
merchants and professional men who composed them were sent to 
their homes. Very soon these citizens fell into their proper places. 
They were not the same as when, a few years before, they left for the 
war. While some may not have been improved, the great majority 
had become broader, more enterprising, more self-reliant and more 
useful citizens. These were sufficient to leaven the great mass of our 
American people. I leave them to grow up a nation such as we have 
to-day. 

Unthinking men have criticized General Grant for having, at the 
close of the War, accepted presents. I know of no American who 
at the time could accept presents from his fellow citizens with so 
good a grace as could the General commanding our armies, who by 
his wisdom had brought the great Civil War to a happy close. My 
opinion is, and has been, that while Grant was not unmindful of the 
kindness shown by individuals in giving the presents, he did not 
think it worth while to decline them. If our people as a nation, 
through their representatives in Congress, were not sufficiently 
patriotic to adequately reward him, the few who were patriotic and 
did appreciate the services rendered might be allowed, in a small 
degree, to express their thanks. 

General Grant had much that was unpleasant to contend with 
after he left his Western troops with whom he had fought, whom he 
had successfully led for years, and taken direct command in the East. 
His Western troops knew no general superior to him; there was no 
talk in the West by officers or newspapers as there was in the East, 
of " Bobby Lee " as one probably his superior. U. S. Grant and R. E. 
Lee were both graduated at the United States Military Academy. 
The first in 1843, while Lee was graduated in 1829. Grant served 
in the Infantry and Lee in the Engineer Corps. Of the two, Grant 
alone served with troops. 

Grant resigned from the Army in 1854 and Lee in 1861. Both 
had rendered distinguished services in the Mexican War. When 
Grant resigned the Army consisted of eight regiments of Infantry, 
four regiments of Artillery and three mounted regiments, with Staff 
Corps and Departments. 

The Army was so small when I entered it in 1854 — the year in 
which Grant left the Army— that before the Civil War broke upon ' 
us I could give the initials of every officer in it above the grade of 
Second Lieutenant. So we knew, or thought we knew, all that was 



2 54 TYPES AND TRADITIONS. 

good or bad about every officer in the Army at that time. We might 
have said that we had their records at the end of our tongue. 

The reason for Grant's resignation in 1854, as well as that of Lee 
in 186 1, was known. Grant's case was unusual at the time and was 
discussed by the Army. That of Lee became so common that what 
at first was looked upon with disfavor was after a time treated with 
indifference. 

Lee's record before his resignation was excellent ; that of Grant 
was not so good as it had been. The prominent officers in the 
Eastern armies were mostly of the Old Army, some of whom estimated 
those two officers according to their Old Army records. Grant was 
more highly considered by the people of the North than he was by 
those officers when he came to command them, when in 1864 he was 
made General in Chief. The people had no prejudices to overcome, 
orfid looked at what he had already accomplished in the Civil War. 
Those officers, some of them, overlooked this when comparing him 
with Lee, considering only what he was in the Old Army at the time 
of his resignation. To be considered highly in the Eastern Armies 
he must add new laurels to those already won. 

In the South at this time there was but one political party visible, 
and that was for the vigorous prosecution of the war. In the North 
we had a "Copperhead" press that opposed the administration and 
the prosecution of the war. These papers magnified the numbers 
and the losses of the Union forces, while they minimized those of 
the enemy. They causelessly blamed our Generals, while they 
sounded the praises of Lee as highly as did the Press of the South. 
It should not be difficult to realize the different effects produced by 
such publications on the soldiers of the Union and their opponents. 
We were fighting for the Nation's life and yet the doctrine of "Free- 
dom of the Press ' ' was so respected by our Governmental authorities 
that publishers of the Copperhead Press escaped being imprisoned in 
Fort Lafayette. 

All eyes in the North were watching the operations of the Armies 
in Virginia, where our armies had had several commanders who were 
declared one by one unequal to the task assigned them, and were 
removed. Would Grant prove unequal to his great task? The hope 
of the opposition Press was that he too would fail, the War close 
and peace be secured by compromise. If Grant was sensitive (and 
who is not?) his campaign of 1864 was not one of unalloyed pleasure. 

Demosthenes, I believe, calls "action" eloquence. General Grant 
made his greatness known by his action. It was he who determined 
the mild terms governing the surrender of Lee's Army at Appomattox 
without suggestion from anyone. 

Grant, the victor, in his soldier's blouse, without a sword! Lee, 
a handsome man in his brand new uniform and handsome sword by 
his side. What a contrast! Lee, dignified and cold. Grant, pleas- 



WITH GRANT AT CITY POINT. 



! 55 



ant, cordial, ready to do all the kindness in his power to an old com- 
rade, a late powerful, active foe, but now beaten after such a contest 
as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed; Americans fighting against 
Americans. Lee did not offer to surrender his sword, nor did Grant 
even suggest it. The officers of the defeated army kept their swords, 
their baggage and their horses. The enlisted men, who claimed to 
own horses or mules were allowed to keep them. The four years' 
war was at an end, these animals would now be used only for peace- 
ful purposes. The Commissary, at Lee's request, issued to the de- 
feated army, which had been living on parched corn, rations of fresh 
beef, salt, hard-bread, coffee and sugar, while the Quartermaster 
gave them all the wagons he could spare. General Grant did this. 
Were such terms ever before given by a conqueror to a defeated foe? 
Was not Grant eloquent ? 

The War was at an end and General Grant must have felt happy 
and could forgive, and I am sure did forgive, his cavilers, and smile 
at the remembrance of the would-be critics in Newspaper Row. 

The War was over, the laurels were won, and the people crowned 
Ulysses S. Grant, not with a golden crown ornamented with precious 
stones, but with the grandest gift at the disposal of a free, grateful 
people, the office of President of the United States for two terms. 
It was a terrible war, a Civil War, a war between friends and brothers ; 
but the blood of the Nation, of the North and of the South, shed 
profusely on many a battle-field, deplorable as it was, it proved to 
be the seed of a great nation, of a world power. "One of the most 
fortunate of nations, one of the most prosperous and one of the most 
peaceful and orderly." 





"A New Monthly Service Magazine? — A Suggestion."* 
Brig.-Gen. Charles A. Woodruff, U. S. A. (Retired.) 

"I believe that every one who has the welfare of the army at heart 
would be delighted to see a monthly army publication second to no 
service journal in the world, thoroughly representative of the Military 
Service of the United States, one which, while representing all branches 
of the land service, regulars, volunteers and militia, should voice the best 
sentiments and aspirations of the service collectively, worthy of the pres- 
ent exalted status of our profession, and one that would be regarded by 
all classes as the exponent of the soundest opinions and highest ideals 
of the army. 

"I do not wish to be understood as disparaging either one of the three 
very creditable journals we now have (I do not include the Artillery 
Journal, for I understand that to be, largely, an auxiliary text-book of 
the Artillery School), each is good in its way, and the Journal of the 
Military Service Institution, during its twenty-seven years of exist- 
ence has published papers of great excellence and value, but I believe that 
if a union of the three could be effected upon a general satisfactory basis, 
the interests of no corps of the army would be injured, that the service 
generally would be benefitted, and that we would have a publication 
second to no service journal in the world, and of which we should all be 
proud. 

"Personally, I desire to read all three of these journals, for they 
have many articles that are interesting and valuable, but if I could get 
the contents of the three in one, I should much prefer it. I believe such 
a journal could be made a power for good by shaping public opinion. 

"The army has too often suffered from self-inflicted wounds, caused 

*This letter, addressed to the Secretary, is published with the approval of the Publi- 
cation Committee without remark, for the information of the Service at large, or for 
further comment from our readers. [Editor.] 



A NEW MONTHLY SERVICE MAGAZINE? 257 

by the destroyer of family peace— jealousy. A united service journal 
should, and I think could, avoid some of that. We have had too much 
politics in the army; we all know it, but we have had no voice of our 
own that under par. 5 A.R. could be raised in protest, but a journal 
speaking for the whole army could discuss general subjects with some 
force and effect. 

"I would not have our cavalry and infantry societies lose their iden- 
tity, but I would have their journals merged into a service periodical. 
In exchanging their corps quarterlies for a general monthly, each branch 
might have its editor control certain space in each issue of the monthly 
service magazine for his special arm of the service, the total perhaps 
being equal to the space now at his disposal. Such a periodical would 
broaden every officer's views. While it is well that an officer should 
be a bit conceited in regard to the importance of his own branch of the 
service, he should remember that, at times, all the other branches are, at 
least, useful; esprit de corps is very valuable, but an esprit de corps 
that includes the service is much more valuable. All our young officers 
hope to be generals, and the greatest generals are those who understand 
and can utilize all branches of the service. 

"The three editors might constitute a board to whom could be sub- 
mitted certain papers of doubtful value or propriety which either one 
might personally hesitate to accept or reject. 

"By the union I have suggested, the comparative cost of publication 
would be materially reduced, the returns from advertising would be im- 
mensely increased, each writer would have more readers, and that al- 
ways has a tendency to put a writer on his mettle. 

"I think the subscription list would greatly exceed the present sub- 
scription to the three. A few now subscribe to more than one, and a few 
would scorn to read a general service magazine, but army officers gen- 
erally would eagerly subscribe for the united periodical, many more 
National Guardsmen would want it, the leading newspapers would take 
it, clubs and reading rooms would find it in demand and very many of 
those earnest, valuable friends, who, while not in the army, are with it 
heart and soul, would welcome such a magazine. 

"Judging by the personnel of the Council of the Military Service 
Institution, from my personal experience while a member of the Council, 
from the list of Gold Medalists, of those who received Honorable Men- 
tion and the subjects presented, I think no fair-minded man can believe 
that the Institution favors any corps or branch of the service to the 
detriment of any other, hence my reason for writing to you, General, 
knowing that if the Council thought the plan impracticable or chimerical, 
the paper would be pigeonholed and no harm done ; on the other hand, if 
taken up by you and not considered worthy of action by the other socie- 
ties, it could be attributed to a retired brain. 

"I have only suggested a few reasons that appeal to me as sane and 
sound, to present the subject for consideration. 



258 COMMENT AND CRITICISM. 

"If the matter is deemed worthy of discussion, it would be necessary 
to bring together representatives of the different societies interested to 
evolve and consider a plan for union or consolidation, for, as I said, mine 
is only the suggestion of an idea." 
Berkeley, Cal., July 10, 1907. 



"Trumpeters and Trumpet Calls Versus Trumpeters and Buglers." 
First Lieut. G. A. Weiser, Fifteenth Infantry. 

I find it necessary to reply to Major Mahan's article, "Trumpeters 
and Buglers," in the April (1907) number, in which he criticizes my 
paper in the December (1906) number of this Journal, entitled 
"Trumpeters and Trumpet Calls." 

In the first place, the latter article was written for a United States 
Service Journal, no allusion being made anywhere in the paper to the 
European armies. It was an article written from a practical, not theoret- 
ical point of view, based on practical experience, for the benefit of the 
majority of army officers who, as Major Mahan very correctly states, 
"do not know much about music" (nor is it at all essential for them to 
know much about that subject), and my article was so worded as to 
readily appeal to the mind of the layman and not try his patience with a 
scientific exposition on the production of tones, nor with an elaborate 
description of musical instruments used in other armies. 

It was furthermore assumed, and quite reasonably so, that officers on 
duty with troops at posts or stations undoubtedly had noticed, at one 
time or other, defective sounding of calls, and I also know that any of 
the above officers would not care one iota for a musical call if the trump- 
eter, in the endeavor of producing musical notes, would fail to make him- 
self heard at a sufficient distance and thus cause these officers to- be late 
for formation, unless their timepieces agree exactly with that at head- 
quarters, which is very seldom the case. 

I have made a study of music since boyhood days and been actively 
engaged in musical lines for many years and know music not only from 
a theoretical basis, but have gained experience in a practical way in the 
subject. 

Major Mahan states that I introduced confusion into my article by 
using the term "trumpeter" and "bugler" synonymously. His attention 
is invited to the following quotations from the various regulations issued 
for the information, guidance and use of the army : 

Army Regulations, 1904. 

Paragraph 266. — "Appointments of non-commissioned officers will 
take effect on the day of appointment by the authorized commander, and 
of musicians and trumpeters on the day of appointment by the company 
commander." 



TRUMPETS AND BUGLES. 259 

Paragraph 1190. — "There will be furnished by the Quartermaster's 
Department to each field-battery two small brass B b bugles; to every 
other company two G trumpets with F slides, and, if desired, detachable F 
crooks, * * * the foregoing articles will conform to pattern in 
the office of the quartermaster-general." 

The phrase every other company applies to troops of cavalry, where 
the performers on said instruments are termed trumpeters ; to companies 
of infantry, coast artillery and engineers, where they are styled musicians. 
In the last section of par. 260, "Field Service Regulations," (page 98), 
we find that "Mouthpieces of bugles are removed," * * * in 
which case the word "bugles" applies to all arms of the service. 

On page 61, par. 134, F. S. R., caution is given that "no trumpet or 
drum signals, except "to arms" or "to horse," will be sounded, * * * 
where the word "trumpet" also refers to the three arms of the service. 

In the "Manual of Guard Duty," pars. 189 to 192, the term musician 
covers the troop or company trumpeter as well as the battery bugler, in- 
asmuch as this manual "is published for the government of the Armies 
of the United States" and not for any particular arm. 

The explanatory note under the heading "Trumpet Calls," etc., in 
the drill regulations for the separate arms, states that, "To economize 
space the music is written an octave higher than the trumpet scale and is 
adjusted to the scale of the bugle." Here the word "trumpet" evidently 
refers to the instrument so elaborately described by Major Mahan, but 
the term "bugle," nevertheless, does not mean only the battery bugle, 
but the troop or company trumpet as well, and the various trumpet calls 
given in these regulations are sounded by the troop or company trump- 
eters on the trumpet, and they are also sounded by the battery bugler on 
the bugle. 

From the foregoing quotations the following facts are established : 
1. — The Quartermaster's Department issues bugles and trumpets for 
the use of the army. 

2. — Trumpet calls are sounded on the trumpet and also on the bugle. 
3. — Foot troops are supplied with the trumpet and not with the bugle, 
as Major Mahan erroneously assumes. 

4.— The terms trumpeter, bugler and musician, and trumpet and bugle 
are used on various occasions synonymously and indiscriminately 
throughout the official publications, no fine distinction being drawn, as it 
is assumed that persons familiar with the military service know how the 
different terms are applied generally and how they should be used in par- 
ticular whenever necessity therefor arises. 

Anent the statement of the French professor of the trumpet, that it 
would take, under average conditions, four years for a young man to be- 
come a competent trumpeter, and under favorable conditions, two years, 
it seems that our military service would be very short of trumpeters, as 
under average, as well as favorable, conditions no man in our service 
would be excused from duty for several years in order to learn to play 



2 6o COMMENT AND CRITICISM. 

the trumpet, if that is the sort of trumpeters the professor referred to ; on 
the other hand, if he had in mind a trumpet player, a musician who plays 
his part in a band, then there seems to be no plausible reason to bring 
into connection the trumpeters mentioned in my article with the grad- 
uates of a conservatory of music. 

My esteemed critic (on page 218) states that the tongue is not an 
element used in producing sounds. On page 219, however, he contra- 
dicts himself and explains in about 150 words that the tongue actually is 
a function essential in producing consecutive sounds (on a brass instru- 
ment). The expression "hammer out the note" is used by band leaders 
and bandsmen, frequently, instead of applying the expression "striking 
the note," as found in numerous text-books. The fact of the matter is 
that the tongue is as much a function in playing a brass instrument (in 
contradistinction from producing single or separate sounds) as are the 
lips, breath, throat and lungs, enumerated by Major Mahan. 

Quoting from J. B. Arban's book of 355 pages on the cornet, under 
the heading of "Method of Striking or Commencing the Tone," we find 
that * * * "the performers should invariable strike the note * * * 
These, are the only three methods of commencing, or, as it is called, 'strik- 
ing' the sound; further on I will duly explain the various articulations. 
I shall not pass to the slur until after the pupil shall have thoroughly 
mastered the striking of the note." 

So far the quotation. True enough, those expressions may be con- 
ventional, but they do not alter the fact that the tongue is a very im- 
portant element in correctly performing on a brass instrument; that it 
acts as a valve in gauging the air supply through the lips is not for a 
moment denied, but it is still maintained, and every bandleader or cor- 
netist in the service will uphold me, that the tongue is an essential and 
predominating factor in commencing and articulating notes, or a series 
of notes, especially in double and triple tonguing; and the expression to 
"hammer out the notes," while it may sound somewhat harsh to a delicate 
musical ear, is anything but "wholly in error," and from a practical stand- 
point, applying it to our trumpeters, is perfectly correct, it being more 
readily understood by them than a scientific reasoning on the production 
of sounds. 

As for the use of the cornet mouthpiece on our trumpet suffice it to 
say that I have reliable information that out of twenty-four trumpeters 
in one of our infantry regiments, twenty-two use cornet mouthpieces, 
purchased by themselves, and it is safe to assume that similar conditions 
obtain more or less in other regiments; at least, one trumpeter of ex- 
perience told me that he has served as trumpeter in two other regiments 
and nearly all their company musicians use cornet mouthpieces, which 
again demonstrates the predominance of practice over theory, and the 
service at large evidently has not been impaired by the use of the cornet 
mouthpiece on the regulation trumpet. 

Referring to the use of the mouthpiece by itself in order to keep the 



TRUMPETS AND BUGLES. 



261 



lips in good condition and of which suggestion my esteemed critic re- 
marks, "Practice with the mouthpiece alone is of no value, as the pres- 
sure on the lips cannot be regulated with any accuracy," it is maintained 
that this is only true as far as producing a tone is concerned, but, using 
the words of a military bandleader, "it will help to preserve the em- 
brouchure of an experienced player and will serve to strengthen that of 
a beginner." This same bandleader told me that he used the cornet 
mouthpiece on trains and boats when traveling and it is impracticable to 
play the instrument, and it helps him greatly in keeping his lips in con- 
dition for playing. He further states that the majority of cornet players 
known to him do the same thing. Anyone who has actually played a 
trumpet or cornet can readily understand my views on this point, and 
it is only for those, or the officers who may be in authority over them, 
that I recommend this use of the mouthpiece when it is otherwise impos- 
sible, on account of the surroundings or time of the day, to use the in- 
strument proper. 

The mention Major Mahan makes of one Joseph Lark and the manner 
in which he sounded taps only corroborates my statement that "such calls 
as 'Church Call,' 'Call to Quarters' or Taps' are susceptible of some ex- 
pression, especially the latter, and it is at funeral ceremonies that 
a good trumpeter is appreciated by the manner in which he sounds 
'Taps.' " 







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SOME IDEAS ON FIELD ENGINEERING. 

{From The Royal Engineers' Journal.) 

HE following extracts from the reports on the Annual Field Works 
Courses of various Companies are published for general informa- 
tion: 

I. WATERPROOF BAG RAFT AND FOOTBRIDGE. 



The Field Troops experimented with waterproof bags, made of india 
rubber with an outer cover of canvas, and inflated by lung power. The 
bags can be used separately for footbridges or joined together to form 
rafts. 

Fig. i, Plate I., gives suggestions for superstructure for a raft and 
for a footbridge. Photo i shows a G.S. wagon on a raft made of sixty 
bags. 

2. SHEET BOAT. 

The same units made a sheet boat of six planks nailed together (Fig. 
2). A tarpaulin was lashed on outside to the uprights, and a few boards 
placed in the bottom of the boat. 

3. SINGLE BARREL RAFTS. 

The troops also used single barrel rafts, made after the Japanese 
model, as shown in Fig. 7. 

4. CUT RAFT IN TRESTLE BRIDGE. 

Fig. 3 and Photo 2 show a novel method employed by the Forty- 
second (Fortress) Company for forming cut in a trestle bridge which 
was erected across a moat with no current in the water. The raft sup- 
porting the trestles of the cut was made of twenty-eight 108-gallon 
barrels. A party of twenty-two men could form cut and reform bridge 
in five minutes. 



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Section B.B . 

PLATE II.— SOME IDEAS ON FIELD ENGINEERING. 
(From the Royal Engineers Journal.) 



Range. 


Time of Flight. 


48 yds. 


4.y 2 sees. 


no " 


5/ " 


130 " 


6% " 


160 " 


634 " 


176 " 


7Va " 



266 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 



5. WOODEN MORTAR. 

Fig. 4 shows a 5-inch wooden mortar constructed by the Seventh 
(Field) Company. It was made up in four sections with iron tongues 
and bound with 2-inch rope, which was kept wet when the mortar was 
being used. 

The projectiles were made of tin, the charges being four pounds 
three ounces of guncotton and the total weight four and one-half pounds. 
The tin case was found too light. The projectiles were fired with No. 8 
detonators and safety fuse to burn seven seconds ; this arrangement 
worked well. A range table was made out as follows : 

Charge. 
34 oz. 
1 

iVa " 
134 " 

2/ 2 " 

6. ROLLER GRENADE. 

The same company made a roller grenade (Fig. 5), carrying twenty- 
four pounds of guncotton. It was pushed forward by shafts made of 
drain rods. 

7. LIGHT PILE FOOTBRIDGE. 

The Fifth (Field) Company constructed a rapid pile footbridge (Fig. 
6) as follows : 

Light trestles were made, consisting of two legs with a transom fixed 
by one 5-inch nail at each leg. The first trestle having been pushed out 
into position, a plank, weighted down by men on the shore end, was 
passed across to the transom. One man then went out and drove in 
the trestle with a maul, and added a few more nails to the transom when 
it had reached the required level. The process was then repeated until 
the bridge was finished. 

The man with the maul reached the far bank, twenty-eight feet across, 
in four and one-half minutes, and the bridge was completed in eight 
minutes. 

8. LIGHT FLOATING FOOTBRIDGE. 

The same company made a light floating footbridge (Fig. 4, Plate II.) 
with single 108-gallon casks at 12 foot 3 inch centers. To the bottom 
of each cask was lashed, as outriggers, a pair of light spars 18 feet long, 
braced at their ends. The footway consisted of single 12-inch planks 
lashed to the outriggers close to the casks. 

The bridge carried men in single file at 4-foot distance. 

9. TUBE HAND-RAIL POST FOR PONTOONS. 

The Fifth Company experimented with a tube hand-rail post for use 
on pontoon bridges. The arrangement is shown in Fig 3, Plate II. 

Iron straps, made to fit over the top and sides of the saddle, are fast- 
ened to the saddle by bolts underneath. The straps have short turn-up 
pieces which meet over the top of the saddle and take the tube post, 
which is dropped on to them and pinned through. The posts have tee 
pieces at their tops and holes near their centers, to take respectively 
3-inch and 2-inch ropes as hand-rails. 



Some Ideas on Field Engineering 



SUPtfIS TRUCTURE 

WATERPROOF BAG FLOATS- 



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Fig I 



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SINGLE BARREL RAFT. 



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PLATE I. 
(Reproduced from The Royal Engineers' Journal.) 



PLATE SHOWING 



SHELTER PIT MADE BY TWO COMPANIONS 



Reference, 



V = Valise. 

R = Rifle in firing position of soldier not 

digging. 
A.B.s -Ground occupied by one of the soldiers. 
C.D.= do: do: do: do: do: 
S.P..,S.P* , S.P* = Shelter Pita. 




Fig. 5. 



1st Period. Plan. 



A B digs out S.P. throwing up screen between the 
two valises V. and V. 

2nd Period. Plan. 



A B is ready to fire out of S.P; C D digs out 
pit S.PJ, and throws up screen on right of his 
valise prolonging existing screen. 

3rd Period .Plan. 



A B starts digging again and excavates pit S.P? 
and increases thickness of screen. CD is ready 
to fire out of S.PJ and brings his valise close 
to his side. 

4th and subsequent Periods . — 

The two companions work, and fire alternately, 
and gradually get into more convenient positions 
as screen and pit give greater shelter. 



PLATE II.— SOME IDEAS ON FIELD ENGINEERING. 
(From The Royal Engineers Journal.) 



268 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 

This fitting does not injure the superstructure of the pontoons. It 
is sufficiently rigid, and yet sufficiently pliant to give way without serious 
damage if collided with. 

10. FERR0-C0NCRETE FOR OVERHEAD COVER. 

Fig. i shows a design by the First (Fortress) Company. This meth- 
od of constructing overhead cover with ferro-concrete might prove use- 
ful, and should present little difficulty in semi-permanent works. It could 
easily be disguised or concealed. 

11. ELECTRO-CONTACT MINES ON RAILWAYS. 

Fig. 2 shows a simple method of firing an electro-contact mine under 
a rail. It was successfully experimented with by the Tenth (Fortress) 
Company. 

12. STRENGTHENED SANDBAGS. 

The same company found that the splitting of sandbags filled with 
shingle, when struck by bullets, was much reduced when the sandbags 
were used double, i. e., one inside another. 

13. MASKING LOOPHOLES. 

The Twenty-third (Field) Company tried a novel means of masking 
loopholes. A network of string was stretched from the top of the loop- 
hole to the toe of the parapet, and heather and weeds were fastened to the 
net. This arrangement fulfilled its object, and did not seriously impede 
the view through the loophole. 

14. ENTRENCHING LYING DOWN. 

Fig. 5 shows the French plan for excavating cover under fire, the 
men working in pairs. 



OUR MILITARY FORCES IN INDO-CHINA. 

{From Armee et Marine for February 20, 1906.) 

Translated by Captain L. S. Sorley, Fourteenth Infantry, 
for Military Information Drv., G. S. 

THE Russo-Japanese War has drawn attention to the situation of our 
colonial possessions in the Far East in case of an aggression on 
the part of Japan. It was even ascertained, too late, that we had 
been very near to suffering this aggression and that the day after Fashoda 
Japan had prepared a project for the invasion of Tonkin as well as for 
landing in Manchuria and in Korea. 

Only the expansion of the Russians in the Far East was made with a 
force superior to ours ; moreover, Manchuria was attached to the heat 
of the Russian Empire by a railroad whose returns were increasing every 
day. The Japanese then turned toward the more immediate danger and 
hastened to attack the Russians before their installation on Manchuria 
should become strong enough to diminish their chances of success. 



*The French bar of Japanese aggression in the Far East furnishes the text upon which 
the author bases a consideration of the military resources of France in Indo-China — 
Translated. 



FORCES IN INDO-CHINA. 269 

They now need time to direct their success, to organize their new ter- 
ritories and to reestablish their finances. Moreover, our "entente cor- 
dial," with their faithful and indispensable ally, England, is a pledge of 
security for us. We can then be reassured for the moment as to the fate 
of Indo-China; but we must not for that reason forget the warning of 
Fashoda, nor even the warning of the attack of Port Arthur. Our duty 
is to profit by these hours of peace and tranquillity to complete the defens- 
ive organization of our colonies in the Far East. 

The most important side of this organization is at the same time the 
most difficult to realize. This is the protection of that long line of coast 
which extends from South China to Siam and upon which abound points 
of debarkation. Our Far Eastern naval division would be in a very bad 
position opposed to the superior Japanese squadron in proximity to these 
arsenals and having at its disposal that admirable naval base formed by 
the islands of Formosa and the Pascadores, upon which Admiral Courbet 
so proudly planted the French flag and which we had the weakness to 
cede to China by the Treaty of Tientsin (June 9, 1885). Alas! the Jap- 
anese well understood the exceptional importance of these islands in 
arrogating them to themselves by the Treaty of Shimonoseki after war 
with the Chinese in 1895. We must then concentrate all our efforts to 
increasing our naval forces in the Far East, and if through necessity 
our cruisers and battleships can only be sent there in limited numbers 
we can at least augment the number of our torpedo boats and sub- 
marines, perfect the arsenal of Saigon, create another at Tonkin in the 
Bay of Along, already recognized by Courbet, who regarded it as an 
excellent situation to screen a military port. 

Something has indeed been done along these lines; thus it is that 
the Foudre has transported some submarines to Indo-China and a dry- 
dock has been added to the arsenal at Saigon. But this is only a begin- 
ning and far from lulling oneself to sleep over the task accomplished 
it must be completed. We have already had a program for the creation 
and perfecting of points of support for the fleet. The presence of a Pel- 
leton in the Ministry of War has sufficed to so retard this program in its 
execution that at the present hour it is far from completed. Well! It 
is obligatory to complete this program, especially in that which concerns 
Indo-China and to hasten the execution of it. In the meantime it seems 
that the- entire defense of our Indo-Chinese Empire should reduce itself 
to that of the two deltas of Tonkin and Cochin-China. There, at least, 
we have troops in sufficient number to resist any European power what- 
soever. 

As to Japan, it is more difficult to state; that will depend upon the 
liberty of movement enjoyed by our home squadrons to take -themselves 
to the Pacific. In any case, these questions are seriously studied and it 
is not without reason that the government has sent General Voyron, a 
member of the superior council of war, and one of the most prominent 
generals of our colonial army, to inspect our troops in Indo-China. 

The attention of General Voyron had had to concern itself not only 
with the degree of instruction and training of our troops, but also upon 
the means necessary to apply in all that concerns the value of our mili- 
tary organization in Indo-China. 

At present we support in Cochin-China, in Anam and in Tonkin, under 
the group name of Indo-China, an effective force superior to that of a 
French army corps. The headquarters is established at Hanoi. There 
under the general commander-in-chief of the troops of Indo-China op- 
erate a complete staff, and the directions of service for the artillery, the 
sanitary service, the administration, backed up by the colonial commissar- 



270 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 

iat; in a word, an organization analogous to that of the territory of an 
army corps. Morever, there is geographical service performed by officers 
of the colonial army who have served a tour in the geographical service of 
the army, and by officers having belonged to this latter service and 
placed at the disposition of the Minister of the Colonies. 

The organization is then completed, as it must be in a new country, 
where the arrangement of a plan is as indispensable for military opera- 
tions as for the execution of public works. 
The troops are of three kinds : 

ist. — French colonial troops; these are the regiments of colonial 
infantry and artillery. 

2d. — Native colonial troops with French officers (skeleton of 
fourteen French per company) ; these are the Tonkinese and Anam 
Rifles. 

3d. — Special troops not belonging to the colonial army, and de- 
tached by the Minister of War. 

These troops are divided into two divisions. 

The first division has its headquarters at Hanoi ; it is divided 
into two brigades. 

The first brigade comprises : the Ninth Regiment of Colonial In- 
fantry and the First and Fourth Regiments of Tonkinese Rifles. 

The second brigade comprises: the Tenth Regiment of Colonial 
Infantry, the Second and Third Regiments of Tonkinese Rifles. 

The Fourth Regiment of Artillery, of eight batteries; the Sixth 
mixed (half mounted and half dismounted) company of laborers and 
artificers ; a territorial subdivision of artillery, a colonial disciplinary 
platoon. 

Moreover, to this division are attached the home troops placed 
at the disposition of the colony ; they comprise : 

Two battalions of the First Foreign Regiment; two battalions 
of the Second Foreign Regiment ; one squadron of cavalry ; one de- 
tachment of the Seventh Engineers; one company of gendarmes. 

The second division has its headquarters at Saigon ; it is likewise 
divided into two brigades, numbered Third and Fourth. 

The third brigade comprises : the Eleventh Regiment of Colonial 
Infantry ; the First Regiment of Anam Rifles ; the Fifth Regiment 
of Artillery of ten batteries ; the Seventh mixed company of laborers ; 
a territorial subdivision of artillery. 

The fourth brigade comprises : the Twelfth Regiment of Colonial 
Infantry ; the Second Regiment of Anam Rifles ; the battalion of 
Cambodial Rifles. 

As is seen, the proportion of the native element reaches nearly 
two-thirds of the infantry. What would be their attitude before an 
army of the same race, no longer simply bands of pirates? This is a 
great question. It would perhaps be prudent to transplant a little the 
native troops of our different colonies. Outside of the question of money, 
would this be possible ? 

In Tonkin, outside of a few posts, the greater part of these troops 
are in cantonments in the delta. That is, morever, the essential point 
of the colony with regard to its defense, likewise it is in the delta that 
General Voyron organized maneuvers for the first division toward the 
middle of last December. While awaiting the return of General Voy- 
ron we may say, after careful inquiry, that, he has been entirely satisfied 
with the execution of these maneuvers, which terminated toward the 
Seven Pagodas. The bearing of the troops at the maneuvers, and their 
endurance, were excellent. Moreover, the native authorities rendered 



GERMAN USE OF HELIOGRAPH. 271 

zealous and effective assistance for the numerous passages of rivers 
and the quartering of the troops. Upon this last point a local journal 
the Haiphong Courier, gives a very interesting detail. "It is curiousto 
note," writes our contemporary, "how much the natives prefer to give 
hospitality in their villages to the European soldiers rather than to their 
own race, from whom they dread a thousand vexations which our good 
troops spare them." 

There is a certificate of good character which does honor to our 
colonial army. We trust that their example will be followed by all our 
functionaries ; so that they will teach the natives to prefer French admin- 
istration to every other. When such a sentiment shall be well fixed in 
their slow Asiatic brains, we shall be able, assured of their loyalty, to 
face more easily every eventuality. Jean Martel. 



THE USE OF THE HELIOGRAPH IN THE TRANSMISSION OF 
INFORMATION IN THE GERMAN COLONIAL TROOPS.* 

(Translated from the International Revue for the M. I. D. Supplement No. 80.) 

By Captain Samuel Seay, Jr., Twenty-second Infantry. 

IT is not a new invention and its development that we would speak of 
here — visual signaling, the transmission of information to a distance 
by utilizing the sun's rays — are now very old, almost as old as the his- 
tory of man. 

As far back as our historical knowledge extends we find visual sig- 
naling under one form or another ; at one time columns of smoke are 
used ; at another, signals visible afar, and flags ; or else luminous sig- 
nals at night. It was thus that the news of the fall of Troy was trans- 
mitted in one night, by means of beacon lights, from the coast of Asia to 
Argos, and in the time of the Persian Wars the Greeks possessed a 
complete system of signaling which enabled one to make out certain 
letters by means of torches or flags and by their different positions rel- 
ative to one another. 

Through signals, by means of flags, the result of the Battle of Kysikos 
was announced, and Hannibal and Caesar also made use of visual signal- 
ing to great distances. Csesar relates that the Gauls communicated with 
one another at long distances by cries or by horn blasts, and in all the 
Roman Empire we find a visual signal service perfectly organized, which 
enabled important orders to be transmitted from Rome to the most dis- 



*The German military conditions in southwest Africa, so far as I know, are little 
understood by us; this paper gives a hint of what is being done. It also suggests, what 
I believe to be the fact, that we are letting slip to an unwarranted extent the visual 
communications of our Army, which, in my opinion, are of growing value as an 
auxiliary with the increasing reliance now being placed upon electrical methods and the 
wireless. I think, therefore, that the article might well be published as a timely reminder 
of the importance of visual signalling. 

We believe, and I think justly, in the United States, that our acetylene lantern 
and our type of heliograph with two tripods, which cuts off the beam of light rather 
than throws it aside by action of the instrument itself, is superior to the heliograph 
herein described; and for my own part, I place great reliance ur-on the acetylene lantern, 
which rendered excellent service under my direction in the Philippine Islands, communi- 
cating between Cebu and Bohol when no cables were available. Practically, of course, its 
use is confined to night signaling, that is, for approximately half the time, whereas the 
heliograph is frequently useless. The intense light given by the German instrument 
may render it useful on dark days, but it is probably too complicated, delicate and 
cumbersome to be generally useful in the field. (Note by Lieut.-Col. George P. 
Scriven, Signal Corps, U. S. A.) 



272 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 

tant points of the Empire. During the Middle Ages and in modern 
times telegraphy without wires (not wireless telegraphy. — Translator.) 
was more and more developed, and when at the beginning of the seven- 
teenth century the telescope was invented and enabled one to distinguish 
signals far away, the use of visual signaling become general in war, 
and especially in navigation. 

In 1789 the Chappe brothers invented visual signaling by means of 
movable arms, which Napoleon .made use of in his great campaigns. 
Later there was established in France, then in England, likewise in 
Prussia in 1832, a network of long lines of communication, over which 
was employed this system of visual telegraphy. The signals were made 
by means of the relative positions of the three large movable arms suita- 
ble for a tall mast, and which at night were lighted by lamps of dif- 
ferent colors. 

In 1820 the celebrated German mathematician, Gauss, invented the 
"heliotrope," which he employed in his measurements in Hanover, cre- 
ating by a series of flashes of sunlight a system of signals which could 
be distinguished at 100 kilometers, if the weather was suitable, the sky 
clear, and there was sun. This instrument is used to-day in earth meas- 
urements, to designate a fixed point to a distant observer by means of a 
mirror which receives the sun's rays, and reflects them in the direction 
of the observer. Upon the same principle the "heliograph" is constructed. 
Then the Englishman, Mance, accomplished another step by making use 
of a mirror rotating in the hand to produce by reflection of the sun's rays 
luminous impressions of varying duration far away. By suitable group- 
ings of luminous flashes, or better still, by obscurations of varying dur- 
ation between flashes, which is accomplished by means of a simple var- 
iation of the inclination of the mirror, an alphabet of flashes and breaks 
is formed. This heliograph system of Mance has given at times m 
England, in India and South Africa almost always very good results ; 
with a bright sun one can signal sixty and even 100 kilometers away. 

In spite of all this progress visual signaling had to yield the place to 
the electric telegraph in the second half of the last century, and it was al- 
most forgotton in Germany. Its certainty in transmission, its wonderful 
rapidity, its absolute independence of weather and light, resulted in the in- 
troduction of the electric telegraph almost everywhere, and Mance's helio- 
graph continued in partial use only in several countries poor in communica- 
tions, and in the colonies. Its defects are evident ; fog, smoke, rain and snow 
may reduce to a minimum the possibility of its use; besides, it requires 
a country with elevations, for the stations must be visible from each 
other; but then the enemy, if in good position, is not shut out from 
profiting by the signals. On the other hand the system can be in- 
stalled without elaborate preparations, communications can be main- 
tained without fear lest the enemy or a hostile population should destroy 
the lines, and it matters little if the territory between the stations is 
held by the enemy. In visual signaling there are nothing but stations ; 
no material bonds, no wires which a revolted population can cut. At 
present there is only one installation of electric telegraph in our Pro- 
tectorate, along the railroad from Swakopmund to Windhoek ; and when 
this was destroyed in the insurrections (at present it is again working) 
signaling could be done only with the visual telegraph. It served like- 
wise when Okahandja was besieged. Thus it is being more and more 
established in our Protectorate. At present there are several perma- 
nent stations; a line goes from Karibib, along the railroad toward the 
north, via Omamuru to Ontjo, over a stretch of 200 kilometers another 



GERMAN USE OF HELIOGRAPH. ? 73 

line runs from Windhoek toward the south, via Reloboth Gibeon to 
Keetmanshoop, a distance of 500 kilometers. 

But it is not only from prominent stations that the heliograph can be 
employed. The apparatus is easily transported, and can be carried every- 
.where and set to working by troops. Thus, the Glasenapp Division was 
able to send communications by heliograph at Okahandja after the fight 
at Oviko-Korero, when it could occupy a high mountain after the enemy 
had withdrawn. After a conference with Captain Gross of the balloon 
battalion, held before the Military Society of Berlin, there was an in- 
spection of the English signalmen by the German Army in the autumn 
of 1899, which gave an impulse to the renewed study of the utility of 
visual signaling from the military point of view of the German Army 
after long years of neglect. Trials were made with the apparatus fur- 
nished by the British Government, and the result of a period of nearly 
ten years' experience was that this English appartus is practical and gives 
good results in India and South Africa, but that it does not answer 
for long distances in our climate, where the sky is often overcast. 
Whereas, with bright sunlight one can signal 100 kilometers with the 
heliograph, the lamp of the calcium light, which was used on cloudv 
days, was efficient only to a distance of eight kilometers. 

In Germany they worked unceasingly at perfecting this signal ap- 
paratus, and finally succeeded, with the assistance of the Tests Section 
of the Troops of Communications, the first battalion of the Telegraph- 
ers, and the Cavalry School of Telegraphy, in completing an apparatus 
which is quite superior to the English instrument, and provides the army 
in our climate also, with an instrument which can be of great utility 
in the service of cavalry reconnaissance. 

Since in our country the sun does not shine at times during the day, 
it was necessary to find a source of intense light which could replace 
the sun. At first, use was made of the Drummond calcium light, but 
it was not easy to produce it and to transport it. Finally the chemist. 
Dr. Knofler, found that a flame of acetylene gas and oxygen in proper 
proportions produced a much greater heat than the oxy-hydrogen blow- 
pipe, used until then. With this flame, scales of thorium can be heated 
white, and produce then a light of 500 standard candles. If the luminous 
rays given out by this incandescent body be concentrated by means of 
lenses like those used in light houses [i. e., Fresnel lenses. — Translator] 
so that they are sent out parallel and thrown to a distance, the in- 
tensity of the light may be run up to 80,000 candle-power, and thus a 
source of light of really extraordinary intensity be obtained. 

Upon this principle the field signal light of the German signal instru- 
ment was constructed; and distinction must be made between the helio- 
graph as used in South Africa, where there are usually cloudless skies 
and bright sunlight, and the instrument which has been tried in Ger- 
many at the maneuvers, and which has given such good results there. 
The first of these devices consists of a tripod carrying a mirror rotating 
by means of a screw combination, so that the sun's rays striking it will 
be reflected in a given direction toward another observer whose station is 
known. The mirror is provided with an operating handle which can be 
dropped by the hand like the Morse telegraph instrument. Pressing this 
handle causes the mirror to rotate slightly, which shifts the direction of 
the luminous rays, and by dropping this lever a longer or shorter time 
an alphabet of flashes and breaks is formed, as in the Morse instrument, 
but determined hereby the longer or shorter length of time they are seen' 
by the distant observer. 

In the instrument for signaling by artificial light the movable top 



274 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS. 

of the lamp carries a system of lenses, the incandescent substance, and 
escape outlets for the gases, which are brought to the lamp through 
rubber pipes. This lamp is mounted for rotation on a base. It is geared 
rotatively to a heliograph and a telescope in such a way that the optical 
axis of all three are exactly parallel. It is thus possible to make use 
of the heliograph if there is sunlight, and of the lamp if a cloud should 
suddenly obscure it. The production of gases by a method adapted to 
campaigning has been devised. Acetylene gas is produced by carbide 
of calcium and water in a generator ; oxygen gas is carried in a com- 
pressed state in steel retorts; a small tank strapped to the saddle of a 
horse holds enough oxygen for several hours. 

With the aid of this device signals can be sent fifty kilometers, even 
when it is cloudy ; as a mean distance for war in campaign, from twelve 
to fifteen kilometers is assured. 

Optical telegraphy may be successfully used to establish communica- 
tion between the army of observation on land and the navy acting in con- 
cert with it, unless one makes use of wireless telegraphy, which is pref- 
erable ; also to temporarily replace broken telegraph lines ; again, to 
keep in touch with one another regiments which are separated by im- 
passable country; notably in fortress warfare; and finally, in reconnais- 
sance work for the transmision of urgent reports of officer's patrols or 
of cavalry. 




•DswaaaiaTOD* 



CELEBRATED HATS 

AND 

LADIES' ROUND HATS AND BONNETS 

AND 

THE DUNLAP SILK UflBRELLA. 



178 and 180 Fifth Ave., Bet. 22d and 23d Sts., ) NFW YOPK 
181 Broadway, Near Cortlandt St., ■ • j ' 

Palmer House, Chicago. 914 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, 

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ARMY AND NAVY CAPS A SPECIALTV 




MILI^TOISeEttJ^ 



i iu 



Bnrgojno's 
Surrender. 



£)ES NEUEROFEUTEN BILDER SAAL, vol. XVII, pub- 
lished in Nurnberg, Germany, in 1782, contains an article 
on the "English-American War," covering the period from 
1776 to 1780. The following is a translation of the account 
of the capitulation of Burgoyne's Army to Gates, and a re- 
production of the quaint etching which illustrates the text (see page 275) : 
''Upon the day after the terms of capitulation had been agreed upon, and 
the documents signed and exchanged, the whole army, at the appointed 
hour, marched out from camp with bands playing and colors flying to the 
plain designated for the surrender. At the same time the whole American 
Army was ordered out by General Gates and drawn up opposite their late 
foes, and the order given for them to 'about face' and remain in that posi- 
tion until the surrender was completed. Even the twenty-four companies of 
Grenadiers, who were paraded at the same time and place, had to obey 
the same order and lower their colors, so that the Royal Troops might not 
have any witnesses to this scene of their humiliation. Even General Gates 
did not wish to be a witness to this sad scene, and closed the curtain of 
his carriage until all was over ; which extraordinary action and noble con- 
sideration gained for him the esteem and admiration of the whole English 
Army." — Pennsylvania Magazine of History, 



A Memory 
of 
Antletam 



IN a recent letter to the Editor, Colonel Calef, U. S. A., 
writes: "This (September 17, 1906) is forty-third an- 
niversary of 'Antietam' and how well I recall every event of 
that day. Just at this hour, 10 a. m., Capt. 'Steve' Weed, 
Randol and I walked up to the top of the hill under, or 
behind, which our batteries were parked awaiting orders. From this point 
we saw the Irish Brigade 'go in,' in two beautiful lines, the National and 
Irish colors side by side. The sun was at just the right height to bring 
out strongly the green of Erin, as well as the red of the 'Old Glory,' and 
when the front line reached the danger zone we saw the colors go down 
again and again, but instantly caught up, showing that at each fall a color- 
bearer was left behind, killed or wounded. 'Twas a thrilling sight and so 
absorbed were we watching the progress of the battle that we were in- 
sensible of the fact that we had become the target for a battery opposite 
to us. Rifle projectiles had been promiscuous all the morning, and it was 



MILITARY MISCELLANY. 277 

only when a shot plowed up the turf under Weed's left foot that he re- 
marked, in his quiet way, 'Well, gentlemen, I guess they have our range 
close enough, we had better return to our batteries, where we belong.' 
But it was reserved for a sharpshooter at Devil's Den to take the life of 
one of the bravest of soldiers." 



French T~HE French Army and Navy are co-operating in estab- 

Armv and lishing a salon for the exhibition of works in painting 

Navy an d sculpture by the officers. This will not necessarily be 

Artists a salon of amateurs, for, as the Figaro points out, the French 

Army and Navy contain a not inconsiderable group of artists 

who contribute each year to the regular Paris salons. Among these may 

be mentioned M. Doigneau, pupil of Jules Lefebvre, and Tony Robert-Fleury, 

whose "Ronde des Petites Bigoudennes" attracted much attention at the 

Champs-filysees salon last year ; and Capt. fitienne Buffet, pupil of Franck 

Bail, whose picture "La Repasseuse," in the same salon, was also a success. 

Meissonier and fidouard Detaille, it will be remembered, were also officers 

in the French Army. 

■J* -J* 3& 

"|~HE American soldier does not, by any means, waste all 

"As Thrifty " ] a i s p ay j n riotous living. Last year 54,266 enlisted men 

as a saved and deposited with the paymaster's department $1,495,- 

Soldier" 228. This is a very respectable sum and represents about 
twelve per cent, of the total pay of all the enlisted men for 
that period. If every enlisted man made a deposit the average saving 
for the year was over $27.50. The law providing for deposits by soldiers 
went into effect July 1, 1872. Since then the total deposits have amounted 
to $27,789,553, and discharged soldiers have received $1,582,993 in interest 
on deposits withdrawn. There remains on deposit with the paymaster gen- 
eral the sum of $2,911,737. 

These figures show that this practice of saving is no new thing with 
the American soldier. He has been doing the same thing ever since he had 
the opportunity — nearly a generation. If this habit keeps on growing, as 
apparently it is doing, we shall have to say, in addition to "as brave as an 
American soldier," "as frugal as an American soldier." — Chicago Inter-Ocean. 



[S the horse ever a carnivorous animal? A few years ago 
Horses an English periodical put this question to its readers. A 

Carnivorous German journalist, Eduard Mygind, writes that he followed 
that discussion and was wroth at the very idea of asking 
such a foolish question. But he has since changed his 
mind. During an expedition in the Sudan he noticed that the horses used 
for the transport of meat looked smoother, brighter, more healthy than the 
others, and was astounded when one of the Arab drivers assured him that 
he fed these horses every morning scraps of meat. Subsequently, Herr 
Mygind noticed in Constantinople that butchers' horses usually were sleeker 
than other horses. The butchers, on being interrogated, vehemently denied 
feeding them meat, but at last he came upon one who explained to him that 
this denial was due to the fact that in putting such food before horses 
they were violating religious precepts, but that as a matter of fact, the 
practice was not infrequent. Vegetarians, however, need feel no alarm, for it 
is undeniable that, while an occasional scrap of meat may make a horse 
more vivacious, it also makes him more vicious. 




JOURNAL 

„ Of THE . 

MILITARY 

SERVICE 

INSTITUTION 



Recollections of George Washington.* 

WHATEVER information may be obtained, at any time, concern- 
ing the life and opinions of George Washington, is always of 
interest to an American, this being the term he applied to citizens 
of the United States in order to differentiate them from Canadians, Mex- 
icans or others of the then Spanish and Portuguese Colonies in North 
or South America. 

Sometimes so-called biographies have been published which have 
failed to depict the true Washington, and once there were forged public 
letters, issued in book form, which purported to have been written by 
him. 

His letters on public affairs and to his family, and on his own private 
business concerns, give a better idea, probably, of Washington as he 
was than the most fulsome biography. 

The latest contribution in this direction is the publication by Double- 
day, Page and Company, entitled "Letters and Recollections of George 
Washington, being letters to Tobias Lear and others between 1790 and 
1799, with a diary of Washington's last days." 

These are prefaced by an introduction from Tobias Lear's grand- 
daughter, Mrs. Louisa Lear Eyre. 

Tobias Lear himself was born in Portsmouth, N. H., September 19, 
1762, and graduated at Harvard in 1783, and in 1785 became a tutor in 
Washington's family, to Mrs. Washington's children by her first mar- 
riage. For sixteen years afterward, until Washington's decease, in 
December, 1799, Lear sustained the most intimate relations to his family, 
having married, for his third wife, a niece of Mrs. Washington. 

When Washington became General-in-Chief of the Army of the U. S., 
under President John Adams, Lear was appointed military secretary, 



*Letters and Recollections of George Washington — Being Letters to Tobias Lear 
and Others, 1790-99. New York. Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906. 



LETTERS FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON. 279 

with rank of lieutenant-colonel, July 1, 1799, and served until May 
14, 1800. 

He was afterward Consul General to Santo Domingo, and then to 
Algiers, and later an accountant in the War Department, and died at 
Washington in 1816. 

The letters published in these "Letters and Recollections," may nearly 
all be found in President Jared Sparks' "Writings of Washington," or 
in W. K. Bixby's privately printed collections, or in the letters from 
Washington to William Pearce in the Long Island Historical Society 
publications, or in the Washington papers in the Library of Congress. 

Major Lear's account of the last illness and last words of Washington 
is very interesting. 

The book is illustrated by several artotypes, including one of a mina- 
ture of Washington, given to Lear. The first of the series of letters is 
dated Philadelphia, September 5, 1790, from Washington to Major 
Lear, announcing his arrival from New York in Philadelphia in conse- 
quence of the capitol of the United States having been removed to the 
latter city. 

The corporation of the City of Philadelphia had selected the resi- 
dence of Robert Morris for the Executive Mansion. 

This letter shows the attention Washington paid to even the smallest 
details of his business affairs, for he discussed the accommodations of 
the house, and where every member of the family should be quartered, 
and how the coachman and postilions should be cared for. 

From this discussion he proceeded to give instructions how his coach 
and harness at Mount Vernon should be put in order and then what 
servants and washerwomen should be brought on to Philadelphia, and 
then as to the comparative merits of two persons as stewards and the 
control one of them had over his cook in the planning of "dinners," 
and concluded they would be "more tasty" if the other man should be 
employed. 

Washington's letters to Lear and to others with whom he had busi- 
ness dealings show that while he was strictly just, he nevertheless in- 
sisted on prompt payments of obligations due. 

He was, probably, in 1795, while President of the United States, 
the wealthiest citizen and largest land holder. At that time he owned 
nearly 33,000 unimproved acres on the Ohio and Great Kanhawa Rivers, 
and two large tracts in Kentucky, besides other lands in Pennsylvania 
and Virginia. 

In one of his letters, in August, 1798, he informed a friend that he 
weighed 210 pounds, and wanted to buy a riding horse suitable to his 
weight, and would prefer "a perfect white." 

The last letter of the series is dated December 1, 1799, Washington 
having died of pneumonia at Mount Vernon on the 14th of that month. 
The volume of letters would be more interesting if the publishers 
had not, with inexcusable negligence, omitted an index either of names 
or subjects. As it is, the reader, unless noting a fact contained in a 
letter, or allusion to a person, cannot again readily find it, and, as a 
consequence, the book has no value as one of reference. 

Asa Bird Gardiner. 



2 So REVIEWS AND EXCHANGES. 

Riot Duty — Law and Customs.* 

THIS work is a compilation of personal reflections upon military 
matters and studies of cases of military law. The author was 
hardly fair to himself to make the title so narrow. Military 
efficiency might fairly be the theme under which the chapters on Pre- 
paredness, Assembly, Orders, Reports, Conduct of Officers, Movement 
of Troops, Their Disposal, Subsistence, Pay and Tactical Use would 
find places. 

The colonel has brought together many valuable references to cases 
in which the law of the land has been declared to be controling in 
the discharge of military duty. Civil Courts have been appealed to in 
very many instances where the militia were concerned. 

The fact that the militia is a distinct part of the civil government, as 
distinguished from an army, created for, and acting as a war factor, ex- 
plains the existence of these cases. Indeed, the author lays down the 
law that the Regular Army cannot be assigned to duty in aid of the 
civil authorities. This, however, militates somewhat against the statutes 
quoted, as well as the Senate Document 209, of the Fifty-seventh Con- 
gress, "Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances," and really turns upon 
the question who is the head civil authority. 

No law has yet been pointed out, by which either the use of the 
Federal troops to suppress insurrection, on the request of the governor 
of a State, or the use of the militia through such a special agency, or 
even as an aid to the posse c omit at us in any State, would be held not to 
be in aid of the civil authorities. 

A new phase not touched upon will be the use of troops in the 
colonial possessions of the United States. 

Confusion has resulted in times gone by, when troops were ordered 
to report in aid of the civil authorities, concerning the actual command- 
ing officer. The author makes a distinction between regulars and 
militia, quoting the regulation that Federal troops cannot be directed 
to act under the orders of any civil officer, p. 150, while at p. 194, he 
says, "Tactics in aid of civil authorities are necessarily restricted by 
the control which a sheriff, mayor or other civil officer exercises over 
the military officer." However, since the days of Colonel Stevens, when he 
refused to parade his regiment at the request of the Mayor of New 
York, until ball cartridge was issued, there has been no doubt that the 
military commander is the one in command when the military are re- 
quired to act, and that the military officer is the judge of how to act, 
whether he be a regular or not. C. E. L. 



Fighting the Polar Ice.f 

UNDER the title of "Fighting the Polar Ice," Mr. Anthony Fiala 
presents in most readable form the experiences of the Ziegler 
Polar Exposition, of which he was the commander, and which set 
forth in the season of 1903. 

The book is intensely interesting and presents modestly, though in 
vivid form, all the dangers of arctic travel which dissuade the timid 



*The Laiu and Customs of Riot Ditty. By Byron L. Bargar, of the Ohio Bar. 
Published by the author 1907, pp. 284, index 40 pp. 

t Fighting the Polar Ice. By Anthony Fiala. New York. Doubleday, Page & 
Company. 1907. 



STAFF-OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK. 281 

and offer fascinating allurement to the intrepid. Aside from the narra- 
tive, the work holds abundant information as to the organization 
and equipment for travel in excessively cold regions, useful to those 
who contemplate journeys in such latitudes. 

The paper and printing are superb and the binding in keeping. The 
work is illustrated by reproductions of many phototgraps and drawings. 

H. O. S. H. 



Weights and Measures.* 

IN a series of chapters treating with the historic and scientific sides 
of metrology and the metric system, Professor Hallock and Herbert 
T. Wade, in collaboration, have presented to the student and gen- 
eral reader a valuable addition to the subject. Of this, so much has 
already been written of a highly technical order, that the aim of the 
authors, so well performed, to supply in simple and non-technical 
language a resume of the systems of weights and measures, their 
evolution and the metric system, will undoubtedly be appreciated by 
those especially interested. Beginning with a review of the science of 
metrology, in which the reader finds grouped together the earliest known 
facts of the various standards, the origin of the metric system is 
introduced, and its development up to present time is comprehensively 
dealt with in a thorough manner. Data, in connection with the adoption 
of the system in certain parts of Europe and South America, and its 
introduction into the United States, are given, and several chapters 
are devoted to the advantages derived by its use in commerce, manu- 
facturing and medicine. The International electric units are referred 
to, as well. 

The appendix contains tables of conversion from common to metric 
measures,, useful constants and equivalents. An index of the contents 
greatly facilitates as an aid to reference. J. F. R. 



A Staff-Officer's Scrap-Book. f 

VOLUME ONE of this work was extensively reviewed in the May, 
1906, issue of the Journal. 

In this volume, the author describes his observations from 
August, 1904, through the advance on Liao Yang, the battle at that 
point, from August 25th to September 6th, the desperate engagements 
about the coal mines at Yentai, and On the Shaho, through the month 
of October, and the life in the field till January. 

At the end of the year he had the opportunity to visit Port 
Arthur, where he met General Nogi and saw the trenches and fortifica- 
tions, which were the scenes of the severest contests. He returned 
to the coal mines, remaining a short time, and then left for Yokohama 
early in February. 



^Outlines of the Evolution of Weights and Measures and the Metric System. Edited by 
William Hallock, Ph.D., Professor of Physics in Columbia University," C. N. Y., and 
Herbert T. Wade, editor for Physics and Applied Science, "The New International En- 
cyclopedia." 300 pages, bound in cloth. New York and London: The Macmillan Com- 
pany. 

-\A Staff-Officer's Scrap-Book, during the Russo-Tapanese War. By Sir Ian Hamilton, 
K.C.B. Published by Longman, Green & Co., New York. Vol. 2, pp. 364 and index 
PP- ^3- 



2&2 



REVIEWS AND EXCHANGES. 



The charm of the author's work is his free and easy comment 
upon everything. The ease and grace of his descriptions of the lighter 
sides of the army life and of his entertainment and treatment by the 
generals and officers, added to a sympathetic and copious flow of ob- 
servation of events, noted daily, currente calamo, make a volume of 
great interest. The author is both soldier and bon camarade. 

He has taken pains to study the Japanese character and cult, and 
points out the social conflict inevitable in Japan, with the growth of 
the party intent upon killing Bushido. 

He finds the Japanese soldier is bound up in his profession, indif- 
ferent to the personality of the divisional or regimental commander and 
revealing a remarkable impersonality as to everything; boastfulness is 
unknown, pride and self-satisfaction unbounded; fortitude and disdain 
of money are inseparable parts of his character. The author thinks 
that the precepts of Bushido do not take root in the domain of com- 
merce. 

The volume is well supplied with maps and descriptions. — C. E. L. 



Book Notes.* 

Edwin McMasters Stanton — The Autocrat, Emancipation and Recon- 
struction. By Frank Abial Flower. (Akron, Ohio.) The Saalfield 
Publishing Co., 1905. 

This portly volume of 425 pages contains much interesting matter 
concerning the personal character and official life of the great War Min- 
ister. Many official reports and private letters, some of which have never 
before appeared in type, are utilized in an endeavor to enhance the fame 
of one of the leading figures of the Civil War. Not satisfied, however, 
with giving "to Caesar the things that are Caesar's" the author has not 
hesitated to attempt to deprive others — notably the Martyr President — of 
some of the honors to which they are in the opinion of the world justly 
entitled. In this futile effort the author has detracted from the value of 
the book as an impartial, and unprejudiced record of the period. On this 
account the student should read and digest its contents cum grano sal is. 

The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1863. By Samuel Livingston 
French. New York Publishing Society, of New York, 1906. 

The preface states that the book supplies ''an inside history of the 
Army of the Potomac and its leaders as told in the official despatches, 
reports and secret correspondence" during the period noted. An exami- 
nation confirms the assertion but .fails to explain why the history of that 
army is not completed to the close of the Civil War. The short comings 
of McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade and Halleck are set forth more or 
less logically by documentary evidence : the operations and misfortunes of 
General Pope are treated in a friendly way and the Government is bitterly 
arraigned for its treatment of a faithful public servant. As a compilation 
of Civil War papers, this publication has some value. 

History of the "Bucktail" or Kane Rifle Regiment of the Pennsylvania 

Reserve Corps. By O. R. H. Thomson and W. H. Rauch. (Phila.) 

Electric Printing Co., 1906. 

This elaborate regimental history cannot fail to be of the greatest 
interest to the survivors of the Civil War, and of some value to the coming 



*These notices are not intended to take the place of more extended reviews later. 



BOOK NOTES. 283 

historian of the great conflict, more for its wealth of detail — personal and 
official— of one of the most distinguished units of a famous brigade of the 
Union Army. It has had the benefit of editorial supervision of a trained 
literary expert in collaboration with the Regimental Historian, and the rec- 
ord is chronologically arranged with a chapter to each campaign of the 
Army of the Potomac in which "The Bucktails" participated. An index 
of names and places together with a fairly complete directory — names and 
addresses — of surviving members of the organization, add to the useful- 
ness of the volume for quick reference. 

Manual for N on-commissioned Officers of a Troop of Cavalry in Secur- 
ity and Information.. By Lieut, (now Captain) John J. Boniface, 
4th (now 2d) Cavalry. (Kansas City.) Hudson Kimberly Pub. 
Co., 1904. 

The increasing number of portable and inexpensive manuals con- 
taining practical instruction upon special duties devolving upon command- 
ers of detachments or small bodies of troops, is -creditable alike to authors 
and publishers. No sergeant or corporal of cavalry should be without this 
little book : and it might well be to the advantage of each troop commander 
to issue a copy as "company property" ,at his own expense to each of his 
non-commissioned officers not already provided. Anything tending to in- 
crease the efficiency of the men who wear chevrons should not be over- 
looked by those charged with the interests of the Service. 

Practical Instruction in Security and Information of Non-commissioned 

Officers of Infantry. By Lieut. E. K. Massee, 7th U. S. Infantry. 

(Kansas City.) Franklin Hudson Pub. Co., 1907. 

This is a similar work to that above referred to for non-com. officers 
of cavalry, but more elaborate and full of detail while equally portable 
for the pocket. Much of it might be studied with benefit by others than 
infantry soldiers. The arrangement of the contents is excellent, the lan- 
guage "clear and the diagrams to the point; an excellent folding map of 
Fort Leavenworth and vicinity, is bound up with this little volume. 

Early in September A. C. McClurg- & Co. will issue a work in three 
volumes on "The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba," by Col. H. H. 
Sargent (Capt. Second Cavalry). It is a full strategic history 
of the campaign, with maps; the result of six years' study of the 
operations of 1898. An exhaustive review of this work by Gen. 
Charles King will appear in the Journal Military Service Insti- 
tution for November. — T. F. R. 

Received for Library and Review. 

The Principles of Success in War. By Major C. Ross, D. S. O. The 
Norfolk Regiment, Aldershot, Eng. 

Information on the Battlefield. By Bvt. Colonel J. E. Copper, C. B., 
Royal Engineers, Aldershot, Eng. 

The Citizen's Part in Government. By Elihu Root, Secretary of State. 
(New York.) Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. 

Instructions for the Infantry Private of The National Guard. By Cap- 
tain John W. Norwood, 1st Infantry, N. C. N. G. (New York.) 
Arms and the Man Publishing Co., 1907. 



284 REVIEWS AND EXCHANGES. 

Manual for the Pay Department, revised to include May 7, 1907. (Wash- 
ington.) Government Printing Office, 1907. 

Is the United States Prepared for War? By Frederick Louis Huide- 
koper, with an Introduction by Hon. William H. Taft, Secretary of 
War. (Reprint from N. A. Reviezv, 1907.) 

Leading American Soldiers. By R. M. Johnston, M. A. (New York.) 
Henry Holt & Co., 1907. 

Society of the Army of the Potomac — Thirty-seventh Annual Reunion — 
Report of Proceedings, Washington, 1907. 

A Story of Vicksburg and lackson, "Lest We Forget." By Edwin L. 
Hobart, Company D, 28th Illinois, 1907. 



©ur Eicbanges. 

Army and Navy lournal (to date). 

Army Service Quarterly (London) (Inly). 

Army and Navy Chronicle (London) (luly). 

Artilleristische Monatshefte (Itdy). 

Artilleri-Tidskrift (to date). 

Canadian Military Institute (to date). 

lournal of the Association of Military Surgeons (to date). 

Journal of the Royal Artillery (July). 

lournal of the United States Artillery (to date). 

lournal of the U. S. Cavalry Association (to date). 

Journal of the U. S. Infantry Association (to date). 

Ip%irnal of the Royal U. S. Institution (luly). 

La Revue Technique (todate). 

La Belgique Militaire (to date). 

Our State Army and Navy (Penna.) (to date). 

Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute (to date). 

Reviezv of Reviews (August). 

Rcvista di Artiglieria e Genio (to date). 

Revista Del Ejercito Y Marina (to date). 

Revue de I'Armee Beige (to date). 

Revue Militaire (to date). 

Revue Artillerie (to date). 

Royal Engineers' Journal (July). 

The Cavalry Journal (London) (July) 

The Seventh Regiment Gazette (luly). 

The Texas N. G. Journal (to date). 

United Service Gazette (London) (to date). 

United Service Magazine (London) (to date). 




To Fill 
Vacancy 
of 

President 
of 

Institu- 
tion. 



Ebitor's Bulletin. 



A President (to succeed the late General Ruger) will be 
voted for by the Members of the Military Service Insti- 
tution. At a meeting of the Executive Council, July 10, 1907, 
the following nominations were approved: President, 
Major-Gen. A. S. Webb (late) U.S.A.; Alternates, Lieut- 
Gen. A. MacArthur, Maj.-Gen. E. S. Otis. General Webb, 
one of the Resident Vice Presidents and one of the oldest 
members of the Institution, is widely known as a distin- 
guished Civil War commander and for many years thereafter 
President of the College of the City of New York. 



Resident 
Vice- 
Presi- 
dent. 



A Resident Vice-President (to succeed General Wade) 
was elected at the same meeting; Maj.-Gen. Fred D. Grant, 
U. S. A., has accepted the office. 



Election 
of Treas- 
urer. 



A Treasurer (to succeed Lieut-Col. W. H. Miller, whose 
station has been changed), was elected by the Council. June 
12, 1907, and Col. John G. D. Knight, Corps of Engineers, 
has consented to serve in that capacity. 



286 EDITORS BULLETIN. 

Acces- Accessions to Membership in the Institution (revised), 

sions o s i nC e last publication of a list, are as follows: 

ShiP- {Associate Members thus *) 

*Abbington, E. H., major, Ark. N. G. 
*Abbington, W. H., captain, Ark. N. G. 

Allen, G. M., lieut, 19th Infantry. 

Allison, J. B., captain, 7th Infantry. 
^Andrews, R. B., captain, Ark. N. G. 
*Archbold, J., Jr., Lieut. Col., A. D. C. Pa. N. G 

Ayers, W. J., lieut., Philippine Scouts. 
*Baird, F. M., lieutenant, Dumbartonshire Rifles. 

Ballin, A., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Barlow, M. T., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Barry, A. W., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Becker, F. W., N. G. N. Y. 
*Barry, J. I., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
*Berry, L. P., Jr., captain, Ark. N. G. 

Bloom, J. E., captain, Sub. Department. 
*Boughan, B. A., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
*Boyd, W. A., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
*Broom, N. H., lieutenant-colonel, R. I. M. 

Burch, B. L., lieutenant, 14th Cavalry. 
*Caldwell, J. S., captain, S. C. Infantry. 
^Carroll, B. H., Jr., lieutenant-colonel, T. N. G. 

Cass, L. W., lieutenant, 12th Cavalry. 
*Chester, S. B., barrister at law, London. 
*Collins, T. D., major, T. N. G. 

Collins, R. W., lieutenant, A. C. 
*Compere, E. L., lieutenant, Ark. N. G. 

Conger, A. L., captain, 29th Infantry. 

Currie, D. H., lieutenant, A. C. 

Davis, B., lieutenant, 6th Infantry. 
*Davis, E. L., major, Ark. N. G 
*Devine, A. E., colonel, T. N. G 

Dixon, H. B., captain, Pay Department. 

Farrow, E. E., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Finlayson, J. L., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Fletcher, A. S., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Fonesca, H. R., da, Secretary of War, Brazil. 
*Fowler, G. R., captain, T. N. G. 

Gambril, W. G, major, Pay Department. 
*Gammon, J. L., captain, Texas N. G 

Gordon, T., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Greene, W. F., captain, Ark. N. G. 
*Griffin, E. O., captain, Texas N. G 

*Gronberry, B. F., captain, Ark. N. G. 

*Guessaz, O. C, lieutenant-colonel, T. N. G 
*Hanna, W. A., lieutenant, Ark. N. G 

*Hatfield, H. R., major, Pa. N. G. 



EDITORS BULLETIN. 287 

*Hecht, S., major, Ark. N. G. 

*Hubbard, T. H., brevet brigadier-general, U. S. V. 

*Hudson, W. C, major, Ark. N. G. 

*Hulen, J. A., brigadier-general, T. N. G. 

^Humphrey, L. G, captain, Ark. N. G. 

Ireland, M. L., lieutenant, Ordnance Department. 
*Jarvis, J. M., colonel, N. G. N. Y. 
*Jerome, L. H., late lieutenant, 2d Cavalry. 
*Jett, E. B., major, Ark. N. G 

Johnson, F. C, captain, 2d Cavalry. 
*Johnson, J. E., brevet-major, U. S. Volunteers. 
* Jones, W. N., captain, Ark. N. G. 
*Keating, R. B., captain, Ark. N. G. 

Kelly, J. R., lieutenant, 7th Infantry. 
*Kensil, C. J., lieutenant, N. G. Pa. 

King, H. R., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

King, W., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Knox, A. S., lieutenant, Ark. N. G. 
*Lamb, C. J., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 

Le Sage, J. C, lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Lilenthal, A. W., captain, U. S. V. 
*Lucas, E., captain, Ark. N. G. 

McNally, P., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Mosely, R. L., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Moss, J. A., captain, 24th Infantry. 

Moylan, P., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Mueller, F. L., major, N. G. Pa. 

Neisser, S. M., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Nesbitt, H. M., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
*Newcomb, E. E., colonel, N. G. S. M. 
*Nicholls, J. F., major, T. N. G 
*Niles, A. J., brigadier-general, Ok. 

Nuttman, L. M., captain, 9th Infantry. 
*Opdyke, H. G, captain, N. G. N. J. 

Ovenshine, A. T., captain, 7th Infantry. 

Pagelow, J. A., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Palmer, R. R., lieutenant, 6th Infantry. 
*Pearson, R. M., lieutenant-colonel, Ark. N. G. 
*Peeples, J. A., major, T. N. G 
*Pinney, W. B., captain, Ark. N. G. 

Pitney, C. L., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Platt, C, lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

Prentice, J., lieutenant, A. C. 
*Pringle, J. E., captain, Ark. N. G. 
*Rankin, J., lieutenant, Texas N. G 

Rees, R. I., lieutenant, 3d Infantry. 

Rexach, Ff. C, lieutenant, P. R. P. R. Infantry. 

Rhea, J. C, captain, 7th Cavalry. 
*Rhodes, J. W., lieutenant, Ark. N. G. 

Ristine, B. F., lieutenant, 21st Infantry. 



EDITORS BULLETIN. 

*Schirmacher, T., major, T. N. G. 
Sliney, M. E., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 

*Smith, E. B., chaplain, Governor's Island. 

*Stacy, W. H., major-general, T. N. G. 

*Stayton, R. W., lieutenant-colonel, T. N. G. 

Stoneburn, R. P., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Stroup, H., colonel, Ark. N. G. 
*Swain, G. C, captain, Ark. N. G. 
"Tarkington, A. P., brigadier-general, N. M. N. G. 

Taylor, W. W., Jr., captain, Philippine Scouts. 
*Thomas, W. N., sergeant-major, N. G. Pa. 

Thompson, G. S., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 
*Townsend, A. F., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
♦Tracy, E. H., captain, N. G. N. Y. 
♦True, F. C, captain, N. G. N. Y. 

Turner, G. S., captain, 7th Infantry. 

Van Dusen, J. W., lieutenant Med. Department. 

Ware, J. E., lieutenant, 14th Infantry. 
♦Watkins, W. J., lieutenant, Ark. N. G. 
♦West, C, lieutenant-colonel, N. G. Ok. 

Whitley, F. N., lieutenant, N. G. N. Y. 
♦Whittaker, W., captain, Ark. N. G. 

Whitworth, P., captain, 1st .Infantry. 

Winter, J.G., lieutenant, 6th Cavalry. 
♦Wood, G. H., captain, O. N. G. 

Wray, G. M., lieutenant, Philippine Scouts. 



Acces- 
sions 
to the 
Museum. 



The Museum has received gifts as follows 
Miss Anna Ruger, One Sacred Ghost Dance Banner, 
found by Lieut. D. E. McCarthy, Twelfth Infantry, flying 
at the top of a large cedar tree in the camp of "Big Foot," 
on the Cheyenne River, N. D., February 28, 1891. 

Lieut-Col. Nathan S. Jarvis, M. D., N. G. N. Y., Oil 
Painting by Catlin, of Fort Snelling, Minn., presented by the 
artist, in 1833, to his friend, Surgeon N. S. Jarvis, U. S. A. 



Funeral 
Honors 
to our 
late Pres- 
ident. 



The Ruger Obsequies at West Point, N. Y., were excep- 
tionally interesting, as will appear from the report of the 
Committee representing the Institution at the funeral. 

Governor's Island, N. Y., July 10, 1907. 
To the Secretary, Military Service Institution, 

Governor's Island, N. Y. 
Sir : — I have the honor to submit the following report : 

Upon receipt of news of the death of Maj.-Gen. Thomas 
H. Ruger, U. S. Army, retired, who was President of the 
Military Service Institution, the Senior Vice-President, 
General Alexander S. Webb, immediately called a special 
meeting; of the Executive Committee to meet at the Insti- 



EDITORS BULLETIN, 



289 



tution at 2:00 o'clock p. M. on June 4, 1907, to take action 
towards such official participation of the Institution, in 
connection with the funeral honors, as was deemed due 
its distinguished President. 

Upon motion, duly made, it was directed that a special 
committee, composed of Gen. Alexander S. Webb, Col. H. 
O. S. Heistand and Col. John E. Greer, as official repre- 
sentatives of the Institution, attend the funeral at West 
Point, N. Y., June 6, 1907. The expenses to be borne by 
the Institution. 

The committee, as above constituted, by special arrange- 
ment, met the funeral train as it proceeded from Stamford, 
Conn., to West Point, and traveled with the funeral party. 
Upon arrival at West Point it was learned that, at the 
special request of the family, arrangements had been made 
for a quiet and unostentatious funeral. 

General Ruger had been Superintendent of the Military 
Academy and was held in exceptionally high esteem by 
the Academic Board and the officials of the Institution, 
who were loath to permit his remains to be laid to rest 
without an opportunity for them to testify their respect 
for his memory. The cortege, composed of a hearse and 
three carriages, which had met the party at the ferry land- 
ing, upon arrival in front of the chapel at West Point, 
was there met by the Academic Board and Academy Staff, 
and all of the officers on duty, present, in full dress uni- 
form, with a Company of U. S. Engineers in full dress 
uniform as an escort, with a caisson draped and horse 
properly caparisoned. The senior member of the Academic 
Board present at the Academy, Col. Charles W. Larned, 
speaking for himself and his associates, asked if the mem- 
bers of the Academic Board might not be permitted to 
remove the remains from "the hearse to the caisson and 
that the especial privilege be extended to the members of 
the Academic Board to act in the capacity of honorary 
pall-bearers from that point to the cemetery. The mem- 
bers of the family yielded and permitted, to this extent, 
a military funeral. After the ceremonies at the cemetery, 
the members of your Committee returned immediately to 
their homes. 

Respectfully submitted, 

(Signed) H. O. S. Heistand, 

Chairman. 



Soldier 

and 

Sailor 

in 

Uniform, 

and 

Public 

Opinion. 



The Ames Prize (see full details elsewhere), for the best 
paper on "How May Public Opinion Concerning the Army 
and Navy be so Educated as to Secure to the Soldier and 
Sailor in Uniform the Consideration Ordinarily Accorded to 
the Civilian," will doubtless bring out some interesting views 
on this important subject. Essays submitted to August 10th 
are "Truth" and "Pro Patria et Gloria." The competition 
will close October 1st, next. 




THE JOURNAL 

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER. 1907 



Journal 

of the 

Military 

Service 

Institution 

18T8 

190T 




OMB papers approved for early publication 
in the JOURNAL: 

I. "THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEAVY 

ORDNANCE." By Lieut.=Colonel Rogers 

Birnie, Ordnance Dept., U.S.A. (111.) Read before 

the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., July 30, 1907. 



II. "THE GARRISON RATION: HOW TO IMPROVE IT. 

Captain Arthur M. Edwards, Subsistence' Department. 



By 



HI. "ESSAY ON FIELD ARTILLERY." By Gen. Langlois. Trans- 
lated by Captain S. Seay, 23d Infantry (for General Staff). 

IV. "TEACHING INFANTRY AND CAVALRY THE VALUE 
AND MEANING OF ARTILLERY ACTION." (Translated from 
the Russian for the M. I D. General Staff.) 

V. "TRANSMISSION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE." III. 
(Illustrated.) By Lieut.=Colonel G. P. Scriven, Signal Corps. (Continued 
from September number.) 

VI. "THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR CAVALRY HORSE." By 

M. F. de la Rue. (In type.) 



VII. TYPES AND TRADITIONS OF THE OLD ARMY. "THE 
REGULAR ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG": I. "Cushing's 
Battery." By Lieut.=Col. F. Fuger, U.S.A. (retired). H. "Davison's 
Battery." By Lieut. Jas. Stewart, 4th U. S. Artillery. (Illustrated.) 



Governor's 

Island 

N. Y. H. 



THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE invites contributions 
of original papers, translations and comments upon current 
topics. Attention is called to "Gold Medal," "Seaman," 
" Short Paper," and "Santiago" prizes described elsewhere. 



290 



Ube flIMlitar\> Service Institution* 



HONORARY MEMBERS. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Ex-President Grover Cleveland, LL.D. 

The Secretary of War. The Lieutenant-General. 



OFFICERS AND COUNCIL. 

President. 
(Vacancy.) 

Resident Vice-Presidents. 
Bvt.-Major Gen. A. S. Webb (late), U. S. A. Major-Gen. F. D. Grant, U.S.A. 



Secretary. 
Brig. -Gen. T. F. Rodenbough, U. S. A. 



Asst. Secretary. 

(Vacancy.) 



Treasurer. 
Col. J. G. D. Knight, Corps of Engineers. 

Vice- Treasurer. 
(Vacancy.) 



Executive Council. 



Term ending 1909. 
Colonel G. S. Anderson, Gen. Staff. 
Lieut.-Col. W. P. Evans, Eleventh Infantry. 
Colonel J. E. Greer, Ordnance Dept. 
Major C. E. Ly decker, N. G. N. Y. 
Lieut.-Col. G. P. Scriven, Signal Corps. 



Term ending 191 1. 
Col. L. C. Allen, Twelfth Infantry. 
Captain F. W. Coe, Artillery Corps. 
Capt. T. H. Low, U. S. Marine Corps. 
Major J. S. Mallory, Twelfth Infantry. 
Major W. L. Kenly, Field Artillery. 



Finance Committee. 
Gen. Webb. 
Col. Allen. 
Lieut.-Col. Scriven. 



Term ending 191 3. 

Colonel E. E. Britton, N. G. N. Y. 
Colonel M.Crawford, Artillery Corps. 
Colonel H. O. S. Heist and, Military Sec'y. 
Lieut.-Col. S. F. Allen, Coast Artillery. 



Publication Committee. 
Gen. Rodenbough. 
Col. Greer. 

Col. Crawford. 
Major Mallory. 



CORRESPONDING MEMBERS OF COUNCIL. 



Major John Bigelow, Jr., U. S. A. (retired). 

Lieut. -Col. W. M. Black, Corps of Engineers. 

Major A. P. Blocksom (Cav.), In. Gen. Dept. 
. Capt. G. M. Brooke, Artillery Corps. 

Major W. C. Brown, Third Cavalry. 

Lieut.-Col. R. L. Bullard, Eighth Infantry. 
'C 3 lonel J. H. Calef, U. S. A. (retired). 

Lieut.-Col. C. J. Crane, Adj't-Gen. Dept 

Brig -Gen. F. S. Dodge, U. S. A. (retired). 

Major F. R. Drake, A.D.C., Nat'l Guard, Pa. 

Brig.-Gen. W. S. Edgerly, U. S. A. 

Capt. P. E. Traub, 



Capt. A. P. S. Hyde, Artillery Corps. 
Capt. E. M. Johnson, Eighth Infantry. 
Major W. H. Johnston, Philippine Scouts. 
Capt. J. H. Parker, Twenty-eighth Infantry. 
Col. J. W. Powell, U. S. A. (retired). 
Capt. W. C. Rivers, First Cavalry. 
Capt. J. Ronayne, Twenty-eighth Infantry. 
Lieut.-Col. A. C. Sharpe, Thirtieth Infantry. 
Capt. J. A. Shipton, Artillery Corps. 
Lieut. -Col. A. Slaker, Artillery Corps. 
Capt. M. F. Steele, Sixth Cavalry. 
Thirteenth Cavalry. 



MEMBERSHIP AND DUES. 

Membership dates from the first day of the calendar year in which the "application" is made, 
unless such application is made after October 1st when the membership dates from the first 
day of the next calendar year. 

Initiation fee and dues for first year $2.50; the same amount annually for five years subse- 
quently. After that two dollars per year. This includes the Journal. Life membership $50 

NOTE. — Checks and Money Orders should be drawn to order of, and 
addressed to, " The Treasurer Military Service Institution," Governor's 
Island, New York City. Yearly dues include Journal. 

No Address changed without Notice. 



291 




$^^$$^$$^$$$$^^^^<<t^^^$^^^^^$^$$^$$$^ 



<5olb /Ifoe6al— X907. 



\ 



First Prize— Gold Medal, $100 and Life 
Membership. 

Second Prize— Silver Medal, Honorable 
Mention and $50. 

I. — The following Resolution of Council is published for the 
information of all concerned: 

Resolved, That a Prize of a Gold Medal, together with $100 and a Certificate 
of Life Membership, be offered annually by The Military Service Institu- 
tion of the United States for the best essay on a military topic of current 
interest, the subject to be selected by the Executive Council, and a Silver 
Medal and $50 to the first honorably mentioned essay. Should either prize 
be awarded more than once to the same person, then for each award after 
the first, a Clasp shall be awarded in place of the medal. 

1. Competition to be open to all persons eligible to membership. 

2. Each competitor shall send three copies of his essay in a sealed envelope 
to reach the Secretary on or before January 1, 1908. The essay must be 
strictly anonymous, but the author shall adopt some nom de plume and sign 
the same to the essay, followed by a figure corresponding with the number 
of pages of MS.; a sealed envelope bearing the nom de plume on the outside 
and enclosing full name and address, should accompany the essay. This 
envelope to be opened in the presence of the Council after the decision of the 
Board of Award has been received. 

3. The prize shall be awarded upon the recommendation of a Board con- 
sisting of three suitable persons chosen by the Executive Council, who will be 
requested to designate the essay deemed worthy of the prize; and also in their 
order of merit those deserving of honorable mention. 

In determining the»essay worthy of the prize, the Board will be requested to 
consider its professional excellence, usefulness and valuable originality, as of 
the first importance, and its literary merit as of the second importance. Should 
members of the Board determine that no essay is worthy of the prize, they 
may designate one or more essays simply as of honorable mention ; in either 
case, they will be requested to designate one essay as first honorable mention. 
Should the Board deem proper, it may recommend neither prize nor ho»orable 
mention. Should it be so desired, the recommendation of individual mem- 
bers will be considered as confidential by the Council. 

4. The successful essayshall be ptiblished in the Journal of the Institution, and 
the essays deemed worthy of honorable mention shall be read before the Insti- 
tution, or published, at the discretion of the Council, which reserves the right to 
publish any other essay submitted for a prize, omitting marks of competition. 

5. Essays must not exceed ten thousand words, or twenty-five pages of 
the size and style of the Journal (exclusive of tables), nor contain less than 
five thousand words. 

II. — The Subject selected for the Prize Essay of 1907 is 

"THE MILITARY NECESSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES 

AND THE BEST PROVISIONS FOR MEETING THEM-" 



III. — The Board of Award is named as followa: 

Major-General, JOHN P. STORY, U. S. A. 
Brig.-General, WILLIAM H. CARTER, U. S. A. 
Brig.-General, THOMAS H. BARRY, U. S. A. 



Governor's Island, N. Y 
Jan. i, 1907. 



T. F. RODENBOUGH, 

Secretary. 



&$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$€$ 



292 



OTHER ANNUAL PRIZES. 



THE SEAMAN PRIZE. 

(Founded by Major L. L. Seaman, M.D., LL.B., late Surgeon, U. S. V.) 
First Prise. One Hundred Dollars. 

Second Prise. Fifty Dollars. 

For best two essays on a subject selected by Major Seaman and approved 
by Council; competition open to all officers and ex-officers of Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, Marine Hospital Service, Volunteers or National Guard; in 
other respects same as Gold Medal prize except that essays are limited to 
15,000 words, and are due November 1. 

Subject for 1907: (Relates to West Point and Annapolis only) 
" The Scope of Teaching that should be followed in the newly established Chair 
of Hygiene and Sanitation in our Military and Naval Schools, and the 
practical results to be expected therefrom." 

THE SANTIAGO PRIZE. 

(Founded by the National Society of the Army of Santiago de Cuba.) 

Fifty Dollars. 

For "best article upon matters tending to increase the efficiency of the 
individual soldier, squad, company, troop or battery," published in the 
Journal M. S. I. during a twelvemonth; awarded upon recommendation 
of Board selected by President N. S. A. S. C. ; competition limited to officers 
of the Army and National Guard below grade of Lieut. Colonel ; essays not 
less than 1,000 nor more than 5,000 words; due December 1. 

SHORT PAPER PRIZES, 

HANCOCK PRIZE Fifty Dollars. 

For best short paper on matters affecting the Line of the Army (due <£ 
May 1). 

FRY PRIZE Fifty Dollars. 

For best short paper on matters affecting the General Service not cov- 
ered by Hancock Prize (due Sept. 1). 

Essays to be not less than 1,500 nor more than 3,500 words published 
in the Journal during twelve months. 

293 



THE AMES PRIZE. 

(Offered by Major General Adelbert Ames (late) U. S. V.) 

FIFTY DOLLARS 



For the best essay on the following subject: 

"How may Public Opinion concerning the Army 
and Navy be so Educated as to secure to the Soldier 
and Sailor in uniform the consideration ordinarily 
accorded to the Civilian?" 

Competition open to all persons eligible to Membership, or 
Associate Membership in the Military Service Institution; essays 
limited to 5,000 words; due October 1, 1907; conditions in other 
respects same as Gold Medal. 

The Board selected to determine the relative merits of essays 
submitted is as follows : 

Gen. Thomas E. Hubbard (late) U. S. Volunteers. 
Capt. Conway H. Arnold, United States Navy. 
Gen. Horatio C. King (late) National Guard, N. Y. 

Governor's Island, N. Y., T. F. RODENBOUGH, 

April 10, 1907. Secretary. 



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Medium to finest qualities. 



Mail orders promptly executed. Correspondence solicited. 



Schcabway <& \()&{£>heeb J^Sl 



"QUALITY EXCELLENT" 

According to the report of the MASSACHUSETTS STATE 
BOARD OF HEALTH in their inspection of the 

CANNED MEATS 



. . OF . . . 



RICHARDSON & ROBBINS 

Dover, Del. 

Care and Cleanliness, not excelled in any private kitchen, govern 
their packing and make them 



FIT TO EAT 



The following quotations from the Boston Transcript of July 1 1 



POTTED TONGUE 

(4) Richardson & Robbins, Dover, Del. 
Appearance good ; muscular fibre, abund= 
ant ; contains neither epidermis nor sali= 
vary gland. Quality excellent. 



POTTED HAM 

(4) Richardson & Robbins, Dover, Del. 
Almost wholly muscular fibre. Quality, 
excellent. 



POTTED HAM AND CHICKEN 

(1) Richardson & Robbins, Dover, Del. 
Muscular fibre of two kinds; very little fat. 
Quality excellent. 

POTTED CHICKEN 

(?) Richardson & Robbins, Dover, Del. 
Chiefly muscular fibre, with small amount 
of fat. Quality excellent. 

BONED CHICKEN 

(8) Richardson & Robbins, Dover, Del. 
Appearance and general character excellent. 



Alexander 

For Men, Women and Children 



We refer to hundreds of Army and 
Navy Officers who wear no other make 



SIXTH 

AVENUE 



Shoes 



N. E. CORNER 
19th STREET 



New York 




The GOERZsi'" 1 * 1 
ARMY 



BINOCULAR 



IS ESPECIALLY CON- 
STRUCTED TO MEET THE 
MOST EXACTING SERVICE 
REQUIREMENTS 



Officially adopted by the English, German, Russian and Por- 
tuguese Governments. Was used to the exclusion of nearly all 
others by the Russian and Japanese officers in the Far East. 
Exclusively used by the various departments of the U. S. 
Government. 
TO ALL OFFICERS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 
WE OFFER THESE GLASSES AT GOVERNMENT PRICES 

Write for descriptive pamphlet to 

C. P. GOERZ AMERICAN OPTICAL COMPANY 
Heyworth Bldg'., CHICAGO 35 Union Square, NEW YORK 

Berlin London Paris St. Petersburg 



Summer Uniforms 




MADE BY 



ARMSTRONG 



We make the service coat after the 
Winter pattern when so ordered. 

ARMSTRONG I 
White Serge Uniforms 

are the handsomest garments worn 
Service Uniform White Uniform 

CATALOGUE AND SAMPLES ON REQUEST 

E. A. ARMSTRONG MFG. Co. 

o P p. Auditorium 315 to 321 Wabash Ave., Chicago 





The 

Remington 

Typewriter 



is the standard of the world, by 
which all others are measured. 

Remington Typewriter Company 



(Incorporated) 



New York and Everywhere 



WISIOOr BALLBHBB<H WAWXHUI U>„ KIW XOBlta 




Absolutely Pure. 



Its perfect purity and great leavening strength assure 
the finest, most delicious and wholesome food. Its 
exclusive use safeguards the food against alum, phos- 
phate of lime and all other baking powder adulterants. 

Royal is the only baking powder made 
with Royal Grape Cream of Tartar, and 

hence in purity, strength and health- 
fulness is unapproachable by any other 
baking powder or leavening agent. 



ROYAL BAKING POWDER CO., NEW YORK 



I 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




019 648 437 1 



